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ABSTRACT
This study examined how transparency of an intelligent agent's reasoning affected
complacent behavior in a route selection task in a simulated environment. Also examined
was how the information available to the operator affected those results.
In two experiments, participants supervised a three-vehicle convoy as it traversed
a simulated environment and re-routed the convoy when needed with the assistance of an
intelligent agent, RoboLeader.

Participants were randomly assigned to an Agent

Reasoning Transparency condition.

Participants received communications from a

commander confirming either the presence or absence of activity in the area. They also
received information regarding potential events along their route via icons that appeared
on a map displaying the convoy route and surrounding area. Participants in Experiment 1
(low information setting) received information about their current route only; they did not
receive any information about the suggested alternate route. Participants in Experiment 2
(high information setting) received information about both their current route and the agent
recommended an alternative route.
In the first experiment, access to agent reasoning was found to be an effective
deterrent to complacent behavior when the operator has limited information about their
task environment. However, the addition of information that created ambiguity for the
operator encouraged complacency, resulting in reduced performance and poorer trust
calibration. Agent reasoning did not increase response time or workload and appeared to
have improved performance on the secondary task. These findings align with studies that
have shown ambiguous information can increase workload and encourage complacency,
iii

as such, caution should be exercised when considering how transparent to make agent
reasoning and what information should be included.
In the second experiment, access to agent reasoning was found to have little effect
on complacent behavior when the operator had complete information about the task
environment. However, the addition of information that created ambiguity for the operator
appeared to encourage complacency, as indicated by reduced performance and shorter
decision times. Agent reasoning transparency did not increase overall workload, and
operators reported higher satisfaction with their performance and reduced mental demand.
Access to agent reasoning did not improve operators’ secondary task performance,
situation awareness, or operator trust. However, when agent reasoning transparency
included ambiguous information complacent behavior was again encouraged. Unlike the
first experiment, there were notable differences in complacent behavior, performance,
operator trust, and situation awareness due to individual difference factors. As such, these
findings would suggest that when the operator has complete information regarding their
task environment, access to agent reasoning may be beneficial, but not dramatically so.
However, individual difference factors will greatly influence performance outcomes.
The amount of information the operator has regarding the task environment has a
profound effect on the proper use of the agent. Increased environmental information
resulted in more rejections of the agent recommendation regardless of the transparency of
agent reasoning. The addition of agent reasoning transparency appeared to be effective at
keeping the operator engaged, while complacent behavior appeared to be encouraged both
when agent reasoning was either not transparent or so transparent as to become ambiguous.
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Even so, operators reported lower trust and usability for the agent than when environmental
information was limited. Situation awareness (SA2) scores were also higher in the high
information environment when agent reasoning was either not transparent or so transparent
as to become ambiguous, compared to the low information environment. However, when
a moderate amount of agent reasoning was available to the operator, the amount of
information available to the operator had no effect on the operators’ complacent behavior,
subjective trust, or SA.

These findings indicate that some negative outcomes resulting

from the incongruous transparency of agent reasoning may be mitigated by increasing the
information the operator has regarding the task environment.
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This work is dedicated to everyone who sets their own dreams aside while
supporting others’ dreams, and to my daughter Brittany, who helped me realize why my
dreams are important too.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
A soldier on the battlefield is often required to conduct multiple concurrent tasks.
These include demands such as maintaining local security, identifying and assessing threats
and maintaining situation awareness (SA) (Barnes, Chen, Jentsch, & Haas, 2006; Chen,
Durlach, Sloan, & Bowens, 2008; Hancock & Szalma, 2008). Employing robotic assets to
assist in these respective duties permits the soldier to manage such multiple tasks as they
increase in complexity.

However, contemporary research shows that one operator

managing multiple robotic assets suffers from performance decrement, reduced SA, and
increased workload (Chen et al., 2008; Lewis, 2013; Wang, Lewis, Velagapudi, Scerri, &
Sycara, 2009). In response to these concerns, an intelligent agent, “RoboLeader” (RL), has
been developed to assist in the management of a team of supportive robots (Chen, Barnes,
& Qu, 2010). Studies on this technology have indicated that using an intelligent agent as
the mediator of the robotic team helps to improve operators’ performance, SA, and
decrease associated workload (Chen & Joyner, 2009; Chen & Terrence, 2009). However,
in a recent RoboLeader study (Wright et al., 2013), operator performance degraded at the
highest level of agent assistance. This might be due to the occurrence of automationinduced complacency (see Parasuraman, Molloy, & Singh, 1993; Parasuraman, Sheridan,
& Wickens, 2000). Whether this behavior was due to premature cognitive commitment
(Langer, 1989), some other complacent behavior, such as automation bias, or if the operator
understood they had insufficient knowledge to appropriately override the automation
remained unclear.

What is clear is that there is still much to learn about human

performance issues associated with human-agent teaming.
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In the realm of human-automation interaction, a current topic of investigation is the
quality of the interaction between the human operator and automated systems, specifically,
how the operators’ understanding of the system’s actions affect their performance, and
what qualities are contained within the automated system that might enhance this
interaction. This area of interest is referred to as ‘transparency’, but presently there is no
consensus on exactly how it should be defined. Transparency has been described both as
something the automation provides (whether by design or by behavior) (Cramer, et al.,
2008; Cuevas, Fiore, Caldwell, & Strater, 2007; Kim & Hinds, 2006), and as the
understanding or knowledge an operator has regarding the systems performance, behavior,
or internal state (Cheverst et al., 2005; Cring & Lenfestey, 2009; Jameson, Baldes, Bauer,
& Kroner 2004). Regardless of the definition used, it is agreed that the lack of transparency
within human-automation interaction negatively impacts operator performance.
Appropriate levels of transparency between the human and the agent must be
present to enhance the effectiveness of the interaction. However, no quantitative method
for defining and assessing agent transparency yet exists. To address this need, a model of
Situation awareness-based Agent Transparency (SAT; Chen et al., 2014) has been
developed. This model defines agent transparency (AT) as “the descriptive quality of an
interface pertaining to its abilities to afford an operator’s comprehension about an
intelligent agent’s intent, performance, future plans, and reasoning process.” The SAT
model has levels that approximately correspond to Endsley’s (1995) situation awareness
(SA) model. However, it also incorporates Lee and See’s (2004) “three P’s” (i.e., purpose,
process, and performance) for human-agent trust development, the Beliefs, Desires,
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Intentions (BDI) Agent Framework (Rao & Georgeff, 1995), as well as findings from
recent studies (Chen & Barnes, 2012a, 2012b; Chen & Barnes, 2014; Cring & Lenfestey,
2009; Lyons & Havig, 2014).
This dissertation proposes to investigate performance associated with human-agent
teaming as it pertains to appropriate agent transparency. This evaluation is set within the
framework of the SAT model. Current Department of Defense (DoD) research (Mercado
et al., in press; Boyce et al., in press) has explored the relationship between access to agent
reasoning and decision-making, within the framework of the SAT model, in static singletask conditions. The present research investigated such factors but used a dynamic, multitasking simulation that emulated a real-world military environment.
Thus, this research addresses the following questions:
1. How does increased knowledge of the task environment affect an operator’s
performance, situation awareness, workload, and trust in an agent, such as
RoboLeader?
2. How does increased access to the agent’s reasoning affect operator’s
performance, situation awareness, workload, and trust?
3. Does increased knowledge of the task environment reduce the need for
access to agent reasoning?
4. Does increased access to agent reasoning reduce complacency?
5. Do individuals with low attentional control, low spatial ability, or low
working memory capacity have an increased need for access to agent
reasoning?
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Accrued results are expected to elucidate how the operators’ knowledge of the task
environment interacts with their understanding of agent reasoning to create ‘transparency,'
as well as how increased access to the reasoning behind automation ‘decisions’ affects a
human operators’ ability to interact effectively with said automation. While insufficient
transparency may hinder operator trust in the automation, too much transparency may also
have detrimental effects on operator performance, situation awareness, and decisionmaking by encouraging complacent behavior.

This work will also investigate how

individual difference factors influence the human-agent relationship in terms of
transparency, and the subsequent effect on related human performance issues.
The findings of this work are expected to expand the current understanding as to
how agent transparency exerts influence; identify the role operator knowledge and access
to agent reasoning have in the interaction that creates the emergent construct
‘transparency,’ and how transparency should be evaluated from both a system and an
operator’s standpoints. These findings may serve to benefit human-automation research
directly, but also promises to inform system designers, as well as guide operator training
and performance evaluations.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
What is Automation?
References to automation date as far back as Ancient Greece, with tales of the god
Hephaestus creating automatons to work in his smithy (Graves, 1960, p. 150). Automatons
represent mechanical devices that, once started, complete a predetermined function,
movement sequence or series of movement sequences on their own (Koetsier, 2001).
Homer’s description of self-opening doors in the Iliad, Plato’s praise for Daedalus’ moving
sculptures (Automatones, n.d.), and Ktesibios’ water-powered automata, including the first
cuckoo clock, all appear in writings of the period that pre-date the birth of Christ (Pollard
& Reid, 2007, p. 132). Hellenistic automata were designed as both tools and toys, meant
to empower but primarily to entertain (Automatones, n.d.).
Early medieval automata were almost exclusively for entertainment. Eighth and
ninth century Bagdad boasted many such automata, i.e., wind-powered statues, artificial
animals, even a programmable flute player (Koetsier, 2001). In thirteenth century Italy,
Count Robert II’s reconstruction of the castle at Hesdin included plans for an elaborate
park, containing many examples of mechanized fountains, sundials, and animals (Truitt,
2010). However, the earliest conception of automata as tools would not reoccur until the
Renaissance.
Early Renaissance automata did continue to serve mostly as entertainment.
However, the transition to from toy to tool had begun. Mechanical clocks and carillon
appeared in the 1300’s (Koetsier, 2001). It could reasonably be argued that Turriano’s
mechanical monk (circa 1560) is an example of a tool rather than a toy, an ‘automatic
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prayer machine’ (King, 2002), since the predominant religious view of that era held that
prayers yielded tangible results, and in fact, the church ran a lively business in which people
paid to have masses said for their beloved dead. Advancement in clockwork inspired early
philosophers (Koetsier, 2001), as evidenced by Dr. John Dee’s Wheeling Beetle (circa
1547) (Coovert & Thompson, 2014; Hancock, 2009), and in the seventeenth century
Descartes’ ‘The World’ was published (Descartes, 1998/1664). The notion of the ‘body as
a machine’ seemed to captivate artisans, and automata began to emulate life in great detail,
as evidenced by de Gennes’ eating peacock (Ancient Toys, 1887) and later, Vaucanson’s
digesting duck (Riskin, 2003) and Merlin’s Silver Swan (The Silver Swan, n.d.). However,
the ‘body as a machine’ idea also appears to have spurred an intuitive leap, in terms of
automation development. Here, the emphasis in automation design began to evolve from
mere entertainment to much more practical concerns.
In the eighteenth century, the development of automation for practical purposes
increased dramatically, both in quantity and diversity. One of the most accepted of current
definitions of automation is “the use of electronic or mechanical devices to replace human
labor” (Sheridan, 2002). Although the term ‘automation’ was not coined until the 1950’s
(see Sheridan, 2002, p. 9), examples of automated systems (as per Sheridan’s definition)
appear as far back as the 18th century (Bennett, 1996; Sheridan, 2002). During the era now
known as the Industrial Revolution, automated systems were developed to resolve laborintensive tasks, such as spinning yarn or cleaning cotton, thus increasing production rates
while decreasing manual labor requirements (Bennett, 1996; Sheridan, 2002, p. 10). The
invention (and refinement) of the steam engine created a portable power source for such
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new machinery. Modern automation was developed as a method to free humans from
performing tasks for which they are ill-suited, and in the process, their role changed from
that of the laborer to periodic ‘supervisor’ (Fitts et al., 1951).
While automation initially was intended for tasks that were tedious, repetitive, or
requiring vigilance to perform precisely and consistently, over time it became the panacea
that allowed humans access to new dimensions of operation (e.g., complex mathematical
computations), as well as enable humans to work in unsuitable environments (e.g.,
gathering soil samples inside volcanic craters). Today automation encompasses not only
physical workload but mental workload as well, including such aspects as decision making
(Sheridan, 2002). As systems continue to become more autonomous the role of humans in
such human-automation systems is shifting once again, from that of periodic supervisor,
where they still need to oversee and occasionally intervene in the process, to a level of pure
administration, in which they oversee multiple systems and do not (typically) become
involved in the direct operations of any.
Early automation was little more than mechanization of specific tasks, with the
human operator still very involved in the production process, so much so that at times he
appeared to be part of the machine itself (Figure 1). Once the notion of having machines
perform the work of humans took hold, the next step in development was to have the
machines perform the work in the same manner as the human. The eighteenth century saw
the appearance of the feedback control mechanism and the development of various forms
of governors, which allowed automatic adjustments to processes (Bennett, 1996). The
Analytical Engine, the first programmable calculating machine, was designed by Babbage
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in the early nineteenth century. Babbage’s machine programming used punch cards to
direct the machine in specifying and performing a series of tasks. However, Babbage never
created a completed machine, and the programmable calculator was forgotten until the
1940s when Zuse built his version (Koetsier, 2001). As advancements in automation were
made, the ability to have the automation carry out multiple, successive tasks became a
reality.

Figure 1. Chinese drawloom, circa Han Dynasty. The loom mechanized the task of raising and
lowering the warp, creating space for the passage of the weft. The 'draw boy' keeps the strings
separated while the weaver (seated) operates the loom (Koetsier, 2001).

Once automated systems began to imitate how humans work, both in the ability to
perform successive tasks and the ability to alter task sequence, a new problem arose.
Specifically, this was the problem of which tasks should be assigned to the automation and
which to the human operator. Researchers have struggled to identify an optimal method
for determining task assignment (machine or man) for many years (Chapanis, 1965; Fitts
et al., 1951; Sheridan, 2006). Often they resort to some type of ‘Men Are Better At,
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Machines Are Better At’ (MABA-MABA; Fitts et al., 1951) function allocation list meant
to equate a degree or level of automation with some perceived justification based on system
performance (e.g., Endsley & Kaber, 1999; Parasuraman, Sheridan, & Wickens, 2000;
Sheridan, 2000). One example of an MABA-MABA list is the ‘Ten Levels of Automation
of Decision and Action Selection’ model (Table 1; Parasuraman et al., 2000), which defines
automation as varying along a continuum of levels, with each level specifying which
responsibilities are assigned to the human and which to the automation. While the lowest
levels have the human maintaining authority and executing all actions, at each successive
level the automation increasingly becomes more autonomous. At the highest level, the
automation is completely autonomous, making decisions and carrying out actions without
human input or approval. Thus, as the automation level increases, the responsibilities of
the human operator decrease, until at the highest level of automation the human no longer
has a role (see Table 1).
Table 1. Levels of automation of decision and action selection (Parasuraman et al., 2000).

Automation at any level can have both beneficial and detrimental effects on human
performance (Parasuraman & Mouloua, 1996; Parasuraman & Riley, 1997).
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As

automation levels increase, increased automation-induced complacency and reduced
situation awareness become particularly problematic, as the human operator falls ‘out of
the loop’ (Endsley, 1996; Parasuraman, Molloy, & Singh, 1993). While the MABAMABA lists have demonstrated some utility in system design, they have many
shortcomings (Bainbridge, 1983; Dekker & Woods, 2002; Fuld, 2000). This has led some
researchers to conclude that their use should be abandoned in favor of a more humancentered design that would stress the importance of the human-machine relationship
becoming more synergistic, rather than a dichotomous assignment of specific tasks (Boy,
2014; Dekker & Woods, 2002; Hancock & Chignell, 1993; Marras & Hancock, 2014).
Issues in Automation
Automation-induced Complacency
Complacency has been defined as “self-satisfaction which may result in nonvigilance based on an unjustified assumption of satisfactory system state” (Billings,
Lauber, Funkhouser, Lyman, & Huff, 1976). According to this definition, the human
operator adopts the assumption that all is as it should be [with the automation], even
without evidence that this is true. They thus become less diligent in their supervision of
the automation. Initially considered to be a result of boredom, more recent studies have
indicated that complacency and boredom are distinct and separate constructs (Parasuraman
et al., 1993). Automation-induced complacency is thought to occur when conditions are
such that the operator’s trait complacency combines with task conditions that favor such
complacent behavior, typically in multitasking environments when an operator must divide
their attention across multiple tasks.

Therefore, when discussing complacency, a
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distinction must be made between the propensity for complacency and actual complacent
behavior.
Complacency potential is a trait of the user and evidenced in their attitude towards
(i.e., trust in, reliance upon and confidence in) automation (Parasuraman, Molloy, & Singh,
1993).

Langer (1989) described this concept as a form of premature cognitive

commitment. It is an attitude based on prior exposure and reinforced when following
encounters are similar to the first (i.e., routine, repetition). Once such attitudes are formed,
they become the basis for future actions, often without further thought or analysis. The
Complacency Potential Rating Scale (Pop & Stearman, in review; Singh, Molloy, &
Parasuraman, 1993) has been shown to be effective in distinguishing between complacency
potential and more generalized attitudes towards automation. It is used here to assess
participants’ trait attitude towards automation.
Complacent behavior occurs when factors create conditions that favor inaction (or
continued repetitive action) on the part of the operator. Complacent behavior may be
expressed in many ways, e.g., failing to follow all steps in set procedures, or overload
condition causing the operator to attend to one task while (erroneously) entrusting the less
than perfectly reliable automation to carry out another (Parasuraman et al., 1993).
Complacent behavior could also be described as a manifestation of inappropriate trust,
particularly overtrust. Operator inexperience, high workload, and consistently reliable
systems encourage such overtrust, resulting in more complacent behavior (Chen & Barnes,
2010; Lee & See, 2004; Parasuraman, Molloy, & Singh, 1993). Complacent behavior is
operationalized here as accepting RoboLeader’s route suggestion when it is not correct.
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Situation Awareness
Situation awareness (SA) was first conceptualized during World War I (Gilson,
1995). It has been a contentious topic ever since, as it tends to be a highly subjective
construct which researchers have yet to agree on how to define and operationalize (see
Dekker, Hummerdal, & Smith, 2010; Flach, 1995; Gilson, 1995; Sarter & Woods, 1991;
Smith & Hancock, 1995). In spite of this debate, there does appear to be some consensus
that SA is a useful construct that appears to hold utility for both researchers and designers
(Gilson, 1995; Parasuraman, Sheridan, & Wickens, 2008; Stanton, Chambers, & Piggott,
2001).

Three predominant theories of situation awareness appear in the literature.

Respectively, these are a reflective process-driven model based on Russian psychology
(Bedny & Meister, 1999), an embedded world model (Smith & Hancock, 1995), and a
three-level model for assessing SA (Endsley, 1995). These models describe different
aspects of SA, and while none of the theories alone operationalize and quantify SA
completely, the combination of the three appears to address all of the various aspects of
SA (i.e., individual cognitive processes, interaction with the environment, and final
output/assessment). While the two former models focus on the process of acquiring and
maintaining SA, the latter focusses on SA assessment (Stanton, Chambers, & Piggott,
2001).
The reflective process-driven model proposed by Bedny and Meister (1999)
focuses on internal mental activity and how the cognitive functions interact to form an
understanding of situations and events. They refer to the overall process as ‘operative
reflection’, and describe it as “[Operative reflection] provides dynamic orientation in a
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situation, the opportunity to reflect not only on the present but the past and future, as well
as not only actual but potential features of situations. This dynamic reflection contains
logical-conceptual, imaginative, conscious and unconscious components. Based on these,
individuals developmental models of external events” (p. 71). This is not a model of SA
per se, but activity theory (Bedny & Meister, 1999). The authors proposed that SA is
included in the model, distributed over several ‘blocks’ and created via the interaction of
these blocks, and they contend that is a more comprehensive manner in which to address
SA than the other theories. However, there appear to be a number of intuitive leaps
embedded in their model that are not addressed. Thus the blocks they say constitute SA
are not connected in the model, so how these blocks interact remains unspecified. This
theory does not offer a viable construct of SA, so as such its utility as an experimental tool
is limited.
The embedded world theory of SA proposed by Smith and Hancock (1995)
emphasizes the dynamic nature of the ongoing interaction between an individual and their
environment, and defines SA as “adaptive, externally directed consciousness.” This is
later explained in more detail as “[SA is] the invariant [that] codifies the information that
the environment may make available, the knowledge the agent requires to assess that
information, and the action the knowledge will direct the agent to take to attain its goals”
(Smith & Hancock, 1995, p. 141). Here, SA is an ever-changing emergent property of the
interaction between the environment and an individual’s consciousness rather than a
measurable artifice of an individual’s consciousness. While this definition and description
of SA captures the essence of what SA is, it has limited utility as an experimental construct,
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mainly due to its breadth. Interestingly, this theory appears to compliment and complete
the product model of SA (Endsley, 1995).
The product model of SA takes care to distinguish state situation awareness from
the process of acquiring SA, thus also distinguishing itself from the former theories. Here
situation awareness (SA) is defined as “the perception of the elements in the environment
within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection
of their status in the near future” (Endsley, 1988, 1995). This model describes SA as
something contained within the individual, separate from yet influenced by individual
differences, as well as a function of system design (environment) (see Hancock & Diaz,
2002). This model has been operationalized into ‘levels,’ with each level distinct from the
others, yet having a cumulative nature (e.g., in that level 3 SA cannot be attained without
first achieving level 1 SA). However, to what degree each level must be achieved before
the next is attainable is not well defined, and this may well be variable dependent on task
complexity. This model of SA is used here to quantify how well access to information and
reasoning support the participant during mission completion.
Although we attempt to assess SA at a single point in time, SA is not acquired
instantly but developed over time (Endsley, 1995). Time is often a critical aspect of SA,
both in understanding when an event will occur in the future as well as assessing how
relevant information is to the current state. Time is particularly impactful on levels 2 and
3 SA (see Endsley, 1995) as these incorporate understanding of the past to present state
awareness for comprehension and projection of future states. Temporal understanding can
be critical in dynamic environments, where the operator may have to change strategies in
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order to maintain situation awareness (Endsley, 1988; 1995). Here, knowledge of when a
piece of information was received is manipulated in order to introduce uncertainty
regarding the relevance of that information. I hypothesize that such uncertainty will be
negatively related to the operator’s SA.
At each increasing level of automation, the operator becomes more removed from
the inner loop of control as their role changes from actor to supervisor. This distance
eventually creates an ‘out-of-the-loop’ condition that leads to reduced operator SA (Chen
& Barnes, 2010; Chen & Joyner, 2009; Endsley, 1995; Parasuraman et al., 1993). To avoid
this loss of SA, an intermediate level of automation has been recommended to keep the
operator engaged. Endsley and Kiris (1995) found this to be partially effective, whereas
as the level of automation increased operators’ level 1 SA improved, but their level 2 SA
did not. This finding indicated the increase in the level of automation encourages a change
from active engagement with the automation to a more passive engagement, which can
result in reduced understanding. This threatens task effectiveness when comprehension
and problem-solving are crucial. In this work, the agent’s level of automation is kept at an
intermediate level of autonomy, in order to control the effects of information and reasoning
with varying automation influences.
Autonomy
Unlike automated systems, which follows scripts in which all possible courses of
action have already been determined, autonomous systems exercise a degree of choice
regarding their actions. They do this using information gathered rather than relying
exclusively on information supplied at the design stage (Russell & Norvig, 2003). The
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Department of Defense (DoD) defines autonomy as “a capability (or a set of capabilities)
that enables a particular action of a system to be automatic or, within programmed
boundaries, ‘self-governing’” (Murphy & Shields, 2012). This definition advances the
terms, ‘automatic’ as a trait of an automatic (scripted) system, whereas ‘self-governing’ is
necessarily a trait of an autonomous system. Such confusion is commonplace in discussions
of automatic and autonomous systems.

To disambiguate such terms, we look to

Parasuraman et al.’s (2000) model, which defines automation in regards to two particular
aspects of human information processing (see also Manzey, Reichenbach, & Onnasch,
2012). First, how thoroughly the automation supports the four stages of human information
processing (information acquisition, information analysis, decision and action selection,
and action implementation, see Figure 2). Secondly, how involved the human is in the
information processing (and subsequent action was taken).
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Figure 2. Flowchart depicting the application of Parasuraman et al.'s (2000) automation model.
For each of the four stages of human information processing (information acquisition, information
analysis, decision and action selection, and action implementation) a level of automation is
selected, ranging from low to high. Subsequent evaluations determine if the assignment was
appropriate, and allow for adjustments as needed.
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The first aspect is assessed within each level of automation (Table 1). This ranges
from simple ‘detect and react’ scenarios to more advanced ‘analyze inputs, select
appropriate action, and execute selected action’ decisions. The second aspect is delineated
by each successive level of automation; system autonomy is increasing while human
involvement is decreasing until a point is reached where the system even decides whether
to inform the human as to its actions. As such, the levels of automation encompass
autonomy, particularly in levels 5 (concurrence) and higher, as these levels incorporate a
dynamic, self-governing aspect to automation’s behavior. The focus here is on the decision
aspect of autonomy; specifically, the shared decision space between the human operator
and the autonomous agent. Consequently, the present focus is on level 5, or concurrence
automation.
Agents
What is an agent?
According to the Merriam-Webster dictionary, an agent is simply ‘1. One who acts
or can act; 2. One that acts or exerts power on the behalf of another’ (Agent, n.d.).
According to the first definition, an agent acts. Whether this action is self-directed or at
the behest of another is not addressed. In the second definition, an agent is not necessarily
independent, but rather a respondent. The agent acts in the place of, or at the direction of,
another. The agent acts, but does not necessarily understand when there is a need to take
action, or decide what action to take, or instigate their action, or even assess the result of
actions once they are completed. One example of such an agent would be the proxies
manning phones at an auction. They act solely at the direction of the anonymous bidder.
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The proxy does not necessarily understand if the bids are wise, or choose the amount of
the next bid, or know the value of the item being bid upon, or understand the overall impact
of the purchase on the bidder’s finances. Such an agent is not an independent actor, but
rather an interface for another. Chignell, Hancock, and Loewenthal (1989) defined an
intelligent interface as “an intelligent entity meditating between two or more interacting
agents who possess an incomplete understanding of each other’s knowledge and/or form
of communication” (p.2). From this example, many agents could be viewed as forms of
intelligent interfaces.
The definition of agent used in the computer/artificial intelligence realm is
somewhat different. An agent is capable of perceiving its environment through sensors
(e.g., eyes, ears, cameras, proximity switches), and of affecting its environment through
actuators (e.g., hands, motors) (Russell & Norvig, 2003). This definition does not address
the agent’s independence (or lack thereof). However, one thing is made clear by these
definitions of agents, that is, agency does not equate autonomy.
Russell and Norvig (2003) introduced the idea of independence in their intelligent
agent definition by including the idea that an agent interacts with their environment; they
sense their environment and then act upon said environment. An intelligent agent can be
human, robot, or even a disembodied entity, such as a software computer program, so long
as it is capable of detecting the environment through some sort of input (e.g., hands, eyes,
sensors, network packets) and then affecting the environment through some kind of output
or actuator (e.g., hands, actuators, information display, network packets). Not only can
these intelligent agents be independent, but they can also be rational. That is, they interact
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with their environment in order to achieve a specific goal and measure their success
according to specific performance criteria.
Autonomous Agents
Autonomous agents create general knowledge about their environment based on
their sensory inputs and experience. The more an autonomous agent learns, the more the
agent can rely on this subsequent experience and knowledge to form decisions rather than
its original programming (Russell & Norvig, 2003). Franklin and Graesser (1997) defined
an autonomous agent as “a system situated within and a part of an environment that senses
that environment and acts on it, over time, in pursuit of its own agenda and so as to effect
what it senses in the future” (p.4). An autonomous system can operate independently of
a human operator; updating its work objectives as environmental circumstances change.
Also, it can anticipate and deliberate upon outcomes, and execute subsequent actions as
required. It has everything it needs to carry out its directive successfully, except for an
‘operating force’ (Schulte, Meitinger, & Onken, 2009), which is the only part of the work
system that pursues the complete work objective, and is the role of the human supervisor.
The operating force is the highest authority in the work system and the part of the system
capable of defining the work objective. While an autonomous system can modify the work
objective if needed, it cannot define the initial work objective. As in the Clockwork
Universe Theory (Descartes, 1649); while the clock, once started, may run perfectly, it
cannot start itself. Autonomous agents begin their interaction with the environment with
pre-programmed knowledge concerning their work objectives. However as they gain
experience with their environment that knowledge is updated and revised. The more the
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agent relies on experience and learned information rather than prior programming to
achieve successful performance, the more autonomous that agent becomes. Regardless of
the level of autonomy the agent achieves, human interaction will be required at some point,
if only in the beginning. While agents working autonomously to achieve human objectives
is a future idea, what is currently commonplace is not agents working independently of
humans, but humans working alongside agents.
Human-Agent Teaming
Humans Supervising Teams
There are many examples of humans supervising teams of robotic entities, both in
the military and civilian arenas.

Military battlefield applications include casualty

extraction, IED detection/disposal, reconnaissance, and surveillance. Civilian applications
include search and rescue, firefighting, and space exploration (Chen & Barnes, 2014). In
these complex and dynamic applications, the current state of technology requires a manyto-one supervision model, with multiple human operators overseeing a single robotic
entity. Such team numbers increase as the complexity of the robot’s tasks and environment
increase (Murphy & Burke, 2010). As operator team size grows it tends to become
unwieldy, so the development of autonomous systems that can assist the human operators
and eventually reduce the number of these human operators becomes necessary. Hence,
the move to a one-to-many model is encouraged. Development of systems, such as the
mixed-initiative system that can assist human operators to oversee teams of robots is the
first step towards achieving this goal.
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Mixed-Initiative Systems
Mixed-initiative systems incorporate elements of both adaptive (level of
automation is changeable by the system; Parasuraman et al., 2000) and adjustable (level of
automation is changeable by an external operator or system; Bradshaw et al., 2003)
automation. This allows the human and an agent to work in concert, each with authority
to make decisions (Goodrich, 2010). Although both have the ability to make changes, the
human operator is the ultimate authority in mixed-initiative systems. Mixed-initiative
systems are effective in keeping the human supervisor in the loop, reducing operator
workload, and thus increasing the number of subordinate robots that the operator can direct
(Barnes et al., 2014; Chen & Barnes, 2010; Chen & Barnes, 2014). While mixed-initiative
systems have been lauded as the most flexible system for supervisory control (Calhoun,
Ruff, Draper, & Wright, 2011), these systems are also particularly susceptible to mode
confusion (Goodrich, 2010; Sarter, 2008). Mode confusion is when the operator believes
the automation is in a different mode than it currently is, and as a result, their responses to
the automation prove inappropriate (Joshi, Miller, & Heimdahl, 2003). An example of a
mixed-initiative system developed by the DOD to investigate such human-agent teaming
issues is RoboLeader.
RoboLeader
An intelligent agent, RoboLeader, was developed to simplify interactions between
a human supervisor and a robotic team (Chen, Barnes, & Qu, 2010). The human supervisor
interacts with the RoboLeader, which interprets the supervisor’s goals and then commands
a team of lower capability robots through route planning and convoy management. This
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allows the human to focus on high-level decisions regarding convoy management, freeing
their attention for other tasks such as maintaining security and communications.
RoboLeader Findings
The addition of an intelligent agent to manage the robotic team brings unique
problems. While the operator benefits from reduced workload, findings indicate they did
not always improve performance and SA. Chen, Barnes and Qu (2010) found no difference
in target detection rate and accuracy between the Baseline and RoboLeader-aided
conditions, although there was an improvement in mission completion time. Similar
findings were reported by Wright and colleagues (2013), such that increasing
RoboLeader’s level of assistance (LOA) did not always improve SA or task performance.
Indeed, in some cases (i.e., high spatial ability individuals), performance in the highest
LOA decreased.

Effectively conveying information to the supervising operator in a

manner that allows them to assimilate the information and stay engaged in their supervisory
task becomes challenging when the agent is handling multiple complex tasks (Kilgore &
Voshell, 2014). Transparency of the agent’s intent and reasoning may encourage the
operator to stay involved and in-the-loop. The effects of such a manipulation have yet to
be tested.
Trust in Automation
The amount a user trusts an autonomous system directly affects their willingness to
use it, as well as their performance and how they respond to unexpected scenarios (Lee &
See, 2004). The higher the level of autonomy of the system, the more important the level
of information the system supplies becomes in fostering trust in the human operator (Wang,
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Jamieson, & Hollands, 2009). If the information is not presented in a manner familiar to
an operator, this reduces automation transparency (Kim & Hinds, 2006). The present
dissertation investigates how the appropriate level of information and the preferred manner
in which the information is displayed affects performance and trust in the route-planning
agent.
There are two major types of trust: dispositional trust and history-based trust
(Merritt & Ilgen, 2008). Dispositional trust is a stable trait describing someone’s feelings
about something before any actual encounter. In the present instance, such trust refers to
how one feels about working with a remote monitoring and communications system.
Dispositional trust is generated by exposure to a wide variety of sources, primarily social
influences such as media and literature, and as such it can vary widely between individuals
(Hancock, Billings, & Schaefer, 2011; Schaeffer, Hancock, & Chen, 2015). Dispositional
trust in automation varies along many demographic divides (e.g., age, ethnicity, gender,
education). However, studies exploring this have had only mixed results (Ho et al., 2005,
Merrit & Ilgen, 2008).

The present dissertation does not include assessments of

dispositional trust, as it has not been shown to be predictive of performance in prior
intelligent agent studies using university student participants (Mercado et al., in press;
Wright et al., 2013). However, the relationship between dispositional trust in automation
and task performance still remains to be explained.
In contrast to dispositional trust, history-based trust is developed from direct
interaction with systems and is composed of multiple factors. These can include a human’s
abilities and effectiveness with the system, the system’s behavior, and reliability, as well
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as environmental factors such as risk and uncertainty (Hancock et al., 2011; Masters, Miles,
D’Souze, & Orr, 2004; Schaefer et al., 2014). As an individual’s experience working with
a particular system grows, they calibrate their trust to an appropriate level (Fallon et al.,
2010). When improperly calibrated, this trust is expressed as either insufficient, where the
operator does not rely on the automation sufficiently, versus excessive, where the operator
relies too much on the automation (Lee & See, 2004; Parasuraman, Molloy, & Singh,
1993). The present research explores the effect of access to agent reasoning on historybased trust.

History-based trust is evaluated using the Usability and Trust Survey

(Appendix I; Chen & Barnes, 2012a). Objectively, history-based trust is operationalized
as the time to accept or reject RL route selections, with higher trust being reflected in
shorter selection times.
Transparency and Level of Reasoning
To be transparent means to be easy to be perceived or detected (Transparent, n.d.).
Within the human-automation research community, there is presently no consensus as to
exactly how transparency should be defined. Transparency has been described both as
something the automation provides (whether by design or behavior) (Cramer et al., 2008;
Cuevas, Fiore, Caldwell, & Strater, 2007; Kim & Hinds, 2006), as well as the
understanding or knowledge an operator has regarding the systems behavior (Cheverst et
al., 2005; Cring & Lenfestey, 2009; Jameson, Baldes, Bauer, & Kroner 2004). When
referring to automation or automated systems, early constructs of transparency focused on
explaining the system’s behavior in an effort to foster trust. When users do not understand
the rationale behind a system’s recommendations, they begin to question the accuracy and
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effectiveness of that system (Linegang et al., 2006). As the users’ understanding of the
rationale behind a systems’ behavior grows, the more accurate the users’ calibration of
their trust and reliance (Lee & See, 2004; Lyons, 2013; Mercado et al., under review). The
more autonomous that a system becomes, the more important transparency becomes as a
factor in user understanding and trust (Dzindolet, Peterson, Pomranky, Pierce, & Beck,
2003; Kim & Hinds, 2006). A recent definition of agent transparency, “the descriptive
quality of an interface pertaining to its abilities to afford an operator’s comprehension
about an intelligent agent’s intent, performance, future plans, and reasoning process”
(Chen, Procci, Boyce, Wright, Garcia, & Barnes, 2014) expands on earlier constructs by
extending the idea of agent transparency beyond simply explaining the agents’ behavior
and fostering user trust, but also facilitating the operator’s comprehension and SA.
SAT Model
The SA-based Agent Transparency model (SAT; Chen et al., 2014; Figure 4) describes
knowledge of what is happening in the environment and the agent’s goals as supporting
the operators’ Level 1 SA (i.e., what is the agent trying to do), understanding the agent’s
reasoning process as supporting the operators’ Level 2 SA (i.e., why does the agent do it),
and providing future projections, likelihood of success, and uncertainty information as
supporting the operators’ Level 3 SA (i.e., what should happen; Endsley, 1995). When the
operator has knowledge of the agents’ intent, and understands the agents’ reasoning, as
well as anticipating likely outcomes based on the information, the operator can accurately
calibrate their trust level (Lee & See, 2004). This is particularly important in evolving
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environments, where the operator’s goals may not always coincide with the agents’ goals
(Linegang et al., 2006).

Figure 3. The SAT Model, illustrating how agent transparency is defined at each level (Chen et
al., 2014).

When environmental information or the agent’s reasoning is not available to the
operator, the operator has no motivation to participate in decision-making, thus
encouraging a human-out-of-the-loop isolation (Parasuraman, Sheridan, & Wickens, 2000;
Wickens, 1994).

This can be mistaken for automation-induced complacency

(Parasuraman, Molloy, & Singh, 1993). The present dissertation investigated how the
operator’s knowledge of the current state of the environment, access to agent reasoning,
and uncertainty affects decision-making ability, as measured via the route selection task.
Research has indicated that the addition of information concerning uncertainty at a high
level of agent transparency can improve operator performance in a decision-making task
(Mercado et al., under review). However, that study used a single task in a static
environment. The notion that excessive ‘transparency’ could result in the opposite effect
than that originally intended (i.e., to enhance the human operators’ performance and
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situation awareness while reducing cognitive workload) is a concern that is examined
(Miller, 2014; Ososky, Sanders, Jentsch, Hancock, & Chen, 2014).

The present

dissertation explored this position as it relates to the addition of information to convey
uncertainty. It is hypothesized that the addition of such information in a dynamic,
multitasking environment will have a detrimental effect on task performance. Such effects
do not impact all operators equally, so several individual difference factors relating to task
performance will also be examined.
The Role of Individual Differences in Human-Agent Teaming
Within human-automation interaction and human-agent teaming research, several
individual difference factors have been discussed as being impactful on operator
performance. Such research has indicated that people with higher perceived attentional
control (PAC) are more efficient in allocating attention, and are less susceptible to
performance degradation in a multitasking environment than those with low PAC (Chen &
Joyner, 2009; Derryberry & Reed, 2002; Rubinstein, Meyer, & Evans, 2001). There are
also differential effects due to inherent spatial ability (SpA). These have been found on
teleoperation tasks, robotic operations, and target detection tasks (Chen et al., 2010; Chen
et al., 2008; Lathan & Tracey, 2002). Differences in working memory capacity (WMC)
have also been shown to affect performance in multi-robot supervision tasks (Ahmed et al.,
2013). Here I examine the differential effects of PAC, SpA, and WMC on multitasking
performance, operator SA, and perceived workload.

Complacency Potential (Singh,

Molloy, & Parasuraman, 1993) affects an individual’s ability to monitor automation
adequately and to detect automation failure. Thus, complacency potential is also examined
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as a mediating factor in route selection. I examine each of these factors (PAC, SpA, and
WMC) and how they influence performance in this work.
Attentional Control
Attentional Control, also known as endogenous attention, represents a person’s
ability to control what they attend to and what they ignore (Posner, 1980; Posner &
Petersen, 1989). People with higher attentional control are more effective at switching
between tasks and focusing attention than persons with lower attentional control. They are
also better at threat disengagement, which is returning their attention to less threatening
stimuli after diverting it to a threat (Derryberry & Reed, 2002). Previous RoboLeader
studies have found links between individual differences in such attentional control, and
system reliability, and associated cognitive workload. For example, in a simulated gunnery
task using an aided target recognition software system, reliability was found to have
interactive effects with attentional control (Chen & Terrence, 2009). False alarm prone
(FAP) alerts negatively impacted those with high perceived attentional control (PAC)
individual’s more than miss prone (MP) alerts. However, low PAC individuals were more
negatively affected by the miss prone alerts than the false alarm prone alerts. This
illustrated differences in attentional control: high PAC individuals were able to switch
their attention more readily, so the FAP alert encouraged them to focus needlessly on the
area and search for the (reported) target. However, low PAC individuals were not able to
switch their attention as readily and so were more dependent on alerts in general. As such,
the performance of the latter group was more affected by the MP alerts than the FAP alerts.
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Individual differences in workload (as indicated by pupil diameter) were also
attributed to PAC (Wright et al., 2013). For high PAC individuals’, workload steadily
decreased as the level of assistance (LOA) increased. Low PAC individuals showed no
such difference in workload across LOA conditions. Consistent workload, regardless of
LOA, is only beneficial if the workload is relatively low; in this case, the low PAC
individuals had very high workload in all LOA. As such, the low PAC individuals gained
no benefit from increasing automated assistance.
In the present work, persons with high PAC are expected to make better use of
additional information than their low PAC peers. As the level of information increases, the
performance of high PAC individuals’ on the route planning task is hypothesized to
improve, while the low PAC individuals are expected not to benefit to the same degree
from the additional information.
Spatial Ability
Spatial ability represents the capacity to navigate or manipulate objects in a threedimensional environment (Eliot & Stumpf, 1987). Spatial ability is a basic dimension of
human intelligence and comprises a domain of abilities rather than a single skill (Lathan &
Tracey, 2002). Spatial ability correlates highly with general intelligence (Lohman, 1996).
However, it has not been found to be predictive of overall academic performance. Rather,
it appears to be predictive in several creative and task-specific domains, such as higherorder mathematics and engineering aptitude (Lohman, 1996). Spatial ability in the form
of mental rotation has also been found to be a mediator of performance on spatial working
memory tasks (Christie, Cook, Ward, Tata, Sutherland, Sutherland, & Saucier, 2013).
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Physiological as well as performance-based evidence shows that object-based
(visualization) and egocentric perspective-based measures of spatial abilities rely on
different processing systems (Zacks et al., 1999). How many distinct spatial processing
factors exist and how each should be characterized remains unclear (Lathan & Tracey,
2002). As understanding further develops as to the spatial ability construct and what
abilities fall under this domain, taxonomies of its factors and sub-factors will assumedly
continue to evolve (Carroll, 1993; Lohman, 1988).
Spatial visualization (SV) is the ability to manipulate visual patterns (Carroll,
1993), or to rotate objects mentally in space (Hegarty & Waller, 2005; Lohman, 1988).
Evaluations of SV do not incorporate speed of manipulation but do include difficulty in the
complexity of the manipulation (i.e., rotating, twisting, inverting). The caveat of SV is that
these manipulations are “in space”, i.e., without reference to a framed reference. This
factor, as evaluated using the Cube Comparison Test (Ekstrom et al., 1976; Thurstone,
1951), has been found to be predictive of performance on target detection tasks (Chen &
Joyner, 2009; Chen & Terrance, 2009; Fincannon, 2013).
Spatial Orientation (SO) is the ability to image objects from different perspectives
(Kozhevnikov & Hegarty, 2001; Lohman, 1988), whether from an egocentric or an
exocentric perspective (Gugerty & Brooks, 2004). This factor, evaluated using the Spatial
Orientation Test (Gugerty & Brooks, 2004) has been found to have differential influences
on target detection capabilities, as well as operators’ situation awareness (Fincannon, 2013;
Wright et al., 2013). The Spatial Orientation Test requires participants to conduct a
navigation task, coordinating their egocentric view of the world with an external framed
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reference. In such environments, participants have forward and rearward views from their
vehicle, and need to coordinate that information with what is displayed on a provided map.
Successful integration of this information is expected to lead to improved SA scores and
better performance on route planning tasks.
Working Memory Capacity
Working Memory (WM) refers to a part of the memory system responsible for
comprehension, reasoning, planning, and implementing behaviors (Cowan, 2008). In
Baddeley’s (2000) model of working memory, there are four components; a visuospatial
sketchpad (analog/spatial memory), a phonological loop (linguistic memory), the central
executive (attentional control), and the episodic buffer, a “limited capacity temporary
storage system that is capable of integrating information from a variety of sources” (p.
421). In general, the capacity of working memory is limited to seven ±2 items (Miller,
1956). Working memory capacity (WMC) is not only limited in the number of items that
can be retained but time sensitive also (Melton, 1963). The more items to be remembered,
the shorter the duration those items will stay in working memory.
Research has indicated that working memory capacity is correlated with an
individual’s attentional control (Engle, Kane, & Tuholski, 1999), in that high WM
individuals allocate their attention differently than low WM individuals (Bleckley, Durso,
Crutchfield, Engle, & Khanna, 2003). Here working memory capacity is evaluated as a
covariate for assessing individual differences in performance due to PAC and SpA, since
previous studies have indicated WMC correlates with these factors (Engle et al., 1999).
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Working memory is directly related to an individual’s situation awareness,
particularly level 2 (comprehension) and level 3 (projecting future states), and in
multitasking environments where multiple tasks compete for limited resources (Endsley,
1995; Wickens & Holland, 2000). Here, WMC is treated as an individual difference factor
when evaluating performance differences on SA measures
Eye Tracking Measures to Consider
It has been asserted that underlying cognitive activities can be reliably inferred from
eye tracking metrics (Beatty, 1982; Jacob & Karn, 2003). In an earlier RoboLeader study
(Wright et al., 2013), eye-tracking metrics proved useful in evaluating differences in
workload that subjective measures of workload did not reveal. This work incorporates two
visual measures, 1) fixation count and 2) pupil diameter, as objective measures of cognitive
workload.
Fixation Count (FixC)
When an individual focuses on a specific location, it is known as a ‘fixation.'
During fixations, the eye is not completely still but makes low-velocity movements, such
as drifts and adjustments to maintain focus. Commercial eye tracking systems typically
detect fixations using dispersion algorithms, identifying data points close enough together
over a specified period of time as a fixation (see Figure 4). Such fixations typically last
between 200-300 ms, but may last up to several seconds (Holmqvist et al., 2011). The
number of fixations has been shown to correlate positively with search difficulty (Ehmke
& Wilson, 2007) and encoding memory (Tatler, Gilchrist, & Land, 2005). Fixation count
has been correlated negatively with search efficiency and mental workload (Goldberg &
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Kotval, 1999; Van Orden, Jung, & Makeig, 2000). Fixation Count (FixC) is useful both
as a within-participant and between-participants measure.

Figure 4. Illustration of common eye tracking metrics. The length of time spent in an area of a
specified size is denoted by colored circles (longer time in the area indicated by larger circles).
These circles denote fixations.

Pupil Diameter (PDia)
The size of the pupil opening is a result of changes in the iris. This is a function
controlled by the autonomic nervous system and sensitive to both external (e.g., ambient
light, distance to stimulus, viewing angle) and internal (e.g., emotion) factors. Pupil
diameter is measured by imposing an ellipse over the pupil area and measuring the length
of the vertical and horizontal axes. Of the two axes, the horizontal has proved to be less
sensitive to artifacts due to the eyelid occlusion/closure (Holmqvist et al., 2011). The
diameter of the pupil increases as mental workload and interest increase (Beatty, 1980;
Iqbal, Zheng, & Bailey, 2004; Kang et al., 2009; Peavler, 1974; Van Orden et al., 2000;
Van Orden, Limbert, Makeig, & Jung, 2001). Pupil Diameter (PDia) is useful both as a
within-participant and between-participants measure.
Research Objective
The present research investigates how agent transparency, within the context of
human-agent teaming, influences operator performance and behavior in a dynamic, multi34

tasking environment. In two experiments, the effect of increased access to agent reasoning
is evaluated within two contexts. Experiment one is a low environmental information
environment. Experiment two concerns a high information environment. Each experiment
had participants’ complete three missions at a specific level of agent transparency. Results
were compared between subjects to evaluate how the difference in transparency affected
operator performance, workload, trust, SA, and complacent behavior.

The two

experiments’ findings were compared to evaluate how differences in available information
affected operators’ preferred level of transparency.
The present results are expected to elucidate how the operators’ knowledge of the
environment interacts with their understanding of agent reasoning to create ‘transparency,'
as well as how increased access to the reasoning behind automation ‘decisions’ effects a
human operators’ ability to interact effectively with said automation.

Too little

transparency may hinder human trust in the automation. However, too much may have
similarly detrimental effects on operator performance, situation awareness, and decisionmaking, thus encouraging complacent behavior. In addition, this work investigated how
several individual difference factors of common interest within the human-automation
interaction community influence the human-agent relationship in terms of agent
transparency, and the subsequent effect on the related human performance issues.
Primary Hypotheses:
Based on the review of the literature, this proposal posits the following hypotheses:
1. Overall, increased access to agent reasoning will improve task
performance and operator SA, and reduce complacent behavior.
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2. However, this improvement will be mitigated by increasing the level of
information the operator has available about the task environment.
3. Increasing the transparency of the agent’s reasoning to include
information that could create uncertainty for the operator will improve
performance when information is sparse, but degrade performance when
the operator has more information about the task environment.

Table 2. The anticipated pattern of findings. An up arrow (↑) indicates an increase in performance
on the measure from the next lower level condition, while a down arrow (↓) indicates a decrease.

DV Measure
Route Selection Task (RS)

EXP 1

EXP 2

Comparison:

ART 2 → ART 3 →
ART 1
ART 2

ART 2 → ART 3 →
ART 1
ART 2

EXP 2 → EXP 1
ART 1 ART 2 ART 3

Correct accepts and rejects

↑

↓

↑

↓

↓

↑

↓

Decision Time

↑

↓

↑

↑

↑

↑

↑

Targets Detected

↓

↓

↓

↓

↓

↓

↓

False Alarms

↓

↓

↑

↑

↑

↑

↑

↓

↑

↓

↑

↓

↓

↑

SA Level 1 Queries (Perception)

↑

↑

↑

↓

↓

↓

↓

SA Level 2 Queries (Comprehension)

↑

↑

↑

↑

↑

↑

↓

SA Level 3 Queries (Projection)

↑

↓

↑

↓

↓

↓

↓

Workload (Global NASA-TLX)

↑

↑

↑

↑

↑

↑

↑

Operator Trust

↑

↓

↑

↓

↑

↑

↓

Target Detection Task (TD)

Complacent Behavior
Incorrect Acceptances
Situation Awareness Scores

36

CHAPTER 3: EXPERIMENT 1
Study Overview
Experiment 1 investigated how access to agent reasoning affected the human
operator’s decision-making, task performance, situation awareness, and complacent
behavior in a multitasking environment when limited environmental information is
available. The participants’ role was to supervise a convoy of vehicles as it progressed
through an urban environment, maintaining communications with their command and
identifying potential threats along the way. They were provided with a map of the area
with a predetermined route marked. Icons referring to events in the area appeared on the
map, some of which affected the convoy’s route. Information received from command
could contradict or update the information provided on the map. When approaching such
an area, RoboLeader suggested altering the route, and the participant either accepted or
rejected the suggestion. The level of the agent reasoning transparency (ART) behind
RoboLeader’s (RL) recommendation as to the appropriate route to continue the convoy’s
progress was manipulated between participants, varying from simple notifications to
reports including recency of report. Each participant completed three missions at a specific
ART. As the convoy progressed through the simulated environment, the participants’
maintained communication with ‘command’; receiving incoming messages and responding
when appropriate (SA probes). While overseeing the convoy’s progress, the participants
also conducted a target detection task by monitoring the vehicles’ camera feed and
identifying potential threats in their environment. The number of threats was held constant
across routes.
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Hypotheses:
Based on the review of the literature, this proposal posits the following hypotheses:
It was hypothesized that access to agent reasoning would reduce complacent
behavior, improve task performance, and increase trust in the agent—but only to a degree,
beyond which increased access to agent reasoning would negatively impact performance,
increase complacent behavior, and reduce trust in the agent (i.e., ART1 < ART2 > ART3).
This hypothesis recapitulates an inverted [extended] U-shaped function often observed in
operators in stressful conditions (Hancock and Warm, 1989; Yerkes and Dodson, 1908).
Decision time was also examined as a facet of performance, and as such was expected to
increase as access to agent reasoning increased: ART1 < ART2 < ART3. Although RL’s
messages were slightly longer in ARTs 2 and 3 than in ART1, additional time was not
expected to be required for reading the messages. Participants were expected to take longer
to process the information and reach their decision, resulting in a longer decision time.
Shorter response times may indicate less deliberation on the part of the operator before
accepting or rejecting the agent recommendation.

This could mean either positive

automation bias or reduced task difficulty.
Hypothesis 1: Access to agent reasoning will reduce incorrect acceptances,
ART1 > ART2, and increased transparency of agent reasoning will increase
incorrect acceptances, ART2 < ART3.

When agent reasoning is not

available, incorrect acceptances will be greater than when agent reasoning
is present, ART1 > ART2+3.
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Hypothesis 2: Access to agent reasoning will improve performance (number
of correct rejections and acceptances) on the route selection task, ART1 <
ART2, and increased transparency of agent reasoning will reduce
performance on the route selection task, ART2 > ART3. When agent
reasoning is not available, performance will be lower than when agent
reasoning is present, ART1 < ART2+3.
Hypothesis 3: Access to agent reasoning will increase operator trust in the
agent, ART1 < ART2, and increased transparency of agent reasoning will
decrease operator trust in the agent, ART2 > ART3.
It is hypothesized that increasing agent reasoning transparency will, in turn,
increase the operators’ workload. Typically, increased automation assistance reduces
operator workload, as the operator is able to offload a portion of their duties to the
automation. However, in the case of agent reasoning transparency, the amount of
information the operator must process increases as the agent reasoning becomes more
transparent. It is expected that this increased mental demand will be reflected in the
workload measures.
Hypothesis 4: Access to agent reasoning will increase operator workload,
ART1 < ART2; and increased transparency of agent reasoning will increase
operator workload, ART2 < ART3. When agent reasoning is not available,
workload will be lower than when agent reasoning is present, ART1 <
ART2+3.
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It is hypothesized that agent reasoning transparency will support the operators’
situation awareness (SA). Access to the agent reasoning will help the operator better
comprehend how objects/events in the task environment affect their mission, thus
informing their task of monitoring the environment surrounding the convoy and making
them cognizant of potential risks. This understanding will also enable them to make more
accurate projections regarding the future safety of their convoy. However, the addition of
information that appears ambiguous to the operator will have a detrimental effect on their
ability to correctly project future status.
Hypothesis 5: Access to agent reasoning will improve SA scores, and
increased transparency of agent reasoning will improve SA1 and SA2
scores, but will reduce SA3 scores;


SA1: ART1 < ART2, ART2 < ART3;



SA2: ART1 < ART2, ART2 < ART3;



SA3: ART1 < ART2, ART2 > ART3.

It is hypothesized that increasing agent reasoning transparency will reduce
performance on the target detection task. The increased mental demand on the operator
will affect their ability to monitor the environment for threats effectively. However, access
to agent reasoning will allow operators’ to maintain higher selection criteria, resulting in
fewer FAs.
Hypothesis 6: Access to agent reasoning will reduce the number of targets
detected and the number of FAs, ART1 > ART2, and increased
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transparency of agent reasoning will again result in fewer targets detected
and fewer FAs, ART2 > ART3.
The effects of individual differences in complacency potential, perceived
attentional control, spatial ability, and working memory capacity on the operator’s task
performance, trust, and SA were also investigated.
Hypothesis 7: High CPRS individuals will have fewer correct rejects on the
route planning task than Low CPRS individuals.
Hypothesis 8: High CPRS individuals will have higher scores on the
usability and trust survey than Low CPRS individuals.
Hypothesis 9: High CPRS individuals will have lower SA scores than Low
CPRS individuals.
Hypothesis 10: Individual differences, such as SpA and PAC, will have
differential effects on the operator’s performance on the route selection task
and their ability to maintain SA.
Hypothesis 11: High WMC individuals will have more correct rejects and
higher SA2 and SA3 scores than Low WMC individuals.
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Table 3. The anticipated patterns of findings (hypotheses) for Experiment 1. Information in the
columns indicates the expected score or performance change between agent reasoning transparency
conditions (i.e., ART1, ART2, and ART3).
Add Transparency

Increase
Transparency

ART 1 < ART 2
ART 1 < ART 2

ART 2 > ART 3
ART 2 > ART 3

Target Detection Task Targets Detected
(TD)
False Alarms

ART 1 > ART 2
ART 1 > ART 2

ART 2 > ART 3
ART 2 > ART 3

Complacent Behavior

Incorrect Acceptances

ART 1 > ART 2

ART 2 < ART 3

Situation Awareness
Scores

SA1 Queries (Perception)
SA2 Queries (Comprehension)
SA3 Queries (Projection)

ART 1 < ART 2
ART 1 < ART 2
ART 1 < ART 2

ART 2 < ART 3
ART 2 < ART 3
ART 2 > ART 3

Workload

Global NASA-TLX

ART 1 < ART 2

ART 2 < ART 3

Trust

Incorrect Rejections
Usability and Trust Survey

ART 1 > ART 2
ART 1 < ART 2

ART 2 < ART 3
ART 2 > ART 3

DV Measure
Route Selection Task
(RS)

Correct accepts and rejects
Decision Time

Task Environment
Simulation Scenario. The human operator supervised a three-vehicle convoy as it
proceeded through an urban environment, following a predetermined route, on a
reconnaissance mission. An intelligent agent, RoboLeader, managed convoy behavior and
route planning. As the convoy progressed, events (e.g., threats present, environmental
hazards/obstacles) occurred that might necessitate altering the convoy’s route. The agent
suggested a potential route revision, and the operator would have to accept or reject the
suggestion.
Each vehicle (a UAV, an UGV, and an MGV) was equipped with an indirect
camera feed, displaying the environment below (i.e., the UAV), forward of (i.e., the UGV),
or surrounding the vehicle (i.e., the MGV). The MGV is equipped with 360° indirectvision capability, which the U.S. Army is currently developing, and the operator assessed
via two 180° camera displays, one forward-view, and one rearward view (see Figure 5). In
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addition to the convoy supervisory duties, operators were required to maintain local
security around the convoy via the vehicles’ indirect-vision camera feeds by identifying
threats present in the immediate vicinity. Operators monitored communications from
command, responding when appropriate.
RoboLeader. To frame the task in current-day capabilities, RoboLeader was
dependent on incoming information from a variety of sources upon which to base its
recommendations, and as such, its environment was partially observable. It was possible
for the operator to have more up-to-date information regarding the environment than
RoboLeader, thus creating the justification for overriding RL’s suggestions when they were
inappropriate.

Each route-planning recommendation was independent of the others,

making the environment (from RoboLeader’s Point Of View) episodic and stochastic.
Methodology
Experimental Participants
Seventy-six participants (between the ages of 18 and 40) were recruited from the
Institute for Simulation and Training’s and the Psychology Departments’ SONA Systems.
Participants received their choice of compensation: either cash payment ($15/hr) or Sona
Credit at the rate of 1 credit/hour. Sixteen potential participants were excused or dismissed
from the study; nine were dismissed early due to equipment malfunctions, one withdrew
during training claiming they did not have time to participate, three fell asleep during their
session and were dismissed, two could not pass the training assessments and were
dismissed, and one did not pass the color vision screening test and was dismissed. Those
who were determined to be ineligible or withdrew from the experiment received payment
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for the amount of time they participated, with a minimum of one hours’ pay. Sixty
participants (26 males, 33 females, 1 unreported, Minage = 18 years, Maxage = 32 years, Mage
= 21.4 years) successfully completed the experiment, and their data was used in the
analysis.
Experimental Apparatus
Simulator. The Mixed Initiative Experimental (MIX) Testbed, used in the Chen et
al. (2010) RoboLeader experiment, was modified and used in this experiment (Figure 5).
The MIX Testbed is a distributed simulation environment for investigation into how
unmanned systems are used and how automation affects human operator performance.
This platform includes a camera payload and supports multiple levels of automation. Users
can send mission plans or teleoperate the platform with a computer mouse while being
provided a video feed from the camera payload. Typical tasks include reconnaissance and
surveillance. RoboLeader has the capability of collecting information from subordinate
robots with limited autonomy (e.g., with the capability of collision avoidance and selfguidance to reach target locations), making tactical decisions, and coordinating the robots
by issuing commands, waypoints, or motion trajectories (Chen et al., 2010).
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Figure 5. Operator Control Unit: User interface for convoy management and 360° tasking
environment. OCU windows are (clockwise from the upper center): 1. Map and Route Overview,
2. RoboLeader Communications Window, 3. Command Communications Window, 4. MGV
Forward 180° Camera Feed, 5. MGV Rearward 180° Camera Feed, 6. UGV Forward Camera Feed
and 7. UAV Camera Feed.
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Eye Tracker. A Sensomotoric Instrument (SMI) Remote Eyetracking Device
(RED) was used to collect eye movement data. The SMI RED system uses an infrared (IR)
camera-based tracking system and allows completely non-contact operation. Eye and head
movements, which can be observed at approximately 0.03º of spatial resolution and
sampled at the rate of 120 Hz, along with measurement reliability data, was logged in real
time and synchronized with performance data from other systems. Only the participants’
eye gaze coordinates were measured and recorded; no video of the participants’ eyes and
faces were recorded. The system was individually calibrated for each participant prior to
each mission.
Surveys and Tests
Demographics. A demographics questionnaire was administered at the beginning
of the training session (Appendix B).

Information on participant’s age, gender,

handedness, and video gaming experience was collected.
Ishihara Color Vision Test. An Ishihara Color Vision Test (with 9 test plates) was
administered via PowerPoint presentation. Since the RoboLeader OCU employs several
colors to display the plans for the robots, normal color vision is required to interact
effectively with the system. Participants who incorrectly identified a slide were given the
opportunity to try again once; if on their second chance they could not correctly identify
the slide that was counted as a miss. Participants who incorrectly identified 2 or more
slides were dismissed.
Individual Difference Factors.

Descriptive statistics pertaining to individual

differences (ID) measure scores are listed here.
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ID results were dichotomized into

High/Low groups via median split of all scores. These groups were then evaluated within
each ART for compliance with required analytic assumptions. Finally, for each ID
measure, these groups were assessed across ARTs to ensure that 1) that the high and low
groups were distinct from one another, and 2) that high/low group membership was
consistent between ARTs.
Perceived Attentional Control. A questionnaire on Attentional Control (Derryberry
& Reed, 2002) was used to evaluate participants’ perceived attentional control (Appendix
C). The Attentional Control survey consists of 21 items, measures attention focus and
shifting, and has been shown to have good internal reliability (α = .88). Scoring range is
21 – 84 points, with higher scores indicating greater attentional control. High/Low group
membership was determined by median split of all participants’ scores (MinPAC = 41.0,
MaxPAC = 74.0, MdnPAC = 61.0, MPAC = 60.5, SDPAC = 7.5; PACLOW N = 28, PACHIGH N =
32).
Cube Comparison Test. Two aspects of spatial ability were assessed, spatial
visualization (SV) and spatial orientation (SOT). The Cube Comparison Test (SV; see
Appendix D; Ekstrom, French, & Harman, 1976) measures an individual’s ability to
manipulate objects mentally in 3D space. Participants have 3 minutes per part to compare
21 pairs of 6-sided cubes and determine if the rotated cubes are the same or different. Each
part was scored using the formula: [ (

#𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑒𝑑
21

#𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡

) (#𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑 )] ∗ 100, where attempted items

included both answered and skipped items, answered items included any item where an
answer was supplied (whether correct or incorrect), and skipped items were items that were
not answered, but were followed by at least one answered item. This scoring method not
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only converts the score to a scale 1 – 100, it also addresses both speed and accuracy, while
quantifying the impact of skips on overall score. Each part was scored using this formula,
then the scores from both parts averaged to give the participants’ overall score. High/Low
group membership was determined by median split of all participants’ scores (MinSV =
0.234, MaxSV = 0.95, MdnSV = 0.60, MSV = 0.61, SDSV = 0.18, SV LOW N = 30, SV HIGH N =
30).
Spatial Orientation Test.

The Spatial Orientation Test (SOT) measures an

individual’s ability to orient themselves in a 3D world (SOT; see Appendix E; Gugerty &
Brooks, 2004). It is a computerized test consisting of a brief training segment and 32 test
questions, which score is based on both accuracy and response time. Individual scores are
calculated by dividing average response time by total number correct. Higher performance
is indicated by lower scores. High/Low group membership was determined by median
split of all participants’ scores (MinSOT = 3.97, MaxSOT = 39.32, MdnSOT = 12.72, MSOT =
14.15, SDSOT = 8.41, SOTLOW N = 27, SOTHIGH N = 33).
Complacency Potential Rating Scale. The updated Complacency Potential Rating
Scale (CPRS; Pop & Stearman, in review; Singh, Molloy, & Parasuraman, 1993; Appendix
F) measures an individual’s attitude towards automation and automated devices, and has
been shown to have high internal consistency (r > .98) and test-retest reliability (r = .90).
The CPRS has 20 items, 4 of which are filler items, and each item is scored from 1 (strongly
agree) to 5 (strongly disagree). Several items are negatively worded and are reverse-scored
in the final tally. CPRS scores range from 16 (low complacency potential) to 80 (high
complacency potential). The developers suggest classifying participants as either low or
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high complacency potential using the median split of the CPRS scores. High/Low group
membership was determined by median split of all participants’ scores (MinCPRS = 28.0,
MaxCPRS = 49.0, MdnCPRS = 39.5, MCPRS = 39.9, CPRSLOW N = 30, CPRSHIGH N = 30).
NASA-TLX.

Participants’ perceived workload was evaluated with the

computerized version of the NASA-TLX questionnaire, which uses a pairwise comparison
weighting procedure (Hart & Staveland, 1988; Appendix G). The NASA-TLX is a selfreported questionnaire of perceived demands in six areas: mental, physical, temporal, effort
(mental and physical), frustration, and performance. Participants evaluated their perceived
workload level in each of these areas on 10-point scales, as well as completed pairwise
comparisons for each subscale.
RSPAN. Verbal working memory capacity was assessed using the automated
reading span task (RSPAN; Redick et al., 2012; Unsworth, Heitz, Shrock, & Engle, 2005;
Appendix H), which has shown to have high internal (partial score α = .86) and test-retest
(α = .82) reliability. Participants were shown a sentence, and they determined if the
sentence made sense as written (e.g., “Andy was stopped by the policeman because he
crossed the yellow heaven”). They indicated whether the sentence made sense (YES) or
not (NO) by hitting either the F key (YES) or the J key (NO) on their keyboard. Participants
were given feedback how they are performed on this task and were instructed to keep their
performance above 80%. After evaluating the sentence, they were shown a letter to be
recalled later. At the end of each set, participants were prompted to recall the letters in the
proper order. Sentence-letter set sizes varied between 3 and 6 items, and each participant
received 3 sets of each set size, for a total of 54 sentence-letter sets. Participants who
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scored lower than 80% on the sentence verification task were dismissed from the study.
Working memory capacity was evaluated by using the participants’ total letter set score
(sum of all perfectly recalled letter sets), with higher numbers indicating greater working
memory capacity, (MinRSPAN = 5.0, MaxRSPAN = 51.0, MdnRSPAN = 32.5, MRSPAN = 31.3,
SDRSPAN = 11.1). High/Low group membership was determined by median split of all
participants’ scores, RSPANLOW N = 30, RSPANHIGH N = 30.
Situation Awareness (SA). Participants’ SA was evaluated by periodic queries via
the communications panel. Queries were designed to assess the users level 1 (perception),
level 2 (reasoning/comprehension) or level 3 (projection) SA (Appendix K). Queries were
in the form of multiple choice questions, and participants responded by clicking the button
on the communications panel that corresponded with the correct answer.
Usability and Trust Survey. Participant trust in the system was evaluated using the
Usability and Trust Survey (Chen & Barnes, 2012a; Appendix I). The survey consisted of
20 questions rated on a scale of 1 to 7, with a scoring range of 20 – 140 points. Negative
questions such as “The RoboLeader display was confusing” were reverse coded (a score
of 7=1, 6=2, etc.). Positive questions such as “The RoboLeader system is dependable” and
“I can trust the RoboLeader system” were regularly coded, with the sums of the positive
and negative questions combined to create a global score. Higher scores indicate higher
trust and usability of the system.
Procedure
After being briefed on the purpose of the study and signing the informed consent
form, participants completed the demographics questionnaire, the working memory
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capacity test (RSPAN), and the Ishihara Color Vision Test. Those that successfully
completed the RSPAN task with a sentence comprehension score of 80% or higher and
those that passed the color vision test continued with the study, those that did not pass were
debriefed and dismissed. Then participants completed the Attentional Control Survey, the
Cube Comparisons test, the Spatial Orientation test, and the Complacency Potential Rating
Scale.
Participants then received training and practice on their tasks for the experimental
session. Training was self-paced and delivered by PowerPoint® slides. Participants were
trained on the elements of the OCU, identifying map icons and their meanings, steps for
completing various tasks, and completed several mini-exercises for practice. The training
session lasted approximately 1.5 hours. Before proceeding to the experimental session,
participants had to demonstrate that they could recall all icons and their meanings, as well
as perform all tasks without any help. Participants who scored too low on the assessments
were allowed to review the information again. If the participant had still not reached 90%
proficiency after additional training, the participant was paid for the time they spent in the
experiment up to that point and dismissed.
Participants were given a 5-minute break between the practice session and the
experimental session. The experimental session lasted about 2 hours. Each experimental
session had three missions, each lasting approximately 30 minutes. Participants were
randomly assigned to an Agent Reasoning Transparency (ART) condition (ART1, ART2,
or ART3), which were counterbalanced across participants to ensure an equal N in each
condition. Each experimental session had three missions, each lasting approximately 30
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minutes. The mission order was counterbalanced across participants to avoid order effects.
At the beginning of each mission, the eye tracker was calibrated using the 9-point
calibration setting.
During the missions, participants guided a convoy of three vehicles (their own
MGV, a UAV, and a UGV) through a simulated urban environment, moving along a
predetermined route. As the convoy proceeded through the environment, events occurred
which necessitated altering the route. Each mission had six events that affected the
predetermined route, and each event caused RoboLeader to suggest a route revision.
Events and their associated area of influence were displayed on the map with icons.
RoboLeader suggested a potential route revision, and the operator either accepted the
suggestion or rejected it and kept the convoy on its original path. The participant was given
no information regarding the safety of the alternate route, only the understanding that the
suggested routes were at least as safe as the original route. Two of RoboLeader’s route
change suggestions [per mission] were inappropriate, and the participant needed to reject
the suggestion correctly. Once RoboLeader suggested a route, there was a limited amount
of time (15 seconds) for the participant to acknowledge the suggested change. When the
participant acknowledged RL’s suggestion, the simulation paused until the participant
either agreed with or rejected RL’s suggestion. If time expired before the participant
acknowledged, RoboLeader automatically continued convoy movement along the original
route.
Participants viewed communications from RoboLeader via a text feed in the upper
right-hand corner of the OCU. When they received a message from RoboLeader, they were
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to click the acknowledge button on the RoboLeader communication window. Messages
from RoboLeader varied based on ART. In ART1, messages from RoboLeader were
simple notifications that RoboLeader is suggesting a route revision, corresponding to one
of the map icons. In ART2, RL messages were notifications that provided specific details
about the warning denoted by the map icons. In ART3, RL messages were the same as in
ART2. However, the messages also included information as to how long ago the
information was received (e.g., 1 hour, 4 hours, 6 hours). Transcripts of RoboLeader
messages for each ART are in Appendix J.
The participant maintained communication with their ‘command’ via a text feed
directly below RoboLeader’s communication window. Participants viewed messages from
command, not all of which were directed to the participant. Each mission contained 12
information updates from command, two of which would result in the need to override
RoboLeader’s route recommendation. Communications included messages directed at
other units, which the participant should disregard. These messages were intended to create
‘noise,' as well as maintain a consistent rate for incoming messages (one message from
either source approximately every 30 seconds). Transcripts of command messages for each
mission are in Appendix L. In all conditions, command would also request information
from the operator (SA queries). Requests for information required a response from the
participant, which they did by selecting the appropriate response in the communication
window on the OCU. Each mission contained 18 requests for information, and these were
used to assess the participants SA. Transcripts of SA queries for each mission are in
Appendix K.
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Simultaneously, the participants had to maintain local security surrounding their
own MGV by monitoring the MGV and UGV indirect-vision displays and detect targets in
the immediate environment. Once a hostile target was detected, the participants identified
the target by clicking on the target using the mouse. Mouse clicks in the camera feed
windows produced a camera shutter sound, so the participant had verification that they did
successfully click in the window. However, they did not receive feedback regarding their
performance on the target detection task. There were civilians and friendly dismounted
soldiers in the simulated environment to increase the visual noise present in the target
detection tasks.
After completing all three missions, participants assessed their perceived workload
using the NASA-TLX, and their trust in RL’s suggestions by completing the Usability and
Trust Survey. Participants were then debriefed, and any questions they had were answered
by the experimenter.
Pilot testing was performed to determine whether the amount of proposed training
was sufficient for participants to understand fully and correctly complete the assigned
experimental tasks.

Changes to training length and content were made as deemed

necessary by pilot participants’ performance.
Experimental Design
The study was a between-subjects experiment. Independent variables were Agent
Reasoning Transparency and Individual Difference factors. Dependent measures were
route selection task score, decision time, target detection task scores, workload, SA, and
trust scores.
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Independent Measures
The between-subjects factor was Agent Reasoning Transparency (ART). There
were three levels of agent reasoning: low, medium, and high. ART was manipulated via
RoboLeader messages. In the low ART condition (ART1), the agent recommended a
course of action but otherwise offered no insight as to the reasoning behind the
recommendation. In the medium ART condition (ART2), the agent recommended a course
of action and gave the reason behind this recommendation. In the high ART condition
(ART3), the same information as in ART2 was conveyed, and the recency of the
information supporting the recommendation was also included. The time information was
chosen as an example of the sort of information a system designer may provide to the user,
but the user may not be certain how to incorporate this information into their decision. In
this way, the effect of the type of agent reasoning information could be assessed as well as
the availability. Participants completed three missions in their assigned ART.
Dependent Measures
Route Selection Task Measures:


Performance Score: Participants were scored on whether they correctly
accepted or rejected RoboLeader’s route selection, and those scores summed
across all missions. The score range for this score is 0 (no correct rejects or
accepts) to 18 (correctly accepted or rejected all RoboLeader suggestions).



Incorrect Acceptances: Twice each mission RoboLeader made a suggestion that
should have been correctly rejected. Incorrect acceptances of these suggestions
were indicative of complacent behavior; the participant scored 1 point for each
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incorrect acceptance, and these were summed across all missions. The score
range for this measure is 0 – 6, with higher scores indicating more complacent
behavior and lower scores indicating less.


Incorrect Rejections: Four times each mission RoboLeader made a suggestion
that should have been correctly accepted.

Incorrect rejections of these

suggestions were indicative of low trust and/or poor SA; the participant scored
1 point for each incorrect rejection, and these were summed across all missions.
The score range for this measure is 0 – 12, with higher scores indicating more
distrustful behavior and lower scores indicating less.


Decision Time: Decision time was averaged across missions. Decision Time
was quantified as the time between agent alert and participant route selection.
Reduced decision time when ART was available or increased (compared to
decision time in the notification only condition) could indicate overwork,
resulting in complacent behavior.

Target Detection Task Measures:


Targets correctly detected (percentage): Number of targets correctly identified
was expected to decrease in overwork conditions.



Number of False Alarms: Number of false alarms was expected to increase as
ART increases.



In addition to Hits and FAs, two signal detection theory measures were also used
to assess participant performance on the target detection task:
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o d’ – A measure of sensitivity to target. Values near 0 indicate correct
detection probability near chance while higher values indicate increased
discernibility of targets and participant sensitivity to targets.
o Beta (β) – The likelihood ratio, a measure of response bias. Higher values
of Beta indicate a more conservative response bias.
Situation Awareness Scores: Each mission contained 18 SA queries, 6 for each of
the three SA levels. SA queries were designed to assess the participants’ SA at a specific
SA level (i.e., SA1 – level 1 SA, perception; SA2 – level 2 SA, reasoning, comprehension;
SA3 - level 3 SA, the projection of future state). Higher scores indicate better SA. SA
queries were multiple choice questions that were presented as requests for information
from Command. SA scores were averaged across all three missions.


The SA1 queries were presented along the common route whenever timing would
allow, and when presented where the paths diverged were created to be as similar
as possible between the two paths (i.e. same query, same density of vehicles and
persons, the same type of persons). Each SA1 query had one correct answer and
was scored as one point for each correct answer and minus one point for each
incorrect answer. Score range for SA1 queries was -18 to +18.



SA2 queries were presented after the participant had selected a route and
answered the SA3 query. SA2 queries were meant to gauge the participants’
understanding of the events influencing route selection, and could have multiple
correct answers, depending on information presented to the participant at the
specific location. Only SA2 queries along the ground truth (correct) route were
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scored. Participants received one point for each correct response, and minus one
point for each incorrect response. Score range for SA2 queries was -60 to +30.


SA3 queries were presented immediately after the participant selected a route and
gauged the participants perception of how safe their chosen route would be. Each
query had one correct response, and score range was -18 to +18.
Perceived workload – After completing three missions, the NASA-TLX was

administered to assess the participants’ perceived workload. Both global and individual
factor workload scores were evaluated. Participants were instructed only to consider the
route selection task and their interactions with the RoboLeader agent when completing the
NASA-TLX.
Trust – After completing three missions, the Usability and Trust Survey was
administered to assess the participants’ trust in the agent.
Data Analysis
Data was examined using planned comparisons (α = .05). Specifically, ART1 was
compared to ART2, ART2 to ART3, and ART1 to ART2+3 (average of ART2 and ART3
scores), unless otherwise noted. Omnibus between-subject ANOVAs/ANCOVAs (α = .05)
are also reported. Means, SD, and 95% CI are reported for each measure.
Preliminary GPower 3.1.3 analysis indicated that 60 participants, 3 groups, in a
between-factors ANOVA, had an estimated power of .83 at a medium-to-large effect size
(f = .35).
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Results
Complacent Behavior Evaluation
Hypothesis 1: Access to agent reasoning will reduce incorrect acceptances,
ART1 > ART2, and increased transparency of agent reasoning will increase
incorrect acceptances, ART2 < ART3.

When agent reasoning is not

available, incorrect acceptances will be greater than when agent reasoning
is present, ART1 > ART2+3.
Descriptive statistics for incorrect acceptances and decision times at the locations
where the agent recommendation should have been rejected are shown in Table 4.
Table 4. Descriptive statistics for incorrect acceptances and decision times, sorted by agent
reasoning transparency (ART) level.

Incorrect
Acceptances
Overall DT at
Reject
Locations (sec)
DT Correct
Rejects (sec)

DT Incorrect
Accepts (sec)

95% C.I. for
Mean

N

Mean

SD

SE

ART 1

20

3.25

2.27

0.51

(2.19, 4.31)

ART 2

20

1.14

1.28

0.29

(0.54, 1.73)

ART 3

20

2.65

2.32

0.52

(1.56, 3.74)

ART 1

20

3.82

1.88

0.42

(2.94, 4.70)

ART 2

20

2.96

1.44

0.32

(2.29, 3.64)

ART 3

20

3.41

1.55

0.35

(2.69, 4.14)

ART 1

14

7.47

4.29

1.15

(4.99, 9.95)

ART 2

20

7.49

3.17

0.71

(6.01, 8.98)

ART 3

18

8.14

3.47

0.82

(6.41, 9.86)

ART 1

18

8.04

2.86

0.67

(6.62, 9.46)

ART 2

11

6.09

1.76

0.53

(4.91, 7.28)

ART 3

14

7.90

3.20

0.86

(6.06, 9.75)

Evaluating incorrect acceptances between ART conditions, there was a violation of
the homogeneity of variance assumption. As such, Welch’s correction has been reported,
and contrast tests do not assume equal variance between conditions.
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There was a

significant effect of ART on incorrect acceptances, F(2, 34.8) = 7.96, p = .001, 2 = .14
(Figure 6), and the data has a significant curvilinear trend, F(1, 34.8) = 10.80, p = .002, 2
= .14. Mean incorrect acceptances were lower in ART2 than in ART1, t(29.9) = -3.63, p
= .001, rc = .55, and ART3, t(29.5) = 2.55, p = .016, rc = .43. Overall, incorrect acceptances
were significantly lower when agent reasoning was provided, t(31.8) = -2.31, p = .028, rc
= .38. The hypothesis was supported, since access to agent reasoning did reduce incorrect
acceptances in a low information environment, and increased transparency of agent
reasoning began to overwhelm participants, resulting in increased incorrect acceptances.

Figure 6. Average incorrect acceptances by agent reasoning transparency (ART) level. Bars denote
SE.

Participants’ scores were further analyzed by the number of incorrect acceptances
per ART level (Figure 7). Chi-square analysis found a significant effect of ART on the
number of incorrect acceptances, Χ2(14) = 29.45, p = .009, Cramer’s V = .495. Across all
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ART levels, 17 participants had no incorrect acceptances, 15 of whom were in ARTs 2 and
3, evidence that access to agent reasoning is beneficial in avoiding incorrect acceptances.
The range of potential scores for incorrect acceptances was 0 – 6, and the range of
participants’ scores was 0 – 6. Forty-three participants had at least 1 incorrect acceptance,
42% in ART1, 32% in ART3, and 26% in ART2. The incorrect scores were sorted into
groups; < 50% (score 3 or less) or > 50% (score 4 or higher). Participants in ART1 were
evenly split between these groups, indicating that in the notification-only condition
performance was no better than chance. Also, of the 8 participants who scored 6/6 on
incorrect acceptances, 6 were in ART1. However, of the participants who had > 50%
incorrect acceptances, these were mostly in ART3. Examining the distribution of scores,
it is clear that access to agent reasoning had a beneficial effect on performance. However
the increase in incorrect acceptances in ART3 could be an indication that too much access
to agent reasoning can have a detrimental effect on performance.

Figure 7. Distribution of incorrect acceptance scores across agent reasoning transparency (ART)
levels.
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Complacent behavior could also be indicated by reduced decision time for
responses on the route selection task, particularly at those locations where the agent
recommendation is incorrect. We hypothesized that decision time would increase as agent
reasoning transparency increased, as participants should require additional time to process
the extra information. Thus, reduced time could indicate less time spent in deliberation,
which could be an indication of complacent behavior. In addition to the overall time to
respond, decision times for correct rejections and incorrect acceptances were also
examined (Figure 8). There was not a significant effect of ART on overall decision time,
F(2,57) = 0.29, p = .747, 2 = .02. Mean decision times were shorter in ART2 than in
ART1, t(57) = -0.49, p = .629, rc = .06, and ART3, t(57) = 0.76, p = .453, rc = .10. There
was not a significant effect of ART on decision time for correct rejections, F(2,49) = 0.20,
p = .823, 2 = .03. Mean decision times for correct rejections were essentially the same in
ARTs 1 and 2, t(49) = -0.02, p = .985, rc = .00, and slightly longer in ART3, t(49) = 0.55,
p = .583, rc = .08. There was not a significant main effect of ART on decision time for
incorrect acceptances, F(2,40) = 1.93, p = .153, 2 = .04, however there was a significant
quadratic trend, F(2,40) = 3.80, p = .058, 2 = .06. Mean decision times for incorrect
acceptances were longer in ART1 than in ART2, t(27.0) = -2.27, p = .032, rc = .40, and
shorter in ART2 than in ART3, t(20.9) = 1.80, p = .087, rc = .37. While decision times
remain relatively unchanged across ART levels, decision times for incorrect acceptances
drop significantly in ART2, which could be an indication of complacent behavior. Paired
t-tests were used to compare differences between decision times for correct and incorrect
responses within each ART. The largest difference in decision time was in ART2, t(10) =
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0.95, p = .363, d = 0.24, while differences in ART3, t(11) = 0.65, p = .527, d = 0.23, and
ART1, t(11) = -0.19, p = .851, d = 0.04 were smaller. Although these results did not
achieve statistical significance, it is interesting to note that decision times for incorrect
responses were lower in ART2, which could indicate that incorrect responses in this
condition were a result of more complacent behavior.

Figure 8. Average decision time in seconds for participant responses at decision points where the
agent recommendation was incorrect. Decision times are shown for all responses (overall), correct
rejections, and incorrect acceptances, sorted by agent reasoning transparency (ART) level. Bars
denote SE.

Route Selection Task Performance
Hypothesis 2: Access to agent reasoning will improve performance (number
of correct rejects and accepts) on the route selection task, ART1 < ART2,
and increased transparency of agent reasoning will reduce performance on
63

the route selection task, ART2 > ART3. When agent reasoning is not
available performance will be lower than when agent reasoning is present,
ART1 < ART2+3.
Descriptive statistics for route selection task scores and decision times for all
decision points across three missions are shown in Table 5.
Table 5. Descriptive statistics for route selection scores and decision times, sorted by agent
reasoning transparency (ART) level.
N

Mean

SD

SE

95% C.I. for
Mean

ART 1

20

14.10

2.59

0.58

(12.89, 15.31)

ART 2

20

15.70

2.23

0.50

(14.66, 16.74)

ART 3

20

14.70

2.81

0.63

(13.38, 16.02)

ART 1

20

7.64

3.60

0.81

(5.95, 9.32)

ART 2

20

7.51

3.36

0.75

(5.93, 9.08)

ART 3

20

8.14

3.62

0.81

(6.45, 9.84)

Decision Time
Correct
Responses

ART 1

20

7.53

3.52

0.79

(5.88, 9.18)

ART 2

20

7.42

3.37

0.75

(5.85, 9.00)

ART 3

20

7.98

3.33

0.74

(6.43, 9.54)

Decision Time
Incorrect
Responses

ART 1

18

8.02

2.80

0.66

(6.63, 9.42)

ART 2

17

8.44

4.20

1.02

(6.28, 10.60)

ART 3

14

9.16

5.20

1.39

(6.16, 12.16)

Route Selection
Score

Overall
Decision Time

There was no significant effect of ART on the route selection task scores, F(2,57)
= 2.00, p = .145, 2 = .03 (Figure 9). Planned comparisons revealed mean performance
scores were slightly higher in ART2 than in ART1, t(57) = 1.98, p = .053, rc = .25. There
was no significant difference in performance between ART2 and ART3, t(57) = -1.24, p =
.221, rc = .16. The hypothesis was partially supported, as the medium-large effect size
between ARTs 1 and 2 indicates that the addition of agent reasoning did improve route
selection. Scores in ART3 were lower than those in ART2. However this difference was
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not significant, indicating that performance in these two conditions was essentially the
same.

Figure 9. Average route selection task score by agent reasoning transparency (ART) level. Bars
denote SE.

Examining the distribution of scores, the potential range of scores for the route
selection task was 0 – 18, and the range of participants’ scores was 6 – 18 (Figure 10). Of
these, 12 participants scored 18/18, 6 of whom were in ART3. Only 2 participants scored
less than 50%; the majority scored 67% or higher. Of these scores, there appeared to be
another break point near 80%, so this was used as a natural delineation for sorting the
scores into groups (i.e. 17 – 15, 14 – 12, > 12). Participants in ART1 were evenly split
between the 17 - 15 and 14 – 12 groups. However, there is an interesting difference
between these groups for ARTs 2 & 3, in that ART2 participants makeup 52% of the 17 –
15 group, while ART3 participants make up 45% of the 14 – 12 group. This appears to
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offer additional support for the hypothesis, as performance in the agent reasoning
conditions was better than in the notification-only condition, and performance does appear
to be slightly worse in ART3 than in ART2.

Figure 10. Distribution of scores for the route selection task across agent reasoning transparency
(ART) levels.

ART had no significant effect on overall decision time (DT), F(2,57) = 0.18, p =
.833, 2 = .03. DT in ART1 was slightly longer than in ART2, t(57) = -0.12, p = .908, rc
= .02, and DT in ART2 was shorter than in ART3, t(57) = 0.57, p = .570, rc = .08. Although
this result is contrary to what was expected (DT increasing as ART increased), this could
infer additional support for hypothesis 2, as the slight reduction in decision time regardless
of the increased amount of information to process could indicate a performance
improvement in ART 2 over ART1 when considered jointly with the route selection task
performance. There was no significant difference between ARTs 2 and 3 for overall
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decision time, indicating that the increased access to reasoning had little effect on decision
time.
Overall decision times for acceptances were compared to those for rejections [of
the agent recommendation] using paired t-tests, and there was no significant difference,
t(54) = -0.79, p =.432, d = 0.06 across ART levels. Overall decision times for correct
responses were compared to those for incorrect responses using paired t-tests, and were
found to be significantly shorter, t(48) = -2.15, p =.037, d = 0.17 across ART levels (Figure
11). Within each ART, this difference was greater in ART 2, t(16) = -1.91, p = .074, d =
0.27, than in either ART3, t(13) = -1.19, p = .256, d = 0.18, or ART1, t(17) = -0.46, p =
.651, d = 0.06. Decision times for incorrect responses were evaluated between ARTs, and
there was no significant difference between ART1 and ART2, t(46) = 0.30, p = .767, d =
0.04, or ART2 and ART3, t(46) = 0.49, p = .626, d = 0.07. Decision times for correct
responses were evaluated between ARTs, and there was no significant difference between
ART1 and ART2, t(57) = -0.10, p = .921, d = 0.01, or ART2 and ART3, t(57) = 0.52, p =
.607, d = 0.07. While not offering additional support for the hypothesis, the smaller
difference in mean decision time for incorrect responses demonstrated in ARTs 1 and 3
could be indicative of some participants’ increased complacent behavior in these
conditions.
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Figure 11. Comparison of average decision times for correct responses and incorrect responses,
shown by agent reasoning transparency (ART) level. Bars denote SE.

Operator Trust Evaluation
Hypothesis 3: Access to agent reasoning will increase operator trust in the
agent, ART1 < ART2, and increased transparency of agent reasoning will
decrease operator trust in the agent, ART2 > ART3.
Descriptive statistics for incorrect rejections and the Usability and Trust Survey
scores are shown in Table 6.
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Table 6. Descriptive statistics for incorrect rejections and usability and trust survey results, sorted
by agent reasoning transparency (ART) level.
N

Mean

SD

SE

ART 1

20

0.85

1.53

0.34

95% C.I. for
Mean
(0.13, 1.57)

ART 2

20

1.10

1.33

0.30

(0.48, 1.72)

ART 3

20

0.75

1.68

0.38

(-0.04, 1.54)

ART 1

20

62.75

7.38

1.65

(59.29, 66.21)

ART 2

20

56.25

9.24

2.07

(51.92, 60.58)

ART 3

20

62.50

8.27

1.85

(58.63, 66.37)

ART 1
Usability
ART 2
Responses
ART 3

20

46.75

5.33

1.19

(44.26, 49.24)

20

40.75

6.60

1.48

(37.66, 43.84)

20

45.75

7.03

1.57

(42.46, 49.04)

ART 1
Trust
ART 2
Responses
ART 3

20

58.55

8.28

1.85

(54.67, 62.43)

20

54.40

10.23

2.29

(49.61, 59.19)

20

61.60

11.72

2.62

(56.12, 67.08)

Incorrect
Rejections
Usability
& Trust
Survey

Examining the distribution of incorrect rejections at those locations where the agent
recommendation was correct across ARTs, 33 participants had no incorrect rejections.
These were predominately in ARTs 1 and 3, ART2 having half as many perfect scores as
the other two conditions (Figure 12). The range for potential scores for incorrect rejections
was 0 – 12, and the range of participants’ scores was 0 – 6. Twenty-seven (27) participants
had at least 1 incorrect rejection, and these scores were sorted into < 50% (score 3 or less)
and > 50% (score 4 or higher). Half of the participants in ART2 (10) had only 1 incorrect
rejection. Considering perfect scores and 1 incorrect rejection together, it would appear
that performance between the ARTs was relatively consistent. However, this may also be
evidence of more complacent behavior in ARTs 1 and 3, where the agent recommendation
was accepted more often, compared to more engaged, critical behavior in ART2 which
resulted in occasional errors in judgment and incorrect responses.
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Figure 12. Distribution of scores for incorrect rejections, sorted by agent reasoning transparency
(ART) level.

Evaluating incorrect rejections of the agent suggestions, there was no significant
effect of ART on incorrect rejections, F(2,57) = 0.28, p = .756, 2 = .02 (Figure 13).
Planned comparisons revealed incorrect rejections were slightly higher in ART2 than in
ART1, t(57) = 0.52, p = .606, rc = .07, and ART3, t(57) = -0.73, p = .470, rc = .10. Although
incorrect rejections were higher in ART2 than in either ART1 or 3, which is contrary to
predicted results, these findings were not significant.

70

Figure 13. Average incorrect rejections by agent reasoning transparency (ART) level. Bars denote
SE.

Decision time for responses at the locations where the agent recommendation was
correct was evaluated as a potential indicator of operator trust. It was hypothesized that
decision time would increase as agent reasoning transparency increased, as participants
should require additional time to process the extra information. Thus, increased time could
indicate more time spent on deliberation, which may infer lower trust (e.g. less complacent
behavior).

However, reduced decision times for incorrect rejections of the agent

recommendation at those locations could be indicative of complacent behavior. There was
not a significant effect of ART on overall decision time at the agent correct locations, F(2,
57) = 0.11, p = .896, 2 = .03 (Figure 14). Planned comparisons show that overall decision
times in ART2 were similar to those in ART1, t(57) = 0.09, p = .931, rc = .01, and those in
ART3, t(57) = 0.36, p = .723, rc = .05. Overall decision times for correct accepts were not
significantly across ART, F(2, 57) = 0.31, p = .738, 2 = .02. Planned comparisons show
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that decision times for correct responses in ART2 were similar to those in ART1, t(57) =
0.03, p = .979, rc = .00, and those in ART3, t(57) = 0.66, p = .510, rc = .09. Overall decision
times for incorrect rejections were not significantly different across ART, F(2, 57) = 0.09,
p = .918, 2 = .07. Planned comparisons show that decision times for incorrect rejections
in ART2 were similar to those in ART1, t(24) = 0.40, p = .691, rc = .08, and those in ART3,
t(24) = -0.03, p = .975, rc = .01.

Figure 14. Average Decision Times, in seconds, at the locations where the agent recommendation
was correct, sorted by correct/incorrect selections, for each agent reasoning transparency (ART)
level. Bars denote SE.

Paired t-tests were used to compare differences between decision times for correct
acceptances and incorrect rejections within each ART at those locations where the agent
recommendation was correct (Figure 15). Decision times for incorrect rejections were
significantly longer than for correct acceptances in ART2, t(13) = -2.56, p = .024, d = 0.47.
However, there was no difference between the two in ART1, t(6) = -0.81, p = .448, d =
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0.24, or ART3, t(5) = 0.61, p = .572, d = 0.13. This lack of difference in decision times in
ARTs 1 and 3 could indicate a more complacent stance towards critiquing the agent
recommendation in those conditions, while participants in ART2 appeared to maintain a
more engaged, critical stance.

Figure 15. Average Decision Time, in seconds, for correct acceptances and incorrect rejections
within each agent reasoning transparency (ART) level. Bars denote SE.

Operator trust was also evaluated using the Usability and Trust Survey. Perceived
Attentional Control (PAC) score correlated significantly with (r = .29, p = .013), and was
found to be significant predictor of Usability and Trust Survey scores, R2 = .083, b = .630,
t(58) = 2.29, p = .025. Participants who scored higher on PAC, indicating a greater ability
to focus their attention, also scored higher on the Usability and Trust survey than their
counterparts. PAC scores did not have a consistent relationship with Usability and Trust
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Survey scores for each ART group (heterogeneity of regression), as such was not included
as a covariate in subsequent analyses.
A between-groups ANOVA was conducted to assess the effect of ART on Usability
and Trust Survey scores and found a significant effect, F(2,57) = 3.00, p = .057, 2 = .06
(Figure 16). There was also a significant curvilinear trend to the data, F(1,57) = 5.76, p =
.020, 2 = .07. Usability and Trust scores in ART2 were lower than in either ART1, t(57)
= -1.83, p = .073, rc = .24, and ART3, t(57) = 2.33, p = .023, rc = .29, which is contrary to
the hypothesis. These scores indicate that participants trusted the agent more in ARTs 1
and 3 than in ART2. Adding agent reasoning transparency reduced perceived usability and
trust, however, increased transparency of agent reasoning appeared to improve perceived
usability and trust of the agent.

Figure 16. Average usability and trust survey scores by agent reasoning transparency (ART) level.
Bars denote SE.
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The Usability and Trust survey is a combination of surveys measuring Usability
and Trust. These individual surveys were also evaluated separately to assess whether the
overall findings were due to mainly operator trust or perceived usability.
Perceived Attentional Control (PAC) scores correlated significantly with (r = .28,
p = .03), and were found to be significant predictors of Trust Survey scores, R2 = .078, b =
.384, t(58) = 2.21, p = .031. Participants who scored higher on PAC also scored higher on
the Trust survey than their counterparts.
There was not a significant effect of ART on Trust score, F(2,57) = 2.52, p = .089,
2 = .05, (Figure 17). There was a significant curvilinear trend to the data, F(1,57) = 4.15,
p = .046, 2 = .05. Planned comparisons revealed that trust scores in ART2 were slightly
lower than in ART1, t(57) = -1.29, p = .202, rc = .17, and significantly lower than ART3
scores, t(57) = 2.24, p = .029, rc = .28. These findings do not support the hypothesis, as
ART2 had the lowest Trust scores while ART3 had the highest.
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Figure 17. Average trust scores by agent reasoning transparency (ART) level. Bars denote SE.

Perceived Attentional Control (PAC) scores correlated significantly with (r = .29,
p = .03), and were found to be significant predictors of Usability Survey scores, R2 = .084,
b = .260, t(58) = 2.31, p = .025. Participants who scored higher on PAC also scored higher
on the Usability survey than their counterparts.
There was a significant effect of ART on Usability scores, F(2,57) = 5.11, p = .009,
2 = .12, (Figure 18). There was also a significant curvilinear trend to the data, F(1,57) =
9.96, p = .003, 2 = .13. Planned comparisons show that Usability scores in ART2 were
significantly lower than those in either ART1, t(57) = -2.98, p = .004, rc = .37, or ART3,
t(57) = 2.49, p = .049, rc =.31. Overall, Usability scores were significantly lower when
agent reasoning was present than when it was not, t(57) = -2.01, p = .049, rc = .26.
Increased access to agent reasoning appeared to improve perceived usability of the agent.
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Figure 18. Average usability scores by agent reasoning transparency (ART) level. Bars denote
SE.

Workload Evaluation
Hypothesis 4: Access to agent reasoning will increase operator workload,
ART1 < ART2; and increased transparency of agent reasoning will increase
operator workload, ART2 < ART3. When agent reasoning is not available
workload will be lower than when agent reasoning is present, ART1 <
ART2+3.
Spatial Orientation Test (SOT) scores correlated significantly with (r = .31, p =
.015), and were found to be significant predictors of Global NASA-TLX scores, R2 = .098,
b = .570, t(58) = 2.52, p = .015. Participants who scored higher on the SOT, indicating a
lesser ability to orient and navigate in their environment, also scored higher on the Global
NASA-TLX than their counterparts. SOT scores did not have a consistent relationship
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with Global NASA-TLX scores for each ART group (heterogeneity of regression), as such
was not included as a covariate in subsequent analyses.
A between-groups ANOVA was conducted to assess the effect of ART on Global
NASA-TLX scores, and found that ART had no significant effect on participants' global
workload, F(2,57) = 0.68, p = .509, 2 = .01 (Figure 19). Planned contrasts revealed there
was no overall difference in participant workload when agent reasoning was available
compared to the no reasoning condition, (ART1 - ART2+3), t(57) = -0.48, p = .631, rc =
.06. Participants in ART1 (M = 64.70, SD = 13.47) reported lower workload than those in
ART2 (M = 65.18, SD = 12.38), t(57) = 0.12, p = .909, rc = .02, and workload was higher
in ART2 than in ART3 (M = 60.70, SD = 14.01), t(57) = -1.07, p = .291, rc = .14. The nonsignificant omnibus p-value, along with the small effect sizes, indicate that although
workload scores decreased in ART3, there was no significant difference between ARTs.

Figure 19. Average global NASA-TLX scores by agent reasoning transparency (ART) level. Bars
denote SE.
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Cognitive workload was also evaluated using several ocular indices. Descriptive
statistics are shown in Table 7. Not all participants had complete eye measurement data,
so this N was reduced (N = 12 for each ART). Eye tracking data was evaluated using the
same planned comparisons as the subjective workload measure.
Table 7. Descriptive statistics for eye tracking measures by agent reasoning transparency (ART)
condition.
N
Pupil
Diameter
(mm)

Mean

SD

SE

95% C.I. for Mean

ART 1
ART 2
ART 3

12
12
12

3.71
3.56
3.46

0.32
0.32
0.39

0.09
0.09
0.11

(3.50, 3.91)
(3.36, 3.76)
(3.21, 3.70)

ART 1
Fixation
ART 2
Duration (ms)
ART 3

12
12
12

264.54
288.53
265.71

42.16
42.21
25.23

12.17
12.18
7.28

(237.75, 291.33)
(261.71, 315.35)
(249.68, 281.74)

ART 1
ART 2
ART 3

12
12
12

4895.18
4809.97
5076.82

513.60
875.08
421.63

148.26
252.61
121.72

(4568.85, 5221.51)
(4253.97, 5365.97)
(4808.93, 5344.71)

Fixation
Count

ART had no significant effect on participants' pupil diameter, F(2,33) = 1.57, p =
.224, 2 = .03. There was a marginally significant linear trend, F(1,33) = 3.11, p = .087,
2 = .06, indicating that workload decreased as ART increased. Planned contrasts revealed
that there was no difference in participant workload (as measured via pupil diameter) when
agent reasoning was available, compared to the no reasoning condition, (ART1 - ART2+3),
t(33) = -1.61, p = .116, rc = .27. Participants in ART1 had larger pupil diameters than those
in ART2, t(33) = -1.03, p = .309, rc = .18, who in turn had larger pupil diameters than those
in ART3, t(33) = -0.73, p = .470, rc = .13.
ART had no significant effect on participants' fixation count, F(2,33) = 0.55, p =
.580, 2 = .03. Planned contrasts revealed there was no overall difference in participant
workload (as measured via fixation count) when agent reasoning was available compared
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to the no reasoning condition, (ART1 - ART2+3), t(33) = 0.22, p = .831, rc = .04.
Participants in ART2 had slightly fewer fixations than those in ART1, t(33) = -0.33, p =
.744, rc = .06, and in ART3, t(33) = 1.03, p = .310, rc = .18. These planned comparisons
did not reach statistical significance.
ART had no significant effect on participants' fixation duration, F(2,33) = 1.57, p
= .223, 2 = .03 (Figure 20). There was a marginally significant curvilinear trend, F(1,33)
= 3.13, p = .086, 2 = .06. Planned contrasts revealed there was no overall difference in
participant workload (as measured via fixation duration) when agent reasoning was
available compared to the no reasoning condition, (ART1 - ART2+3), t(33) = 0.95, p =
.348, rc = .16. Participants in ART2 had longer fixation durations than those in ART1,
t(33) = 1.57, p = .126, rc = .26, and fixation durations were longer in ART2 than in ART3,
t(33) = -1.50, p = .144, rc = .25. These planned comparisons did not reach statistical
significance.

Figure 20. Participant average fixation duration by agent reasoning transparency level. Bars denote
SE.
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The NASA-TLX Global score is a composite score made up of six factors.
Examining these factors separately, correlations between factors were low or nonexistent.
An omnibus MANOVA indicated that each factor had no significant difference across
ARTs, Wilks’ λ = .860, F(12,104) = 0.68, p =.770, ηp2 = .07 (Figure 21). Individual
evaluations of each factor across ART were made by one-way ANOVAs using Bonferroni
correction, α = .008, see Table 8.
Table 8. Evaluation of NASA-TLX workload factors across agent reasoning transparency (ART)
levels.
One-way ANOVA
(α = .008)

Mean (SD)
ART 1
MD
PhyD
TD
Perf
Effort
Frust

74.75 (20.10)
14.25 (12.06)
55.50 (24.49)
50.00 (18.92)
76.25 (15.29)
49.25 (24.40)

ART 2
79.75 (13.33)
11.25 (6.46)
61.75 (19.08)
46.25 (25.23)
71.25 (18.13)
48.50 (27.00)

ART 3
72.50 (16.34)
17.75 (13.91)
45.75 (19.49)
57.00 (20.16)
72.25 (15.26)
34.00 (17.29)

F (2,57)

ω2

0.97
1.95
2.90
1.28
0.53
3.49

.00
.02
.06
.01
.02
.05

*

**

Planned Comparisons
(Cohen's d )
ART 1 - ART 2 - ART 1 ART 2
ART 3 ART 2+3
0.25
0.36
0.08
0.36
0.73 *
0.03
0.25
0.63 **
0.10
0.15
0.42
0.07
0.26
0.05
0.27
0.03
0.71 **
0.41

**** p < .001, *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .07

Mental Demand (MD) was the factor contributing the most to workload, and ART2
elicited greater Mental Demand than ARTs 1 or 3. However, the effect size for the
difference between ARTs was small, indicating there is little to no difference in Mental
Demand. Physical Demand (PhyD) contributed the least to overall workload. PhyD scores
were significantly higher in ART 3 than in ART2.
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Figure 21. NASA-TLX workload factor average scores by agent reasoning transparency level. Bars
denote SE.

Effort decreased when access to agent reasoning was available. However, the effect
sizes were small. Temporal Demand (TD) and Frustration (Frust) scores were consistent
between ARTs 1 and 2, but dropped off in ART 3, indicating the additional access to agent
reasoning may have alleviated some of the pressure on participants in these ARTs.
Performance scores are inverted, with lower scores indicating greater satisfaction.
Performance scores indicate that participants in ARTs 1 and 2 were similarly satisfied with
their performance, but those in ART 3 were less satisfied with their performance. Spatial
Orientation Test (SOT) scores correlated significantly with Temporal Demand (r = .36, p
= .005) and Effort (r = .31, p = .015) scores, but no other NASA-TLX factors. Participants
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with High SOT scores, which infers less Spatial Orientation ability, reported greater
Temporal Demand in both ART2 (d = 0.82) and ART3 (d = 0.74) than their Low SOT
counterparts. High SOT score participants also reported greater Effort in ART1 (d = 1.09)
and ART3 (d = 1.37) than their Low SOT counterparts. However there was little difference
in Effort due to SOT in ART2 (d = 0.24).
Situation Awareness (SA) Evaluation
Hypothesis 5: Access to agent reasoning will improve SA scores, and
increased transparency of agent reasoning will improve SA1 and SA2
scores, but will reduce SA3 scores;


SA1: ART1 < ART2, ART2 < ART3;



SA2: ART1 < ART2, ART2 < ART3;



SA3: ART1 < ART2, ART2 > ART3.

Descriptive statistics for situation awareness scores are shown in Table 9.
Table 9. Descriptive statistics for situation awareness scores by agent reasoning transparency
(ART) level.
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Spatial Visualization (SV) scores (r = .31, p = .002) correlated significantly with,
and were found to be significant predictors of, SA Level 1 (SA1) scores, R2 = .130, b =
9.76, t(58) = 2.94, p = .005. Participants who scored higher in SV, indicating a greater
ability to manipulate objects mentally in 3D space, also scored higher on SA1 than their
counterparts. SV scores did not have a consistent relationship with SA1 scores for each
ART group (heterogeneity of regression), as such was not included as a covariate in
subsequent analyses.
SA Level 1 (perception of environment) scores indicated a significant effect of
ART, F(2,57) = 3.04, p = .056, 2 = .06 (Figure 22). Participants in ART2 had lower SA1
scores than those in ART1, t(57) = -0.81, p = .423, rc = 0.11, and ART3, t(57) = 2.42, p =
.019, rc = .31. The hypothesis was partially supported. SA1 scores were lower in ART2
than in ART1, although the small effect size indicates this difference may not be
meaningful. However, SA1 scores were greatest in ART3, supporting the hypothesis that
increased transparency of agent reasoning will lead to improved SA1 scores
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Figure 22. Average SA1 score by agent reasoning transparency (ART) level. Bars denote SE.

Spatial Visualization (SV) scores correlated significantly with (r = .33, p = .006),
and were found to be significant predictors of SA Level 2 (SA2) scores, R2 = .106, b =
7.71, t(58) = 2.62, p = .011. Participants who scored higher in SV, indicating a greater
ability to manipulate objects mentally in 3D space, also scored higher on SA2 than their
counterparts. SV scores did not have a consistent relationship with SA2 scores for each
ART group (heterogeneity of regression), as such was not included as a covariate in
subsequent analyses.
SA Level 2 (comprehension) scores indicated no significant effect of ART, F(2,57)
= 0.77, p = .469, 2 = .01. SA Level 2 scores were evaluated both regardless of route
selection and along the ground truth route only, and no significant difference in results was
found. Participants in ART2 had higher SA2 scores than those in ART1, t(57) = 1.18, p =
.245, rc = .15, or ART3, t(57) = -0.93, p = .358, rc = .12, however these differences were
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not significant. The hypothesis was not supported, in that access to agent reasoning
appeared to have no effect on SA2 scores.
There was unequal variance between groups for SA3 scores, so Welch’s statistic
was reported. SA Level 3 (projection) scores indicated a marginally significant difference
between ARTs, F(2,36.7) = 2.92, p = .067, 2 = .04 (Figure 23). There was also a
significant linear trend, F(1,36.7) = 4.35, p = .041, 2 = .05, indicating that SA3 scores
increased as ART increased. SA3 was evaluated both regardless of route selection and
along the ground truth route only, and no significant difference in results was found.
Participants in ART2 had higher SA3 scores than those in ART1, t(37.9) = 0.44, p = .660,
rc = .07, and participants in ART3 had higher SA3 scores than those in ART2, t(33.7) =
1.68, p = .103, rc = .28. The hypotheses were not supported. Although SA3 scores in
ART2 were greater than those in ART1, this difference did not reach significance. SA3
scores in ART3 were predicted to be lower than those in ART2. However they increased
as access to agent reasoning increased rather than decreased. While the difference between
groups did not reach significance, the significant linear trend indicates that increased access
to agent reasoning does help participants’ project future status.
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Figure 23. Average SA3 score by agent reasoning transparency (ART) level. Bars denote SE.

Target Detection Task Performance
Hypothesis 6: Access to agent reasoning will reduce the number of targets
detected and the number of FAs, ART1 > ART2, and increased
transparency of agent reasoning will again result in fewer targets detected
and fewer FAs, ART2 > ART3.
Descriptive statistics for Target Detection measures are shown in Table 10.
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Table 10. Descriptive statistics for Target Detection Task measures by agent reasoning
transparency (ART) level.

ART 1

20

44.45

10.10

2.26

95% C.I. for
Mean
(39.72, 49.18)

30
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ART 2

20

45.05

13.64

3.05

(38.66, 51.44)

11

65

ART 3

20

44.75

10.19

2.28

(39.98, 49.52)

29
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ART 1

20

20.80

6.25

1.40

(17.87, 23.73)

10

33

ART 2

20

16.35

5.29

1.18

(13.87, 18.83)

7

27

ART 3

20

17.30

7.53

1.68

(13.78, 20.82)

8

32

ART 1

20

2.20

0.32

0.07

(2.05, 2.35)

1.73

2.94

ART 2

20

2.31

0.44

0.10

(2.11, 2.52)

1.40

3.19

ART 3

20

2.29

0.38

0.09

(2.11, 2.46)

1.57

2.94

ART 1

20

2.42

0.28

0.06

(2.29, 2.56)

2.00

3.06

ART 2

20

2.60

0.33

0.07

(2.45, 2.76)

1.90

3.21

ART 3

20

2.60

0.37

0.08

(2.43, 2.78)

1.91

3.23

N
Targets
Detected
(Count)
FAs
(Count)

d'

β

Mean

SD

SE

Min

Max

Spatial Visualization (SV) scores correlated significantly with (r = .26, p = .022),
and were found to be significant predictors of total number of Targets Detected, R2 = .068,
b = 15.71, t(58) = 2.06, p = .044. Participants who scored higher in SV, indicating a greater
ability to mentally manipulate objects in 3D space, also detected more targets in their
environment than their counterparts. SV scores did not have a consistent relationship with
total number of Targets Detected for each ART group (heterogeneity of regression), as
such was not included as a covariate in subsequent analyses.
There was no significant effect of ART on the number of targets detected, F(2,57)
= 0.01, p = .986, 2 = .03. The number of targets detected was slightly greater in ART2
than in ART1, t(57) = 0.17, p = .869, rc = .02, or ART3, t(57) = -0.08, p = .934, rc = .01,
however these differences were not significant.
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Spatial Visualization (SV) scores (r = -.39, p = .001) and Working Memory
Capacity (WMC) scores (r = -.31, p = .009) correlated significantly with the total number
of False Alarms (FAs) reported. SV scores were found to be significant predictors of FAs,
R2 = .154, b = -14.55, t(57) = -2.80, p = .007, while WMC scores showed to be marginal
predictors of number of FAs reported, R2 = .049, b = -0.16, t(57) = -1.87, p = .067.
Participants who scored higher in SV, as well as those who scored higher on WMC
measures, also reported fewer FAs than their counterparts. SV scores and Working
Memory Capacity (WMC) scores did not have a consistent relationship with total number
of False Alarms (FAs) reported for each ART group (heterogeneity of regression), as such
was not included as a covariate in subsequent analyses.
There was a marginally significant effect of ART on the number of FAs across
ARTs, F(2,57) = 2.66, p = .078, 2 = .05 (Figure 24). The number of FAs was lower in
ART2 than in ART1, t(57) = -2.19, p = .033, rc = .28, however there was little-to-no
difference in number of reported FAs between ARTs 2 and 3, t(57) = 0.47, p = .642, rc =
.06. Thus the hypothesis was partially supported, as the addition of agent reasoning
transparency did result in fewer FAs, however the increased transparency did not further
reduce FAs.
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Figure 24. Average number of false alarms (FAs) by agent reasoning transparency (ART) level.
Bars denote SE.

Results of the target detection task were also evaluated using SDT to determine if
there were differences in sensitivity (d’) or selection bias (Beta) between the three ARTs.
There was no significant effect of ART on d’, F(2,57) = 0.44, p = .647, 2 = .02.
Participants were slightly more sensitive to targets in ART2 than in ART1, t(57) = 0.90, p
= .374, rc = .12, or ART3, t(57) = -0.22, p = .831, rc = .03, however these differences did
not achieve statistical significance.
Evaluating Beta across ART, there was no significant effect of ART on Beta scores,
F(2,57) = 1.94, p = .153, 2 = .03 (Figure 25). Beta scores were lower in ART1 than in
ART2, t(57) = 1.71, p = .094, rc = .22, and there was no difference in scores between ART2
and ART3, t(57) = 0.00, p = .998, rc = .00. This indicates that the presence of agent
reasoning allowed the participants to use a stricter selection criterion than in the no
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reasoning condition, but increasing the amount of agent reasoning did not have any further
effect on participants’ selection criteria. This more lenient selection criterion in ART1
could be the reason there were more FAs reported in ART1 than in either ARTs 2 or 3.

Figure 25. Average Beta scores by agent reasoning transparency (ART) level. Bars denote SE.

Individual Differences Evaluations
Complacency Potential
Complacency Potential (CP) was evaluated via the Complacency Potential Rating
Scale (CPRS) scores. The effect of CP on several measures of interest across agent
reasoning transparency (ART) level was evaluated via two-way between-groups
ANOVAs, α = .05. Post hoc t-tests within each ART compared performance differences
between high/low group memberships. Descriptive statistics for Complacency Potential,
as measured using the Complacency Potential Rating Scale (CPRS), are shown in Tables
11 and 12.
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Table 11. Descriptive statistics for Complacency Potential Rating Scale (CPRS) scores by agent
reasoning transparency (ART) level.
Group

Mdn Split Count
Hi
Lo

N

Min

Max

Mdn

Mean

SD

Overall

60

28

49

39.50

39.90

4.90

30

30

ART 1

20

28

46

38.00

38.50

4.90

8

12

ART 2

20

29

48

41.50

40.90

5.00

10

10

ART 3

20

33

49

41.00

40.30

4.60

12

8

Table 12. Descriptive statistics for High/Low Complacency Potential Rating Scale (CPRS) scores
by agent reasoning transparency (ART) level.
N
ART 1

ART 2

ART 3

Mean

SD

SE

95% C.I. for Mean

Low CPRS

12

35.33

3.11

0.90

(33.35, 37.31)

High CPRS

8

43.25

2.55

0.90

(41.12, 45.38)

Low CPRS

10

36.80

3.50

1.11

(34.20, 38.20)

High CPRS

10

45.10

1.37

0.43

(44.12, 46.08)

Low CPRS

8

35.50

1.77

0.63

(34.02, 36.98)

High CPRS

12

43.50

2.68

0.77

(41.80, 45.20)

Hypothesis 7: High CPRS individuals will have fewer correct rejects on the
route planning task than Low CPRS individuals.
A two-way between-groups ANOVA revealed no significant interaction between
CPRS and ART on the number of correct rejects in the route planning task, F(2,54) = 0.39,
p = .682, ηp2 =.01, nor any significant main effect of CPRS on the number of correct rejects
in the route planning task, F(1,54) = 0.88, p = .768, ηp2 = .00.
Hypothesis 8: High CPRS individuals will have higher scores on the
usability and trust survey than Low CPRS individuals.
A two-way between-groups ANOVA revealed no significant interaction between
CPRS and ART on Usability and Trust Survey scores, F(2,54) = 0.86, p = .429, ηp2 = .03,
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nor any significant main effect of CPRS on Usability scores, F(1,54) = 2.25, p = .140, ηp2
= .04.
Hypothesis 9: High CPRS individuals will have lower SA scores than Low
CPRS individuals.
A two-way between-groups ANOVA revealed no significant interaction between
CPRS and ART on SA1 scores, F(2,54) = 0.23, p = .794, ηp2 =.01, nor any significant main
effect of CPRS on SA1 scores, F(2,54) = 0.27, p = .608, ηp2 = .01. There was no significant
interaction between CPRS and ART on SA2 scores, F(2,54) = 0.61, p = .548, ηp2 = .02, nor
any significant main effect of CPRS on SA2 scores, F(2,54) = 0.24, p = .628, ηp2 = .00.
There was no significant interaction between CPRS and ART on SA3 scores, F(2,54) =
1.41, p = .254, ηp2 =.05, nor any significant main effect of CPRS on SA3 scores, F(2,54) =
0.01, p = .921, ηp2 = .00.
Spatial Ability (SOT and SV) and Perceived Attentional Control (PAC)
Hypothesis 10: Individual differences, such as SpA and PAC, will have
differential effects on the operator’s performance on the route selection task
and their ability to maintain SA.
The effects of individual difference (ID) factors and agent reasoning transparency
(ART) level on route selection performance were evaluated via two-way between-groups
ANOVAs, α = .05. When Levene’s Test of Equality of Error Variance was significant, the
evaluation was repeated at α = .01.

Post hoc t-tests within each ART compared

performance differences between high/low group memberships for each ID factor.
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Descriptive statistics for Spatial Orientation (SOT), Spatial Visualization (SV), and
Perceived Attentional Control (PAC) are shown in Tables 13 and 14.
Table 13. Descriptive statistics for Spatial Orientation (SOT), Spatial Visualization (SV), and
Perceived Attentional Control (PAC), by Agent Reasoning Transparency (ART) level.
Group

SOT

SV

PAC

Mdn Split Count
SD
Hi
Lo

N

Min

Max

Mdn

Mean

Overall

60

3.97

29.54

12.72

13.59

7.28

30

30

ART 1

20

5.70

22.00

14.06

13.27

5.20

8

12

ART 2

20

4.12

29.00

10.10

13.35

7.98

11

9

ART 3

20

3.97

29.54

11.22

14.15

8.56

11

9

Overall

60

0.19

0.95

0.50

0.53

0.19

35

25

ART 1

20

0.19

0.93

0.54

0.54

0.19

12

8

ART 2

20

0.21

0.86

0.54

0.52

0.20

13

7

ART 3

20

0.21

0.95

0.49

0.52

0.18

10

10

Overall

60

41.0

74.0

61.00

60.50

7.50

32

28

ART 1

20

46.0

74.0

65.50

63.00

8.00

13

7

ART 2

20

47.0

69.0

60.50

60.10

6.00

10

10

ART 3

20

41.0

74.0

60.00

58.50

8.20

9

11
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Table 14. Descriptive statistics for Spatial Orientation (SOT), Spatial Visualization (SV), and
Perceived Attentional Control (PAC), by Agent Reasoning Transparency (ART) level, sorted by
High/Low group membership.
N
ART 1

SOT

ART 2

ART 3

ART 1

SV

ART 2

ART 3

ART 1

PAC

ART 2

ART 3

Mean

SD

SE

95% C.I. for Mean

Low

12

16.88

2.95

0.85

(13.11, 22.00)

High

8

7.86

1.98

0.70

(5.70, 11.55)

Low

9

20.90

5.28

1.76

(14.64, 29.00)

High

11

7.16

2.32

0.70

(4.12, 10.43)

Low

9

21.93

6.47

2.16

(12.72, 29.54)

High

11

7.78

2.56

0.77

(3.97, 12.71)

Low

8

0.36

0.09

0.03

(0.19, 0.45)

High

12

0.66

0.14

0.04

(0.50, 0.93)

Low

7

0.30

0.11

0.04

(0.21, 0.48)

High

13

0.64

0.12

0.03

(0.50, 0.86)

Low

10

0.39

0.08

0.03

(0.21, 0.48)

High

10

0.66

0.14

0.04

(0.50, 0.95)

Low

7

53.57

4.24

1.60

(46.0, 60.0)

High

13

68.08

3.62

1.00

(62.0, 74.0)

Low

10

55.50

4.43

1.40

(47.0, 60.0)

High

10

64.70

2.95

0.93

(61.0, 69.0)

Low

11

53.18

6.84

2.06

(41.0, 60.0)

High

9

64.89

3.98

1.33

(61.0, 74.0)

Route Selection Task Evaluation
Spatial Orientation (SOT) was not found to be a significant predictor of
performance on the route selection task independent of ART, R2 = .00, β = -.003, t(59) = 0.02, p = .982. A two-way between-groups ANOVA revealed no significant interaction
between SOT and ART on Route Selection scores, F(2,54) = 0.92, p = .406, ηp2 = .03, nor
any significant main effect of SOT on Route Selection scores, F(1,54) = 0.04, p = .848, ηp2
= .00.
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Spatial Visualization (SV) was found to be a significant predictor of performance
on the route selection task independent of ART level, R2 = .10, β = .31, t(59) = 2.52, p =
.015. A two-way between-groups ANOVA, α = .01, revealed no significant interaction
between SV and ART on Route Selection scores, F(2,54) = 1.76, p = .182, ηp2 = .06,
however, there was a significant main effect of SV on Route Selection scores, F(1,54) =
4.31, p = .043, ηp2 = .07 (Figure 26). Post hoc comparisons between high/low SV groups
within each ART level show that High SV and Low SV individuals had similar Route
Selection scores in ART1, t(18) = -0.66, p = .518, d = 0.31, and ART3, t(18) = -0.16, p =
.879, d = 0.07. However in ART2 the High SV individuals had higher Route Selection
scores than their Low SV counterparts, t(18) = -3.08, p = .017, d = 1.59.

Figure 26. Average route selection scores by High/Low Spatial Visualization (SV) group
membership, sorted by agent reasoning transparency (ART) level. Bars denote SE.

A two-way between-groups ANOVA revealed no significant interaction between
PAC and ART on Route Selection scores, F(2,54) = 0.17, p = .845, ηp2 = .01, nor any
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significant main effect of SOT on Route Selection scores, F(1,54) = 0.32, p = .574, ηp2 =
.01.
SA1 Evaluation
A two-way between-groups ANOVA revealed no significant interaction between
SOT and ART on SA1 scores, F(2,54) = 0.77, p = .469, ηp2 = .028, nor any significant main
effect of SOT on SA1 scores, F(1,54) = 0.43, p = .515, ηp2 = .008.
A two-way between-groups ANOVA revealed no significant interaction between
SV and ART on SA1 scores, F(2,54) = 0.34, p = .716, ηp2 = .01, however there was a
significant main effect of SV on SA1 scores, F(1,54) = 14.62, p < .001, ηp2 = .21 (Figure
27. High SV individuals had higher SA1 scores in all ARTs (ART1, t(18) = -1.73, p =
.101, d = 0.81; ART2, t(18) = -2.39, p = .028, d = 1.09; ART3, t(18) = -2.79, p = .012, d =
1.25) than their Low SV counterparts.

Figure 27. Average SA1 scores by Spatial Visualization (SV) High/Low group membership, sorted
by agent reasoning transparency (ART) level. Bars denote SE.
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A two-way between-groups ANOVA revealed no significant interaction between
PAC and ART on SA1 scores, F(2,54) = 1.98, p = .148, ηp2 = .07, nor any significant main
effect of PAC on SA1 scores, F(1,54) = 2.76, p = .102, ηp2 = .05.
SA2 Evaluation
A two-way between-groups ANOVA revealed no significant interaction between
SOT and ART on SA2 scores, F(2,54) = 1.40, p = .255, ηp2 = .05, nor any significant main
effect of SOT on SA2 scores, F(1,54) = 0.27, p = .603, ηp2 = .01. There was no significant
interaction between SV and ART on SA2 scores, F(2,54) = 0.63, p = .534, ηp2 = .02, nor
any significant main effect of SV on SA2 scores, F(1,54) = 3.20, p = .079, ηp2 = .06. There
was no significant interaction between PAC and ART on SA2 scores, F(2,54) = 0.06, p =
.943, ηp2 = .00, nor any significant main effect of PAC on SA2 scores, F(1,54) = 0.44, p =
.511, ηp2 = .01.
SA3 Evaluation
A two-way between-groups ANOVA revealed no significant interaction between
SOT and ART on SA3 scores, F(2,54) = 0.51, p = .604, ηp2 = .02, nor any significant main
effect of SOT on SA3 scores, F(1,54) = 0.68, p = .414, ηp2 = .01.
A two-way between-groups ANOVA revealed no significant interaction between
SV and ART on SA3 scores, F(2,54) = 0.50, p = .611, ηp2 = .02, however there was a
significant main effect of SV on SA3 scores, F(1,54) = 6.73, p = .012, ηp2 = .11 (Figure
28). High SV individuals had higher SA3 scores in all ARTs (ART1, t(18) = -1.54, p =
.142, d = 0.69; ART2, t(18) = -1.89, p = .075, d = 0.85; ART3, t(18) = -0.93, p = .364, d =
0.42).
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Figure 28. Average SA3 scores by Spatial Visualization (SV) High/Low group membership, sorted
by agent reasoning transparency (ART) level. Bars denote SE.

A two-way between-groups ANOVA revealed no significant interaction between
PAC and ART on SA3 scores, F(2,54) = 2.78, p = .071, ηp2 = .09, and no significant main
effect of PAC on SA3 scores, F(1,54) = 0.01, p = .906, ηp2 = .00.
Working Memory Capacity (WMC)
Hypothesis 11: High WMC individuals will have more correct rejections
and higher SA2 and SA3 scores than Low WMC individuals.
The effects of Working Memory Capacity (WMC) and agent reasoning
transparency (ART) level were evaluated via two-way between-groups ANOVAs, α = .05.
Post hoc t-tests within each ART compared performance differences between high/low
group memberships. Descriptive statistics for WMC, as measured using the RSPAN test,
are shown in Tables 15 and 16.
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Table 15. Descriptive statistics for Working Memory Capacity (WMC), by Agent Reasoning
Transparency (ART) level.

WMC

Mdn Split Count
SD
Hi
Lo

Group

N

Min

Max

Mdn

Mean

Overall

60

5.0

51.0

32.50

31.30

11.10

30

30

ART 1

20

8.0

51.0

30.50

30.90

10.98

9

11

ART 2

20

8.0

49.0

36.00

33.85

9.95

13

7

ART 3

20

5.0

51.0

28.50

29.15

12.39

8

12

Table 16. Descriptive statistics for Working Memory Capacity (WMC), by Agent Reasoning
Transparency (ART) level, sorted by High/Low group membership.
N
ART 1

WMC

ART 2

ART 3

Mean

SD

SE

95% C.I. for Mean

Low

11

22.64

6.36

1.92

(18.36, 26.91)

High

9

41.00

5.22

1.74

(36.99, 45.01)

Low

7

23.29

7.85

2.97

(16.03, 30.54)

High

13

39.54

5.09

1.41

(36.46, 42.62)

Low

12

20.92

7.59

2.19

(16.10, 25.74)

High

8

41.50

5.98

2.11

(36.50, 46.50)

Correct Rejections
A two-way between-groups ANOVA revealed no significant interaction between
WMC and ART on Correct Rejection scores, F(2,54) = 0.89, p = .418, ηp2 = .03, nor any
significant main effect of WMC on Correct Reject scores, F(1,54) = 0.19, p = .664, ηp2 =
.00.
SA scores
A two-way between-groups ANOVA revealed no significant interaction between
WMC and ART on SA2 scores, F(2,54) = 1.64, p = .203, ηp2 = .06, nor any significant
main effect of WMC on SA2 scores, F(1,54) = 1.51, p = .224, ηp2 = .03. There was no
significant interaction between WMC and ART on SA3 scores, F(2,54) = 0.42, p = .661,

100

ηp2 = .02, nor any significant main effect of WMC on SA3 scores, F(1,54) = 2.36, p = .131,
ηp2 = .04.
Discussion
The primary goal was to examine how the transparency of an intelligent agent’s
reasoning in a low information environment affected complacent behavior in a route
selection task. Participants supervised a three-vehicle convoy as it traversed a simulated
environment and re-routed the convoy when needed with the assistance of an intelligent
agent, RoboLeader (RL). Information regarding potential events along the pre-planned
route, together with communications from a commander confirming either the presence or
absence of activity in the area, were provided to all participants. They did not receive any
information about the suggested alternate route. However, they were instructed that the
proposed path was at least as safe as their original route. When the convoy approached a
potentially unsafe area, the intelligent agent would recommend re-routing the convoy. The
agent recommendations were correct 66% of the time. The participant was required to
recognize and correctly reject any incorrect suggestions. The secondary goal of this study
was to examine how differing levels of agent transparency affected main task and
secondary task performance, response time, workload, SA, trust, and system usability,
along with implications of individual difference factors such as spatial ability, WMC, PAC,
and complacency potential (CP).
Each participant was assigned to a specific level of agent reasoning transparency
(ART). The reasoning was provided as to why the agent was making the recommendation
and this differed among these levels. ART1 provided no reasoning information; RL
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notified that a change was recommended without explanation. The type of information the
agent supplied varied slightly between ARTs 2 and 3. In ART2 the agent reasoning was a
simple statement of fact (e.g. recommend revise convoy route due to Potential IED). In
ART3 an additional piece of reasoning information was added, which conveyed when the
agent had received the information leading to its recommendation (e.g. recommend revise
convoy route due to Potential IED, TOR: 1 [hour]). This additional information did not
convey any confidence level or uncertainty but was designed to encourage the operator to
evaluate the quality of the information actively rather than simply respond. Therefore, not
only was access to agent reasoning examined, but the impact of the type of information the
agent supplied was examined as well.
Complacent behavior was examined via primary (route selection) task response, in
the form of incorrect acceptances of the agent recommendation, an objective measure of
errors of commission (Parasuraman et al., 2000). As predicted, access to agent reasoning
reduced these incorrect acceptances and increased access to agent reasoning increased
incorrect acceptances. The number of incorrect acceptances was highest when no agent
reasoning was available. When the amount of agent reasoning was increased to its highest
level, the number of incorrect acceptances increased to nearly the same level as in the noreasoning condition. This pattern of results indicates that while access to agent reasoning
in a decision-supporting agent can counter complacent behavior, too much information
resulted in an out-of-the-loop (OOTL) situation and increased complacent behavior.
Similar to previous findings (Mercado et. al., 2015) access to agent reasoning did not
increase response time. In fact, decision times were reduced in the agent reasoning
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condition, even though the agent messages in the reasoning conditions were longer than in
the no reasoning condition and therefore should require slightly more time to process.
Similar studies have suggested that a reduction in accuracy with consistent response times
could be attributed to a speed-accuracy trade-off (Wickens et al. 2015). However, the
present findings indicated that may not be the case. Initially, there was an increase in
accuracy with no accompanying increase in response time (hence no trade-off). What
appears to be more likely is that not only does the access to agent reasoning assist the
operator in determining the correct course of action, but the type of information the
operator receives also influences their behavior.
In all conditions, the operator received all information needed to correctly route the
convoy without the agent’s suggestion. In the no reasoning condition, the operators were
less likely to override the incorrect agent suggestion, demonstrating a clear bias for the
agent suggestion. With a moderate amount of information regarding the agent reasoning,
the operators were more confident in identifying and overriding erroneous
recommendations. In the highest reasoning transparency condition, operators were also
given information regarding when the agent had received the information used to generate
the recommendation (i.e. its recency). While this information did not imply any confidence
or uncertainty pertaining to the agent recommendation, such additional information
appeared to encourage more complacent behavior in the operators. This may be due to the
increased difficulty in assimilating the additional information, however it is more likely
that this type of information was ambiguous, and this ambiguity appeared to encourage the
operators to defer to the agent suggestion even when incorrect.
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Performance on the route selection task was evaluated via correct rejections and
acceptances of the agent suggestion. An increased number of correct acceptances and
rejections, as well as reduced response times were all indicative of improved performance.
Route selection performance was anticipated as improving with access to agent reasoning
and then decline as access to agent reasoning increased. This hypothesis was partially
supported. Performance did improve when access to agent reasoning was provided.
Increased transparency of agent reasoning did result in a subsequent decline in scores,
however the small-medium effect size indicated these results are not strong evidence in
support of the latter demand of the hypothesis. Spatial visualization (SV) was predictive
of performance on the route selection task. Individuals with High SV scores outperformed
their Low SV counterparts on the route selection task in ART2. This demonstrated their
advantage in assimilating the agent reasoning information supplied in this condition.
However, this advantage was lost when additional reasoning in ART3 was supplied.
Access to agent reasoning did not increase overall operator workload as
hypothesized. Workload was evaluated using the NASA-TLX and several ocular indices
shown to be informative as to cognitive workload. Global NASA-TLX scores were lower
in ART3 than in ARTs 1 and 2, but such changes were not significant. Pupil Diameter
(PD), Fixation Count (FC) and Duration (FD) did not differ significantly between the three
ARTs. This contradicts the stated hypothesis, and could be evidence that there is no
difference in perceived cognitive workload between ARTs. However, examination of the
NASA-TLX subscales tells a somewhat different story. The ratings for factors Temporal
Demand (i.e. ‘How much time pressure did you feel due to the rate or pace at which the
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task or tasks elements occurred?’) and Frustration (‘How insecure, discouraged, irritated,
stressed, and annoyed versus secure, gratified, content, relaxed, and complacent did you
feel during the task?’) were relatively consistent between in ARTs 1 and 2, but dropped off
significantly in ART3. Interestingly, Physical Demand (‘How much physical activity was
required (e.g., pushing, pulling, turning, controlling, activating, etc.? Was the task easy or
demanding, slow or brisk, slack or strenuous, restful or laborious?’) was much higher in ART3

than in ART2. These findings appear to be at odds with one another, however this
combination of results may be an indication of increased workload in ART3. As the
experiment was delivered via computer simulation, the only sort of physical demand that
a participant could encounter would be scanning the OCU for information. Typically,
higher physical demand coupled with reduced frustration and temporal demand should
result in improved performance. However, the number of incorrect acceptances increased
in ART3 from ART2, and participants reported the least satisfaction in their [perceived]
Performance (i.e. ‘How successful do you think you were in accomplishing the goals of
the task set by the experimenter? How satisfied were you with your performance in
accomplishing these goals?’) in ART3. Considered alongside the other findings, the
subjective performance rating may be indicative of their awareness of their actual
performance in ART3, in that the participant is aware that they are essentially off-loading
the route selection task in favor of other tasks. Increased scanning does little to improve
performance on the route selection task, however it is key to improved SA1 scores and
target detection task performance. While there was no difference in target detection
performance between ARTs, SA1 scores in ART3 were much higher than in the other
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conditions. This observation tends to support the findings of increased complacency in
this ART. These findings also indicate that although incorrect acceptances were greatest
in ARTs 1 and 3, the reasons behind such may be different. While the incorrect acceptances
in ART1 may be due to high workload encouraging complacent behavior, the incorrect
acceptances in ART3 may be due to more complex reasons than simply higher workload.
Situation Awareness (SA) scores were hypothesized to improve with access to
agent reasoning; this with the exception of SA3 scores in ART3. In this study, SA1 scores
evaluated how well the participant maintained a general awareness of their environment,
with the idea that increased access to agent reasoning would also give the participant
context for events within their environment, thus making certain events and situations more
salient. Those who were more successful at this integration would then show improved
performance on the route selection task, as well as improved SA2 scores (Hancock and
Diaz 2002). SA1 scores did not improve with access to agent reasoning. However with
increased agent reasoning transparency SA1 scores improved substantially. This may
indicate that additional access to reasoning allowed participants more time to monitor their
environment. However, since there was also a reduction in performance on the route
selection task, as well as demonstrated complacent behavior in ART3, it is more likely that
the improvement in SA1 scores was a result of neglecting duties on other tasks (i.e., an
inter-task trade-off). There were no significant difference in SA2 (comprehension) scores
between ARTs. However SA3 scores did show a significant upward trend across ARTs.
This suggests that, while access to agent reasoning does not improve comprehension, it
could incrementally improve an operator’s ability to predict future outcomes. In previous
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studies, increased autonomous assistance did result in improved SA (see Wright et al.
2013). However, the present findings indicate access to agent reasoning does little to
improve SA.

There were differences in SA scores dependent upon the individual

difference factor spatial visualization (SV). High SV individuals had higher SA1 and SA3
scores than their low SV counterparts. This was most likely due to their increased ability
to scan their environment (Lathan and Tracey 2002; Chen et al. 2008; Chen et al. 2010).
Access to agent reasoning appeared to have little influence on performance on the
target detection task. There were no significant differences in the mean number of targets
correctly detected across ART. However, access to agent reasoning did mitigate the
number of false alarms reported. Signal Detection Theory measured whether access to
agent reasoning had any effect on sensitivity or selection criteria. Sensitivity to targets,
assessed as d’, appeared to be slightly lower in the no reasoning condition. Selection
criteria were also lower in the no reasoning condition. Thus, participants appeared to use
a higher selection criterion when targets were more readily identifiable, and then
subsequently loosened their selection bias when target sensitivity was lower. This pattern
of behavior could explain the greater number of false alarms reported in the no reasoning
condition.
Operator trust in the agent was assessed objectively by evaluating incorrect
rejections of the agent’s suggestions when the agent was correct, along with the associated
decision times, and subjectively using the Usability and Trust Survey. The performance
measure of operator trust indicated potentially higher trust in the notification-only and the
highest agent reasoning transparency conditions, as the number of acceptances (no
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incorrect rejections) was double that of the moderate agent reasoning transparency
condition, with no associated difference in decision time. However, when a moderate
amount of agent reasoning was available, there were fewer acceptances, even though the
overall score was roughly the same as the other conditions, and decision times in this
condition were longer for incorrect rejections than for the correct acceptances. This could
be evidence of trustful behavior when agent reasoning transparency was present.
Subjective measures also indicated access to agent reasoning reduced trust and
usability evaluations. Increased transparency of agent reasoning resulted in increased trust
and usability ratings. However there was no associated overall improvement in
performance. Interestingly, operators reported highest trust and usability in the conditions
that also had the highest complacency and lowest in the condition that had the highest
performance. In the conditions when the agent reasoning was not transparent, and when
the agent reasoning was highly transparent, the participant’ trust and usability evaluations
were highest (albeit for potentially different reasons), even though they knew the agent was
not completely reliable. However, in the condition with a moderate amount of agent
reasoning transparency, the participants reported lower trust and usability, indicating they
were more critical of the agent recommendations in this condition, resulting in reduced
complacency and improved performance.
A potential limitation of this work could be the added time information in ART3.
While the participants in that agent reasoning condition were instructed that the time
reflected when the agent received the information upon which it based its recommendation,
they were not instructed how they should use that information in their deliberations. Thus,
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this information could have appeared ambiguous to the participants, and there could be
variability in how they factored this information into their decision based on their personal
experience.
Conclusion
The findings of the present study are important for the design of intelligent
recommender and decision-aid systems. Keeping the operator engaged and in-the-loop is
important for reducing complacency, which could allow lapses in system reliability to go
unnoticed. To that end, how agent reasoning transparency affected complacent behavior,
as well as task performance and trust, was examined. Access to agent reasoning appears
to be an effective deterrent to complacent behavior when the operator has limited
information about their task environment. Contrary to the position adopted by Paradis et
al. (2005), operators do accept agent recommendations even when they do not know the
rationale behind the suggestions. In fact, the absence of agent reasoning appears to
encourage complacent behavior. Access to the agent’s reasoning appears to allow the
operator to calibrate their trust in the system effectively, reducing incorrect acceptances
and improving performance. This outcome is similar to findings previously reported by
Helldin et al. (2014) and Mercado et al. (2015). However, the addition of information that
created ambiguity for the operator again encouraged complacency, resulting in reduced
performance and poorer trust calibration.

Prior work has shown that irrelevant or

ambiguous information can increase workload and encourage complacent behavior (Chen
and Barnes, 2014; Westerbeek and Maes, 2013), and these findings align with those. As
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such, caution should be exercised when considering how transparent to make agent
reasoning and what information should be included.
Similar to Mercado et al. (2015), access to agent reasoning did not increase
response time or workload. In addition, the presence of agent reasoning appears to have
positively affected performance on the secondary target detection task. While the overall
number of targets detected did not differ among conditions, the selection criterion appeared
to have been higher in the agent reasoning conditions, resulting in fewer reported false
alarms.

While increased false alarms may be beneficial in some settings, this task

environment was non-combat and suburban, and a false alarm meant erroneously
identifying a civilian or friendly soldier as a potential enemy combatant. While the route
selection task and target detection tasks were not simultaneous, it appears as though the
presence of agent reasoning allowed the participants to focus better on the target detection
task between route decision locations.
Future Work
This work represents the first of two studies exploring the effect of agent
transparency on complacent behavior. In the follow-up study, the amount of information
the operator has regarding the task environment will be increased. As a result of this
increase, the amount of agent reasoning provided will also be increased to incorporate
additional information into agent recommendations.

This will allow comparison of

differences in operator complacency and performance due to further operator knowledge
of their task environment as well as that as a result of greater access to agent reasoning.
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CHAPTER 4: EXPERIMENT 2
Study Overview
Experiment 2 investigated how access to the agent’s reasoning affected the human
operator’s decision-making, task performance, situation awareness, and complacent
behavior in a multitasking environment when additional, sometimes competing,
environmental information is available. It differed from Experiment 1 in two ways: first,
the level of environmental information was increased, and second, the degree of agent
reasoning transparency, when available, was increased. Environmental information was
displayed by icons appearing on the map, with events affecting both the original route and
the proposed alternative displayed. Agent reasoning transparency (ART) was manipulated
via RoboLeader’s detailed notifications, which were expanded from experiment 1 to
include each of the icons affecting the area, along with weighing information as to how
each event was factored into RL’s recommendation.
Hypotheses
Based on the review of the literature, this proposal posits the following hypotheses:
It is hypothesized that access to agent reasoning would reduce complacent
behavior, improve task performance, and increase trust in the agent, and increased access
to agent reasoning would increase complacent behavior, negatively impact performance,
and reduce trust in the agent. Although decision time decreased with the access to agent
reasoning in EXP1, the increase in agent transparency in this study was expected to
increase decision time (aside from clearly complacent behavior): ART1 < ART2 < ART3.
Unlike EXP1, RL’s messages were considerably longer in ARTs 2 and 3 than in ART1, as
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such additional time was expected to be required for reading the messages. Participants
were expected to take longer to process the information and reach their decision, resulting
in a longer decision time. Shorter response times may indicate less deliberation on the part
of the operator before accepting or rejecting the agent recommendation. This could mean
either positive complacent behavior or reduced task difficulty.
Hypothesis 1: Access to agent reasoning will reduce incorrect acceptances,
ART1 > ART2, and increased transparency of agent reasoning will increase
incorrect acceptances, ART2 < ART3.

When agent reasoning is not

available, incorrect acceptances will be greater than when agent reasoning
is present, ART1 > ART2+3.
Hypothesis 2: Access to agent reasoning will improve performance (number
of correct rejects and accepts) on the route selection task, ART1 < ART2,
and increased transparency of agent reasoning will reduce performance on
the route selection task, ART2 > ART3. When agent reasoning is not
available, performance will be lower than when agent reasoning is present,
ART1 < ART2+3.
Hypothesis 3: Access to agent reasoning will increase operator trust in the
agent, ART1 < ART2, and increased transparency of agent reasoning will
decrease operator trust in the agent, ART2 > ART3.
It is hypothesized that increasing agent reasoning transparency will, in turn,
increase the operators’ workload. In EXP1, increased access to agent reasoning reduced
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operator perceived workload. However, in this study, as the agent reasoning becomes more
transparent the amount of information the operator must process has increased considerably
from that presented in EXP1. It is expected that this increased mental demand will be
reflected in the workload measures.
Hypothesis 4: Access to agent reasoning will increase operator workload,
ART1 < ART2; and increased transparency of agent reasoning will increase
operator workload, ART2 < ART3. When agent reasoning is not available,
workload will be lower than when agent reasoning is present, ART1 <
ART2+3.
It is hypothesized that agent reasoning transparency will support the operators’
situation awareness (SA). Access to the agent reasoning will help the operator better
comprehend how objects/events in the task environment affect their mission, thus
informing their task of monitoring the environment surrounding the convoy and making
them cognizant of potential risks. This understanding will also enable them to make more
accurate projections regarding the future safety of their convoy. However, the addition of
information that appears ambiguous to the operator will have a detrimental effect on both
their ability continuously monitor their environment, as well as their ability to correctly
project future status.
Hypothesis 5: Access to agent reasoning will improve SA scores, and
increased transparency of agent reasoning will improve SA2 scores, but will
reduce SA1 and SA3 scores;
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SA1: ART1 < ART2, ART2 > ART3;



SA2: ART1 < ART2, ART2 < ART3;



SA3: ART1 < ART2, ART2 > ART3.

It is hypothesized that increasing agent reasoning transparency will reduce
performance on the target detection task. The increased mental demand on the operator
will affect their ability to monitor the environment for threats effectively. The increased
amount of environmental information will also affect the operators’ selection bias,
resulting in increased false alarms.
Hypothesis 6: Access to agent reasoning will reduce performance on the
target detection task (fewer targets detected, higher FAs), ART1 > ART2,
and increased transparency of agent reasoning will further reduce
performance on the target detection task; ART2 > ART3.
The effects of individual differences in complacency potential, perceived
attentional control, spatial ability, and working memory capacity on the operator’s task
performance, trust, and SA was also investigated. While the results of EXP1 did not always
show differences due to ID factors, it is expected that those results occurred because the
operators did not experience as heavy a cognitive load as expected. If that is the case, then
the increased amount of environmental information and agent reasoning present in EXP2
should increase the cognitive burden, and differences due to ID factors will become
apparent.
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Hypothesis 7: High CPRS individuals will have fewer correct rejects on the
route planning task than Low CPRS individuals.
Hypothesis 8: High CPRS individuals will have higher scores on the
usability and trust survey than Low CPRS individuals.
Hypothesis 9: High CPRS individuals will have lower SA scores than Low
CPRS individuals.
Hypothesis 10: Individual differences, such as SpA and PAC, will have
differential effects on the operator’s performance on the route selection task
and their ability to maintain SA.
Hypothesis 11: High WMC individuals will have more correct rejects and
higher SA2 and SA3 scores than Low WMC individuals.
Overall summaries of expected findings for experiment 2 are shown in Table 17.
Table 17. Anticipated patterns of findings (hypotheses) for Experiment 2. Indicates expected score
or performance across agent reasoning transparency conditions (i.e., ART1, ART2, and ART3).
Add Transparency

Increase
Transparency

Route Selection Task Correct accepts and rejects
(RS)
Decision Time

ART 1 < ART 2
ART 1 < ART 2

ART 2 > ART 3
ART 2 < ART 3

Target Detection Task Targets Detected
(TD)
False Alarms

ART 1 > ART 2
ART 1 < ART 2

ART 2 > ART 3
ART 2 < ART 3

Complacent Behavior Incorrect Acceptances

ART 1 > ART 2

ART 2 < ART 3

DV Measure

Situation Awareness
Scores

SA1 Queries (Perception)
SA2 Queries (Comprehension)
SA3 Queries (Projection)

ART 1 < ART 2
ART 1 < ART 2
ART 1 < ART 2

ART 2 > ART 3
ART 2 < ART 3
ART 2 > ART 3

Workload

Global NASA-TLX

ART 1 < ART 2

ART 2 < ART 3

Trust

Incorrect Rejections
Usability and Trust Survey

ART 1 > ART 2
ART 1 < ART 2

ART 2 < ART 3
ART 2 > ART 3
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Task Environment
There was no change in either the simulation scenario or RoboLeader capabilities
from Experiment 1.
Methodology
Experimental Participants
Seventy-three participants (between the ages of 18 and 44) were recruited from the
Institute for Simulation and Training’s and the Psychology Departments’ SONA Systems.
Participants received their choice of compensation: either cash payment ($15/hr) or Sona
Credit at the rate of 1 credit/hour.

Thirteen potential participants were excused or

dismissed from the study; eight were dismissed early due to equipment malfunctions, one
withdrew during training claiming they did not have time to participate, two fell asleep
during their session and were dismissed, one could not pass the training assessments and
was dismissed, and one did not pass the color vision screening test and was dismissed.
Those who were determined to be ineligible or withdrew from the experiment received
payment for the amount of time they participated, with a minimum of one hours’ pay. Sixty
participants (21 males, 39 females, Minage = 18 years, Maxage = 44 years, Mage = 21.0 years)
successfully completed the experiment and their data was used in the analysis.
Experimental Apparatus
The simulator and eye tracker were the same as in Experiment 1.
Surveys and Tests
All surveys, questionnaires, and tests were the same as in Experiment 1 (EXP1).
Descriptive statistics pertaining to Experiment 2 individual differences (ID) measures are
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listed here. Since the ID measures were dichotomized into High/Low groups similarly to
those in EXP1, these groups were also compared between experiments to ensure consistent
delineation between high and low group scores. For each ID measure, the high and low
groups were found to be distinct from one another, and this difference was consistent
between EXPs 1 and 2.
Perceived Attentional Control. High/Low group membership was determined by
median split of all participants’ scores (MinPAC = 33, MaxPAC = 75, MdnPAC = 58, MPAC =
57.6, SDPAC = 8.16; PACLOW N = 29, PACHIGH N = 31).
Cube Comparison Test. High/Low group membership was determined by median
split of all participants’ scores (MinSV = 0.19, MaxSV = 0.88, MdnSV = 0.50, MSV = 0.52,
SDSV = 0.14, SVLOW N = 27, SVHIGH N = 33).
Spatial Orientation Test. High/Low group membership was determined by median
split of all participants’ scores (MinSOT = 3.96, MaxSOT = 50.60, MdnSOT = 11.19, MSOT =
13.79, SDSOT = 8.48, SOTLOW N = 27, SOTHIGH N = 34).
Complacency Potential Rating Scale.

High/Low group membership was

determined by median split of all participants’ scores (MinCPRS = 25, MaxCPRS = 47,
MdnCPRS = 37, MCPRS = 36.8, CPRSLOW N = 28, CPRSHIGH N = 32).
RSPAN.

Working memory capacity (WMC) was evaluated by using the

participants’ total letter set score (sum of all perfectly recalled letter sets), with higher
numbers indicating greater working memory capacity, (MinRSPAN = 10.0, MaxRSPAN = 54.0,
MdnRSPAN = 31.0, MRSPAN = 31.5, SDRSPAN = 12.1). High/Low group membership was
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determined by median split of all participants’ scores, RSPANLOW N = 29, RSPANHIGH N
= 31.
Procedure
The procedure and experimental design were the same as in Experiment 1, with the
following exception:
When RoboLeader suggested a route revision, in addition to the knowledge of the
event potentially affecting their primary route, participants received information regarding
potential events that could affect the alternate route. RoboLeader messages in ARTs 2 and
3 included details about events denoted by the map icons for both primary and alternate
routes, as well as weighing factors illustrating how RoboLeader used this information in
its recommendation. Transcripts of RoboLeader messages for each ART are in Appendix
J.
Results
Complacent Behavior Evaluation
Hypothesis 1: Access to agent reasoning will reduce incorrect acceptances,
ART1 > ART2, and increased transparency of agent reasoning will increase
incorrect acceptances, ART2 < ART3.

When agent reasoning is not

available, incorrect acceptances will be greater than when agent reasoning
is present, ART1 > ART2+3.
Descriptive statistics for incorrect acceptances and decision times at the locations
where the agent recommendation should have been rejected are shown in Table 18.
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Table 18. Descriptive statistics for incorrect acceptances and decision times, sorted by agent
reasoning transparency (ART) level.

Incorrect
Acceptances
Overall DT at
Reject
Locations (sec)
DT Correct
Rejects (sec)

DT Incorrect
Accepts (sec)

N

Mean

SD

SE

ART 1

20

1.00

1.17

0.26

95% C.I. for
Mean
(0.45, 1.55)

ART 2

20

0.90

0.91

0.20

(0.47, 1.33)

ART 3

20

1.50

1.64

0.37

(0.73, 2.27)

ART 1

20

11.14

3.68

0.82

(9.42, 12.87)

ART 2

20

11.51

3.35

0.75

(9.94, 13.08)

ART 3

20

12.30

3.96

0.89

(10.45, 14.16)

ART 1

20

10.84

3.45

0.77

(9.23, 12.45)

ART 2

20

11.25

3.19

0.71

(9.75, 12.74)

ART 3

20

12.52

4.21

0.94

(10.55, 14.49)

ART 1

11

12.17

5.76

1.74

(8.30, 16.05)

ART 2

12

14.37

4.49

1.30

(11.51, 17.22)

ART 3

12

12.39

4.60

1.33

(9.46, 15.31)

Working Memory Capacity (WMC) score correlated significantly with incorrect
acceptances (r = -.28, p = .015), and was found to be a significant predictor of incorrect
acceptances, in that participants with lower WMC had more incorrect acceptances than
those with greater WMC, R2 = .079, b = -0.03, t(58) = -2.23, p = .029. WMC scores did
not have a consistent relationship with incorrect acceptances for each ART group
(heterogeneity of regression), as such was not included as a covariate in subsequent
analyses.
There was unequal variance between groups for incorrect acceptances, so Welch’s
statistic was reported, and contrast tests do not assume equal variance between conditions.
A between-groups ANOVA was conducted to assess the effect of ART on incorrect
acceptances, and no significant effect was found, F(2,36.23) = 1.04, p = .373, 2 = .01
(Figure 29). Planned comparisons revealed the number of incorrect acceptances were
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lower in ART2 than in ART1, t(35.9) = -0.30, p = .765, rc = .05, and ART3, t(29.7) = 1.43,
p = .163, rc = .25, however these differences were not significant.

Figure 29. Average number of incorrect acceptances by agent reasoning transparency (ART) level.
Bars denote SE.

Participants’ scores were further analyzed by the number of incorrect acceptances
per ART level (Figure 30). Chi-square analysis found no significant effect of ART on the
number of incorrect acceptances, Χ2(10) = 7.36, p = .692, Cramer’s V = .248. Across all
ART levels, 25 participants had no incorrect acceptances, and these were (roughly) equally
distributed between ARTs, indicating that the addition of agent reasoning had no more
effect on performance than operator knowledge alone. The range of potential scores for
incorrect acceptances was 0 – 6, and the range of participants’ scores was 0 – 5.

Thirty-

five participants had at least 1 incorrect acceptance, and these scores were sorted into
groups; < 50% (score 3 or less) or > 50% (score 4 or higher). The participants who made
incorrect acceptances appeared to be evenly distributed among ARTs. Of these, 31 out of
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35 participants scored under 50%. This is evidence that ART had little to no effect on the
number of incorrect acceptances. It is interesting to note that no participants in ART2 had
more than 3 incorrect acceptances. However, of the participants who had >50% incorrect
acceptances, these were mostly in ART3, which could be an indication that too much
access to agent reasoning can have a detrimental effect on performance.

Figure 30. Distribution of number of incorrect acceptances across agent reasoning transparency
(ART) level.

As in Experiment 1, decision time for responses at the locations where the agent
recommendation was incorrect was evaluated as a potential indicator of complacent
behavior. It was hypothesized that decision time would increase as agent reasoning
transparency increased, as participants should require additional time to process the extra
information, particularly in Experiment 2 as the text conveying agent reasoning in ARTs 2
and 3 was much longer than the notification presented in ART1 (see Appendix J). Thus,
reduced time could indicate less time spent on deliberation, which may infer complacent
behavior. In addition to the overall time to respond, decision times for correct rejects and
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incorrect accepts were also examined (Figure 31). There was not a significant effect of
ART on overall decision time, F(2, 57) = 0.52, p = .597, 2 = .02 (Figure 32). Overall
decision time was slightly shorter in ART1 than in ART2, t(57) = 0.31, p = .755, rc = .04,
and slightly shorter in ART2 than in ART3, t(57) = 0.68, p = .497, rc = .09. There was not
a significant effect of ART on decision time for correct rejections, F(2,57) = 1.56, p = .322,
2 = .01. Mean decision times for correct rejections were slightly shorter in ART1 than in
ART2, t(57) = 0.36, p = .724, rc = .05, and shorter in ART2 than in ART3, t(57) = 1.10, p
= .275, rc = .14. There was not a significant main effect of ART on decision time for
incorrect acceptances, F(2,32) = 0.70, p = .504, 2 = .02. Mean decision times for incorrect
acceptances were longer in ART2 than in ART1, t(32) = 1.06, p = .297, rc = .18, and in
ART3, t(32) = -0.98, p = .336, rc = .17. Decision times remained relatively unchanged
across ART levels, however in ART2 decision times for incorrect acceptances were longer
than decision times for correct rejects. This is evidence that these incorrect responses were
most likely due to errors in judgement rather than complacent behavior. Paired t-tests were
used to compare differences between decision times for correct and incorrect responses
within each ART. The largest difference in decision time was in ART2, t(11) = -1.57, p =
.146, d = 0.47, while times in ART1, t(10) = -1.38, p = .198, d = 0.34, and ART3, t(11) =
0.62, p = .551, d = 0.12 were more consistent. Although these results did not achieve
statistical significance, it is interesting to note that decision times between correct and
incorrect responses are similar in ARTs 1 and 3, while those in ART2 indicate that
participants in this condition spent more time in deliberation when their response was
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incorrect than when it was correct, and the medium effect size indicates this difference is
meaningful.

Figure 31. Average decision time in seconds for participant responses at decision points where the
agent recommendation was incorrect. Decision times are shown for all responses (overall), correct
rejections, and incorrect acceptances, sorted by agent reasoning transparency (ART) level. Bars
denote SE.

Route Selection Task Performance
Hypothesis 2: Access to agent reasoning will improve performance (number
of correct rejects and accepts) on the route selection task, ART1 < ART2,
and increased transparency of agent reasoning will reduce performance on
the route selection task, ART2 > ART3. When agent reasoning is not
available, performance will be lower than when agent reasoning is present,
ART1 < ART2+3.
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Descriptive statistics for route selection task scores and decision times for all
decision points across three missions are shown in Table 19.
Table 19. Descriptive statistics for route selection scores and decision times, sorted by agent
reasoning transparency (ART) level.

Complacency Potential Rating Scale (CPRS) scores (r = -.37, p = .002) and SOT
scores (r = -.25, p = .025) correlated significantly with route selection scores, and were
found to be significant predictors of route selection scores. Participants who scored higher
on the CPRS, indicating a greater potential to demonstrate complacent behavior when
interacting with automation, performed worse on the route selection task than their
counterparts, R2 = .138, b = -.276, t(58) = -3.04, p = .004. Participants who scored lower
on the SOT demonstrate greater spatial orientation abilities, and also performed better on
the route selection task than their counterparts, R2 = .064, b = -.111, t(58) = -2.00, p = .051.
However, neither CPRS scores nor SOT scores had a consistent relationship with route
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selection scores across ART groups (heterogeneity of regression), and as such were not
included as covariates in subsequent analyses.
A between-groups ANOVA was conducted to assess the effect of ART on route
selection scores and found no significant effect, F(2,57) = 0.02, p = .982, 2 = .03. Planned
comparisons revealed route selection scores were higher in ART2 than in ART1, t(57) =
0.10, p = .924, rc = .01, and higher in ART3 than in ART2, t(57) = 0.10, p = .924, rc = .01.
The results trended as predicted, however they were not significant.
Examining the distribution of scores, the potential range of scores for the route
selection task was 0 – 18, and the range of participants’ scores was 7 – 18 (Figure 32). Of
these, 4 participants scored 18/18, 3 of whom were in ART3. Only 9 participants scored
50% or less, the majority scored 67% or higher. For comparative purposes, scores were
sorted into similar groups as in experiment 1 (i.e. 17 – 15, 14 – 12, > 12). Interestingly,
scores in each ART appear to be nearly evenly distributed between the groups. This does
not offer support for the hypothesis, as performance in the agent reasoning conditions
appears to be no better than in the notification-only condition.
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Figure 32. Distribution of scores for the route selection task across agent reasoning transparency
(ART) levels.

Overall decision time for route selection responses was evaluated using one-way
ANOVA. The homogeneity of variance assumption was violated, as such, Welch’s
correction has been reported, and contrast tests do not assume equal variance between
conditions. There was not a significant effect of ART on elapsed decision time, F(2, 36.8)
= 1.69, p = .198, 2 = .01. Planned comparisons revealed decision times were longer in
ART2 than in ART1, t(38.0) = 1.72, p = .094, rc = .27, but not significantly different than
in ART3, t(32.0) = -0.01, p = .996, rc = .00. Overall, decision times were longer in the
conditions with agent reasoning than without (ART1 < ART2+3), t(46.5) = 1.77, p = .083,
rc = .25. These results were not significant, but they do follow the same pattern as those
for the task performance evaluation.
Overall decision times for acceptances were compared to those for rejections [of
the agent recommendation] using paired t-tests, and there was no significant difference,
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t(59) = -1.91, p = .061, d = 0.17 across ART levels. Comparing decision times for correct
responses to those for incorrect responses using paired t-tests, decision times for correct
responses were significantly shorter than those for incorrect responses, t(55) = -5.20, p <
.001, d = 0.58 (Figure 33) across ART levels. Within each ART, this difference was greater
in ART 2, t(18) = -3.61, p = .002, d = 0.95, than in ART1, t(19) = -3.21, p = .005, d = 0.67,
and smallest in ART3, t(16) = -2.56, p = .021, d = 0.23. Decision times for incorrect
responses were evaluated between ARTs, and there was no significant difference between
ART1 and ART2, t(30.31) = 1.54, p = .134, d = 0.56, or ART1 and ART3, t(34.35) = 0.25, p = .802, d = 0.09, and a marginally significant difference between ART2 and ART3,
t(28.11) = -2.00, p = .055, d = 0.76. While not offering additional support for the
hypothesis, the smaller difference in mean decision time for incorrect responses
demonstrated in ART3 could be indicative of some participants’ increased complacent
behavior in the highest agent reasoning condition.
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Figure 33. Comparison of average decision times for correct responses and incorrect responses,
shown by agent reasoning transparency (ART) level. Bars denote SE.

Operator Trust Evaluation
Hypothesis 3: Access to agent reasoning will increase operator trust in the
agent, ART1 < ART2, and increased transparency of agent reasoning will
decrease operator trust in the agent, ART2 > ART3.
Descriptive statistics for incorrect rejections and the Usability and Trust Survey
scores are shown in Table 20.
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Table 20. Descriptive statistics for incorrect rejections and Usability and Trust Survey results,
across agent reasoning transparency (ART) level.
N

Mean

SD

SE

ART 1

20

3.75

3.49

0.78

95% C.I. for
Mean
(2.12, 5.38)

ART 2

20

3.80

2.76

0.62

(2.51, 5.09)

ART 3

20

3.10

3.04

0.68

(1.68, 4.52)

ART 1

20

91.30

19.29

4.31

(82.27, 100.33)

ART 2

20

91.20

15.73

3.52

(83.84, 98.56)

ART 3

20

93.60

13.03

2.91

(87.50, 99.70)

ART 1
Usability
ART 2
Responses
ART 3

20

40.35

7.18

1.61

(36.99, 43.71)

20

39.45

6.05

1.35

(36.62, 42.28)

20

41.60

5.70

1.27

(38.93, 44.27)

ART 1
Trust
ART 2
Responses
ART 3

20

50.95

13.08

2.92

(44.83, 57.07)

20

51.75

11.19

2.50

(46.51, 56.99)

20

52.00

8.61

1.93

(47.97, 56.03)

Incorrect
Rejections
Usability
& Trust
Survey

.

Scores on the complacency potential rating scale (CPRS) correlated significantly
with incorrect rejections (r = .33, p = .005), and CPRS was found to be a significant
predictor of incorrect rejections, R2 = .110, b = 0.23, t(58) = 2.67, p = .010. However,
CPRS scores did not have a consistent relationship with incorrect rejections across ART
groups (heterogeneity of regression), and as such were not included as covariates in
subsequent analyses.
Examining the distribution of incorrect rejections at those locations where the agent
recommendation was correct across ARTs, eleven participants had no incorrect rejections,
and this number appears to be relatively even across ARTs (Figure 34). The range for
potential scores for incorrect rejections was 0 – 12, and the range of participants’ scores
was 0 – 9. Forty-nine (49) participants had at least 1 incorrect rejection, and these scores
were sorted into < 50% (score 5 or less) and > 50% (score 6 or higher). While scores in
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ART1 appeared to near the rate for chance, the majority of scores in ARTs 2 and 3 were
below 50%, indicating that access to agent reasoning was helpful in reducing incorrect
rejections.

Figure 34. Distribution of scores for incorrect rejections, sorted by agent reasoning transparency
(ART) level.

A between-groups ANOVA found no significant effect of ART on incorrect
rejections, F(2,57) = 0.32, p = .731, 2 = .02. Planned comparisons revealed incorrect
rejections were higher in ART2 than in ART1, t(57) = 0.51, p = .960, rc = .01, and ART3,
t(57) = -0.71, p = .480, rc = .09, however these differences were not significant.
As in Experiment 1, decision time for responses at the locations where the agent
recommendation was correct was evaluated as a potential indicator of operator trust. It was
hypothesized that decision time would increase as agent reasoning transparency increased,
as participants should require additional time to process the extra information. Thus,
increased time could indicate more time spent on deliberation, which may infer lower trust.
In addition, decision times for incorrect rejections of the agent recommendation at those
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locations could be indicative of complacent behavior, i.e. reduced decision times for
incorrect responses. There was not a significant effect of ART on overall decision time at
the agent correct locations, F(2, 57) = 2.03, p = .141, 2 = .03 (Figure 35). Planned
comparisons show that overall decision times in ART2 were longer than those in ART1,
t(57) = 2.00, p = .051, rc = .26, but not significantly longer than those in ART3, t(57) = 0.77, p = .445, rc = .10. Overall, decision times were longer in the conditions with agent
reasoning access than in the notification only condition (ART1 – ART2+3), t(57) = 1.86,
p = .068, rc = .24. Decision times for correct accepts were significantly higher in the agent
reasoning conditions than in the notification only condition (ART1 – ART2+3), t(48.2) =
2.44, p = .018, rc = .33. Decision times for correct responses were shorter ART1 than in
ART2, t(37.4) = 2.48, p = .018, rc = .38, but not significantly different in ART2 than in
ART3, t(34.1) = -0.34, p = .736, rc = .06. Decision times for incorrect responses were
longer in ART2 than in ART1, t(31.0) = 1.45, p = .159, rc = .25, (d = 0.52), and significantly
longer than in ART3, t(31.0) = -2.21, p = .042, rc = .36.
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Figure 35. Average Decision Times, in seconds, at the locations where the agent recommendation
was correct, sorted by correct/incorrect selections, for each agent reasoning transparency (ART)
level. Bars denote SE.

Paired t-tests were used to compare differences between decision times for correct
acceptances and incorrect rejections within each ART at those locations where the agent
recommendation was correct (Figure 36). Decision times for incorrect rejections were
significantly longer than for correct acceptances in ART1, t(11) = -3.36, p = .004, d = 0.79,
and ART2, t(17) = -3.40, p = .003, d = 0.84. However, there was no difference between
the two in ART3, t(14) = -0.88, p = .395, d = 0.21. While the difference in decision times
in ARTs 1 and 2 could indicate difficulty integrating the information, resulting in incorrect
choices, the lack of the same difference in ART3 could indicate complacent behavior.
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Figure 36. Average Decision Time, in seconds, for correct acceptances and incorrect rejections
within each agent reasoning transparency (ART) level. Bars denote SE.

Operator trust was also evaluated using the Usability and Trust Survey. Scores on
the complacency potential rating scale, CPRS, correlated significantly with Usability and
Trust survey scores (r = -.35, p = .003), and CPRS was found to be a significant predictor
of scores on the Usability and Trust survey, R2 = .120, b = -1.26, t(58) = -2.81, p = .007.
Participants who scored higher on the CPRS measure rated the agent as being less usable
and trusted than their counterparts. However, CPRS scores did not have a consistent
relationship with route selection scores across ART groups (heterogeneity of regression),
and as such was not included as a covariate in subsequent analyses.
A one-way ANOVA evaluating overall Usability and Trust scores found no
significant effect of ART, F(2,57) = 0.14, p = .870, 2 = .03. Planned comparisons revealed
scores were higher in ART1 than in ART2, t(57) = -0.19, p = .985, rc = .00, and higher in
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ART3 than in ART2, t(57) = -.47, p = .642, rc = .06, however these differences were not
significant.
The Usability and Trust survey is a combination of surveys measuring Usability
and Trust. These individual surveys were also evaluated separately to assess whether the
findings were due to mainly operator trust or perceived usability.
A one-way ANOVA evaluating overall Trust scores found no significant effect of
ART on Trust scores, F(2,57) = 0.05, p = .952, 2 = .03. Planned comparisons revealed
scores were higher in ART2 than in ART1, t(57) = 0.07, p = .944, rc =.01, and higher in
ART3 than in ART2, t(57) = 0.23, p = .821, rc = .03, however these differences were not
significant.
A one-way ANOVA evaluating overall Usability scores found no significant effect
of ART, F(2,57) = 0.58, p = .563, 2 = .01. Planned comparisons revealed scores were
slightly higher in ART1 than in ART2, t(57) = -0.45, p = .655, rc = .06, and higher in ART3
than in ART2, t(57) = 1.07, p = .288, rc = .14, however these differences were not
significant.
Workload Evaluation
Hypothesis 4: Access to agent reasoning will increase operator workload,
ART1 < ART2; and increased transparency of agent reasoning will increase
operator workload, ART2 < ART3. When agent reasoning is not available,
workload will be lower than when agent reasoning is present, ART1 <
ART2+3.
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ART had no significant effect on participants' global workload, F(2,57) = 1.14, p =
.327, 2 = .00 (Figure 37). Planned contrasts revealed there was no overall difference in
participant workload when agent reasoning was available compared to the no reasoning
condition, (ART1 - ART2+3), t(57) = -1.47, p = .147, rc = .19. Participants in ART1 (M =
67.03, SD = 10.87) reported higher workload than those in ART2 (M = 62.80, SD = 13.78),
t(57) = -1.10, p = .275, rc = .14, and workload was higher in ART2 than in ART3 (M =
61.48, SD = 11.58), t(57) = -0.34, p = .733, rc = .05. The non-significant omnibus p-value,
along with the small effect sizes, indicate that although workload scores decreased as ART
increased there was no significant difference between ARTs.

Figure 37. Average global NASA-TLX scores by agent reasoning transparency (ART) level. Bars
denote SE.

Cognitive workload was also evaluated using several ocular indices. Descriptive
statistics are shown in Table 21. Not all participants had complete eye measurement data,
so this N was reduced (ART1 N = 18, ART2 N = 17, ART3 N = 17) and unweighted results
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reported. Eye tracking data was evaluated using the same planned comparisons as the
subjective workload measure.
Table 21. Descriptive statistics for eye tracking measures by agent reasoning transparency (ART)
condition.
N
Pupil
Diameter
(mm)

Mean

SD

SE

95% C.I. for Mean

ART 1
ART 2
ART 3

18
17
17

3.77
3.43
3.48

0.58
0.32
0.36

0.14
0.08
0.09

(3.48, 4.06)
(3.26, 3.59)
(3.29, 3.66)

ART 1
Fixation
ART 2
Duration (ms)
ART 3

18
17
17

4864.48
4949.58
4995.22

620.01
701.14
680.51

146.14
170.05
165.05

(4556.16, 5172.80)
(4589.09, 5310.07)
(4645.33, 5345.10)

ART 1
ART 2
ART 3

18
17
17

279.20
263.89
271.67

38.57
43.44
32.62

9.09
10.54
7.91

(260.01, 298.38)
(241.55, 286.22)
(254.90, 288.44)

Fixation
Count

Evaluating average Pupil Diameter (PDia) between ART conditions, there was a
violation of the homogeneity of variance assumption. As such, Welch’s correction has
been reported, and contrast tests do not assume equal variance between conditions. ART
did not have a significant effect on participants' pupil diameter, F(2,31.67) = 2.35, p = .112,
2 = .07 (Figure 38), however there was a marginally significant linear trend, F(1,49) =
3.81, p = .057, 2 = .05, indicating that workload decreased as ART increased. Planned
contrasts revealed that there was a significant difference in participant workload (as
inferred via PDia) when agent reasoning was available, compared to the no reasoning
condition, (ART1 - ART2+3), t(23.1) = -2.12, p = .045, rc = .40. Participants in ART1 had
larger pupil diameters than those in ART2, t(26.5) = -2.18, p = .039, rc = .39. However,
there was not significant difference in workload (as inferred via PDia) between ARTs 2
and 3, t(31.5) = 0.46, p = .650, rc = .08.
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Figure 38. Average participant pupil diameter by agent reasoning transparency (ART) level. Bars
denote SE.

ART did not have a significant effect on participants' fixation count, F(2,49) = 0.17,
p = .841, 2 = .03. Planned contrasts revealed that there was no significant difference in
participant workload (as inferred via fixation count) when agent reasoning was available,
compared to the no reasoning condition, (ART1 - ART2+3), t(49) = 0.56, p = .581, rc =
.08. Participants in ART1 had fewer fixations than those in ART2, t(49) = 0.38, p = .708,
rc = .05, who in turn had fewer fixations than those in ART3, t(49) = 0.20, p = .843, rc =
.03. While these results are trending in the hypothesized direction of increasing workload
as ART increases, the findings are not significant.
ART did not have a significant effect on participants' fixation duration, F(2,49) =
0.69, p = .505, 2 = .01. Planned contrasts revealed that there was no significant difference
in participant workload (as inferred via fixation duration) when agent reasoning was
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available, compared to the no reasoning condition, (ART1 - ART2+3), t(49) = -1.02, p =
.314, rc = .14. Participants in ART2 had shorter fixations than those in ART1, t(49) = 1.18, p = .245, rc = .17, and those in ART3, t(49) = 0.59, p = .558, rc = .08. While these
results indicate that the addition of agent reasoning transparency alleviates workload, the
results were not significant and the effect sizes were small.
In Experiment 1 the NASA-TLX factors were also examined individually, and so
this analysis is repeated for Experiment 2 results. An omnibus MANOVA indicated that
there was no significant difference across ARTs for any individual factor, Wilks’ λ = .761,
F(12,104) = 1.27, p =.247, ηp2 = .13. Individual evaluations of each factor across ART
were made by one-way ANOVA using Bonferroni correction, α = .008, see Table 22.
Table 22. Evaluation of NASA-TLX workload factors across agent reasoning transparency (ART)
conditions.
One-way ANOVA
(α = .008)

Mean (SD)
ART 1
MD
PhyD
TD
Perf
Effort
Frust

83.75 (12.45)
21.00 (12.94)
54.25 (23.69)
52.75 (20.99)
73.75 (17.08)
45.00 (25.75)

ART 2
76.50 (20.27)
15.25 (8.66)
51.25 (24.00)
49.50 (19.93)
73.75 (19.79)
43.25 (26.77)

ART 3

ω2

F (2,57)

72.25 (20.10)
13.50 (9.61)
46.00 (19.10)
55.00 (18.06)
68.50 (19.67)
42.25 (21.67)

2.09
2.76
0.70
0.39
0.52
0.06

*

.04
.06
.01
.02
.02
.03

Planned Comparisons
(Cohen's d )
ART 1 - ART 2 - ART 1 ART 2
ART 3 ART 2+3
0.34
0.20
0.50 *
0.46
0.14
0.61 **
0.11
0.20
0.24
0.14
0.23
0.02
0.00
0.23
0.13
0.06
0.03
0.09

**** p < .001, *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .07

Mental Demand (MD) was the factor contributing the most to workload, and ART1
elicited greater Mental Demand than ARTs 2 or 3 (Figure 39). Although this difference
did not reach significance, planned comparisons between ART levels indicate the mediumlarge effect sizes for the differences between ART1 and the RoboLeader conditions ARTs
2 and 3 were significant. This is evidence that the presence of agent reasoning alleviates
mental demand, contradicting the stated hypothesis that workload in ART1 will be lower
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than in ARTs 2 and 3. Physical Demand (PhyD) contributed the least to overall workload.
While the difference between ARTs 1 & 2 had a medium effect size, it did not reach
significance (p = .091). However, there was a significant difference between the no
reasoning condition (ART1) and the transparent reasoning conditions (ART 2+3).
Unlike Experiment 1, there was no significant difference in factors Temporal
Demand (TD) or Effort across ARTs.

However, there was an interesting negative

correlation between Temporal Demand and the number of hours of sleep the participant
reported for the previous night (r = -.26, p = .042), indicating that those who had less sleep
found the task more demanding overall.

Figure 39. Average NASA-TLX workload factor scores by agent reasoning transparency (ART)
level. Bars denote SE.
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Situation Awareness (SA) Evaluation
Hypothesis 5: Access to agent reasoning will improve SA scores; and
increased transparency of agent reasoning will improve SA2 scores, but will
reduce SA1 and SA3 scores;


SA1: ART1 < ART2, ART2 > ART3;



SA2: ART1 < ART2, ART2 < ART3;



SA3: ART1 < ART2, ART2 > ART3.

Descriptive statistics for Situation Awareness (SA) scores are shown in Table 23.
Table 23. Descriptive statistics for Situation Awareness scores by agent reasoning transparency
(ART) level.
N

SA1

SA2

SA3

Mean

SD

SE

ART 1 20

1.60

4.31

0.96

ART 2 20

2.25

3.84

ART 3 20

1.55

5.43

ART 1 20
ART 2 20

14.80

ART 3 20

95% C.I. for
Mean

Min

Max

(-0.42, 3.62)

-6

10

0.86

(0.45, 4.05)

-6

10

1.21

(-0.99, 4.09)

-7

10

3.35

0.75

(13.23, 16.37)

9

20

13.20

7.15

1.60

(9.85, 16.55)

0

24

15.20

6.28

1.40

(12.26, 18.14)

1

25

ART 1 20
ART 2 20

2.90

9.40

2.10

(-1.50, 7.30)

-16

16

0.45

8.51

1.90

(-3.53, 4.43)

-18

16

ART 3 20

2.00

8.78

1.96

(-2.11, 6.11)

-14

18

Working Memory Capacity (WMC) scores correlated significantly with SA1 scores
(r = .26, p = .021), and WMC was found to be a significant predictor of SA1 scores, R2 =
.069, b = 0.10, t(58) = 2.07, p = .043. Participants who scored higher on the WMC measure
scored higher on SA1 queries than their counterparts. However, WMC scores did not have
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a consistent relationship with SA1 scores across ART groups (heterogeneity of regression),
and as such was not included as a covariate in subsequent analyses.
A one-way ANOVA evaluating SA1 scores found no significant effect of ART,
F(2,57) = 0.15, p = .865, 2 = .03. Planned comparisons revealed scores were higher in
ART2 than in ART1, t(57) = 0.50, p = .617, rc = .06, or ART3, t(57) = -0.48, p = .630, rc
= .06, however these differences were not significant.
Working Memory Capacity (WMC) scores (r = .38, p = .001), Spatial Visualization
(SV) scores (r = .27, p = .018), and Spatial Orientation Test (SOT) scores (r = -.46, p <
.001) correlated significantly with SA2 scores. WMC (R2 = .143, b = 0.18, t(58) = 3.11, p
= .003) and SOT (R2 = .208, b = -0.36, t(58) = -3.90, p < .001) were also found to be
significant predictors of SA2 scores. Participants who scored higher on the WMC and SV
measures, or who performed better on the SOT, scored higher on SA2 queries than their
counterparts. However, none of these potential covariates had a consistent relationship
with SA2 scores across ART groups (heterogeneity of regression), and as such were not
included as covariates in subsequent analyses.
A one-way ANOVA evaluating SA2 scores found no significant effect of ART,
F(2,57) = 0.85, p = .434, 2 = .01. Planned comparisons revealed no change in scores
between ART1 and ART2, t(57) = 0.00, p = 1.000, rc = .00, and scores in ART3 were
slightly higher than in ART2, t(57) = 1.13, p = .264, rc = .15, however this difference was
not significant.
Complacency Potential Rating Scale (CPRS) scores (r = -.25, p = .026) and Spatial
Orientation Test (SOT) scores (r = -.27, p = .018) correlated significantly with SA3 scores.
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Participants who scored lower on the CPRS, indicating a lower potential for complacent
behavior, as well as those who performed better on the SOT, scored higher on SA3 queries
than their counterparts. However, neither of these potential covariates had a consistent
relationship with SA3 scores across ART groups (heterogeneity of regression), and as such
were not included as covariates in subsequent analyses.
A one-way ANOVA evaluating SA3 scores found no significant effect of ART,
F(2,57) = 0.39, p = .680, 2 = .02. Planned comparisons revealed SA3 scores in ART1
were higher than those in ART2, t(57) = -0.87, p = .388, rc = .11, and scores in ART2 were
lower than in ART3, t(57) = 0.55, p = .584, rc = .09. These results were contrary to the
stated hypothesis, in that SA3 scores were lowest in ART2, however these results were not
significant.
Target Detection Task Performance
Hypothesis 6: Access to agent reasoning will reduce performance on the
target detection task (fewer targets detected, higher FAs), ART1 > ART2,
and increased transparency of agent reasoning will further reduce
performance on the target detection task; ART2 > ART3.
Descriptive statistics for Target Detection measures are shown in Table 24.
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Table 24. Descriptive statistics for Target Detection Task measures by agent reasoning
transparency (ART) level.

Targets
Detected
(Count)
FAs
(Count)

d'

β

N

Mean

SD

SE

ART 1

20

45.25

10.96

2.45

95% C.I. for
Mean
(40.12, 50.38)

ART 2

20

47.65

10.74

2.40

(42.62, 52.68)

ART 3

20

40.30

13.27

2.97

ART 1

20

16.30

6.18

ART 2

20

16.65

ART 3

20

ART 1

Min

Max

24

59

30

73

(34.09, 46.51)

18

61

1.38

(13.41, 19.19)

4

28

4.97

1.11

(14.33, 18.97)

11

26

15.90

6.12

1.37

(13.04, 18.76)

6

26

20

2.30

0.40

0.09

(2.11, 2.49)

1.62

2.95

ART 2

20

2.38

0.35

0.08

(2.21, 2.54)

1.81

3.32

ART 3

20

2.19

0.44

0.10

(1.99, 2.39)

1.49

2.88

ART 1

20

2.64

0.34

0.08

(2.48, 2.80)

2.17

3.24

ART 2

20

2.59

0.28

0.06

(2.46, 2.72)

1.88

2.96

ART 3

20

2.65

0.39

0.09

(2.47, 2.83)

2.14

3.51

Spatial Visualization (SV) scores correlated significantly with (r = .38, p = .001),
and were found to be significant predictors of total number of Targets Detected, R2 = .143,
b = 32.15, t(58) = 3.12, p = .003. Participants who scored higher in SV, indicating a greater
ability to mentally manipulate objects in 3D space, also detected more targets in their
environment than their counterparts. SV scores did not have a consistent relationship with
total number of Targets Detected for each ART group (heterogeneity of regression), as
such was not included as a covariate in subsequent analyses.
There was no significant effect of ART on the number of targets detected, F(2,57)
= 2.05, p = .138, 2 = 0.03 (Figure 40). The number of targets detected was slightly greater
in ART2 than in ART1, t(57) = 0.65, p = .520, rc = .09, and significantly higher in ART2
than in ART3, t(57) = -1.98, p = .052, rc = .25. While access to agent reasoning did not
appear to improve performance on the target detection task, increasing the amount of agent
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reasoning did reseult in a decline in performance, indicating the participants may have
become overwhelmed.

Figure 40. Average number of targets detected by agent reasoning transparency (ART) level. Bars
denote SE.

There was no significant effect of ART on the number of FAs across ARTs, F(2,57)
= 0.08, p = .919, 2 = 0.03. The number of FAs was higher in ART2 than in ART1, t(57)
= 0.19, p = .849, rc = 0.03, and ART3, t(57) = -0.41, p = .683, rc = 0.05, however these
differences were not significant.
Results of the target detection task were also evaluated using SDT to determine if
there were differences in sensitivity (d’) or selection bias (Beta) between the three ARTs.
There was no significant effect of ART on d’, F(2,57) = 1.10, p = .341, 2 = .00.
Participants were slightly more sensitive to targets in ART2 than in ART1, t(57) = 0.59, p
= .555, rc = .08, or ART3, t(57) = -1.47, p = .147, rc = .19, however these differences did
not achieve statistical significance. Evaluating Beta across ART, there was no significant
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effect of ART on Beta scores, F(2,57) = 0.17, p = .843, 2 = .03. Beta scores were slightly
lower in ART2 than in ART1, t(57) = -0.48, p = .636, rc = .06, and ART3, t(57) = 0.53, p
= .596, rc = .07, however these differences were not significant. In an information-rich
environment, agent reasoning transparency appears to have no effect on sensitivity to
targets or target selection criterion.
Individual Differences Evaluations
Complacency Potential
Complacency Potential (CP) was evaluated via the Complacency Potential Rating
Scale (CPRS) scores. The effect of CP on several measures of interest across agent
reasoning transparency (ART) level were evaluated via two-way between-groups
ANOVAs, α = .05. Post hoc t-tests within each ART compared performance differences
between high/low group memberships. Descriptive statistics for Complacency Potential
(CP), as measured using the Complacency Potential Rating Scale (CPRS), are shown in
Tables 25 and 26.
Table 25. Descriptive statistics for Complacency Potential Rating Scale (CPRS) scores by agent
reasoning transparency (ART) level.
Group

Mdn Split Count
Hi
Lo

N

Min

Max

Mdn

Mean

SD

Overall

60

25

47

37.00

36.83

4.38

32

28

ART 1

20

25

41

35.00

35.00

4.21

8

12

ART 2

20

32

47

40.00

39.05

3.53

15

5

ART 3

20

31

47

35.50

36.45

4.54

9

11
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Table 26. Descriptive statistics for High/Low Complacency Potential Rating Scale (CPRS) scores
by agent reasoning transparency (ART) level.
N
ART 1

ART 2

ART 3

Mean

SD

SE

95% C.I. for Mean

Low CPRS

12

32.42

3.34

0.96

(30.29, 34.54)

High CPRS

8

38.88

1.36

0.48

(37.74, 40.01)

Low CPRS

5

34.80

1.79

0.80

(32.58, 37.02)

High CPRS

15

40.47

2.72

0.70

(38.96, 41.97)

Low CPRS

11

33.18

1.54

0.46

(32.15, 34.21)

High CPRS

9

40.44

3.64

1.21

(37.64, 43.25)

Hypothesis 7: High CPRS individuals will have fewer correct rejects on the
route planning task than Low CPRS individuals.
A two-way between-groups ANOVA revealed no significant interaction between
CPRS and ART on the number of correct rejects in the route planning task, F(2,54) = 2.04,
p = .140, ηp2 =.07, however there was a significant main effect of CPRS on the number of
correct rejects across ART, F(1,54) = 7.51, p = .008, ηp2 = .12 (Figure 41). Post hoc
comparisons between high/low CPRS groups within each ART level show that High CPRS
and Low CPRS individuals had similar Route Selection scores in ART1, t(18) = 0.20, p =
.842, d = 0.31, however low CPRS participants had more correct rejects in ART2, t(18) =
2.17, p = .044, d = 1.37, and ART3, t(18) = 2.69, p = .015, d = 1.20. When agent reasoning
was not available there was no difference in correct rejects between High and Low CPRS
persons.

However, when agent reasoning was available participants with Low

Complacency Potential (CP) had more correct rejects than those with High CP, and this
difference became greater as agent reasoning transparency increased.
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Figure 41. Average number of correct rejects by High/Low complacency potential rating scale
(CPRS) score group, sorted by agent reasoning transparency (ART) level. Bars denote SE.

Hypothesis 8: High CPRS score individuals will have higher scores on the
usability and trust survey than Low CPRS score individuals.
A two-way between-groups ANOVA revealed no significant interaction between
CPRS score and ART on Usability and Trust Survey scores, F(2,54) = 0.11, p = .895, ηp2
= .00, nor any significant main effect of CP on Usability scores, F(1,54) = 1.79, p = .187,
ηp2 = .03.
Hypothesis 9: High CPRS score individuals will have lower SA scores than
Low CPRS score individuals.
A two-way between-groups ANOVA revealed no significant interaction between
CPRS scores and ART on SA1 scores, F(2,54) = 0.22, p = .800, ηp2 = .01, however there
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was a significant main effect of CP on SA1 scores across ART, F(1,54) = 4.12, p = .047,
ηp2 = .12 (Figure 42). Post hoc comparisons between high/low CPRS score groups within
each ART level show that Low CP individuals had higher SA1 scores in each ART (ART1,
t(18) = 0.93, p = .365, d = 0.42; ART2, t(18) = 1.05, p = .310, d = 0.72; ART3, t(18) =
1.54, p = .142, d = 0.69) than their High CP counterparts. Thus, in a high information
environment, Low CP individuals better monitored their environment than High CP
individuals.

Figure 42. Average level 1 situation awareness (SA1) scores by High/Low complacency potential
rating scale (CPRS) group, sorted by agent reasoning transparency (ART) level. Bars denote SE.

A two-way between-groups ANOVA revealed no significant interaction between
CPRS and ART on SA2 scores, F(2,54) = 0.46, p = .636, ηp2 = .02, nor any significant
main effect of CPRS on SA2 scores across ART, F(1,54) = 3.23, p = .078, ηp2 = .06. A
two-way between-groups ANOVA revealed no significant interaction between CPRS and
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ART on SA3 scores, F(2,54) = 0.78, p = .465, ηp2 = .03, nor any significant main effect of
CPRS on SA3 scores across ART, F(1,54) = 1.80, p = .185, ηp2 = .03.
Spatial Ability (SOT and SV) and Perceived Attentional Control (PAC)
Hypothesis 10: Individual differences, such as SpA and PAC, will have
differential effects on the operator’s performance on the route selection task
and their ability to maintain SA.
The effects of individual difference (ID) factors and agent reasoning transparency
(ART) level on route selection performance were evaluated via two-way between-groups
ANOVAs, α = .05. When Levene’s Test of Equality of Error Variance was significant, the
evaluation was repeated at α = .01.

Post hoc t-tests within each ART compared

performance differences between high/low group memberships for each ID factor. Spatial
Orientation (SOT) is reverse-scored, so lower test scores imply greater spatial ability (High
SOT group), while Spatial Visualization (SV), and Perceived Attentional Control (PAC)
are scored normally (higher test scores implies greater ability). Descriptive statistics for
SOT, SV, and PAC are shown in Tables 27 and 28.
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Table 27. Descriptive statistics for Spatial Orientation (SOT), Spatial Visualization (SV), and
Perceived Attentional Control (PAC), by Agent Reasoning Transparency (ART) level.
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Table 28. Descriptive statistics for Spatial Orientation (SOT), Spatial Visualization (SV), and
Perceived Attentional Control (PAC), by Agent Reasoning Transparency (ART) level, sorted by
High/Low group membership.

Route Selection Task Evaluation
A two-way between-groups ANOVA revealed no significant interaction between
SOT and ART on Route Selection scores, F(2,54) = 0.20, p = .981, ηp2 = .01, however
there was a significant main effect of SOT on Route Selection scores, F(1,54) = 4.40, p =
.041, ηp2 = .08 (Figure 43). Post hoc comparisons between high/low SOT groups within
each ART level show that Low SOT individuals (those who performed better on the SOT)
had higher Route Selection scores in each ART (ART1, t(18) = -1.29, p = .214, d = 0.61;
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ART2, t(18) = -1.10, p = .287, d = 0.50; ART3, t(18) = -1.24, p = .230, d = 0.56). Although
these post hoc analyses did not reach statistical analysis, they had medium effect sizes.

Figure 43. Average route selection scores by High/Low Spatial Orientation Test (SOT) group
membership, across agent reasoning transparency level. Bars denote SE.

A two-way between-groups ANOVA revealed no significant interaction between
SV and ART on Route Selection scores, F(2,54) = 0.04, p = .965, ηp2 = .00, nor any
significant main effect of SV on Route Selection scores, F(1,54) = 0.08, p = .782, ηp2 =
.00.
A two-way between-groups ANOVA revealed no significant interaction between
PAC and ART on Route Selection scores, F(2,54) = 0.14, p = .869, ηp2 = .01, however
there was a significant main effect of PAC on Route Selection scores, F(1,54) = 3.98, p =
.051, ηp2 = .07 (Figure 44). Post hoc comparisons between high/low PAC groups within
each ART level show that High PAC individuals had higher Route Selection scores in each
ART (ART1, t(18) = -1.18, p = .255, d = 0.53; ART2, t(18) = -0.74, p = .467, d = 0.34;
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ART3, t(18) = -1.56, p = .137, d = 0.69). Although these post hoc analyses did not reach
statistical analysis, they had medium effect sizes.

Figure 44. Average route selection scores by High/Low Perceived Attentional Control (PAC)
group membership, across agent reasoning transparency level. Bars denote SE.

SA1 Evaluation
A two-way between-groups ANOVA revealed no significant interaction between
SOT and ART on SA1 scores, F(2,54) = 1.80, p = .175, ηp2 = .06, nor any significant main
effect of SOT on SA1 scores, F(1,54) = 3.30, p = .075, ηp2 = .06. A two-way betweengroups ANOVA revealed no significant interaction between SV and ART on SA1 scores,
F(2,54) = 0.35, p = .709, ηp2 = .01, nor any significant main effect of SV on SA1 scores,
F(1,54) = 2.63, p = .111, ηp2 = .05. A two-way between-groups ANOVA revealed no
significant interaction between PAC and ART on SA1 scores, F(2,54) = 0.52, p = .598, ηp2
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= .02, nor any significant main effect of PAC on SA1 scores, F(1,54) = 0.73, p = .399, ηp2
= .01.
SA2 Evaluation
A two-way between-groups ANOVA revealed no significant interaction between
SOT and ART on SA2 scores, F(2,54) = 2.42, p = .099, ηp2 = .08, however there is a
significant main effect of SOT on SA2 scores, F(1,54) = 16.98, p < .001, ηp2 = .24 (Figure
45). Post hoc comparisons between high/low SOT groups within each ART level show
that High SOT and Low SO individuals had similar SA2 scores in ART1, t(18) = -0.87, p
= .398, d = 0.39, however high SO participants had higher SA2 scores in ART2, t(18) = 2.78, p = .012, d = 1.29, and ART3, t(18) = -3.09, p = .006, d = 1.42. When agent reasoning
was not available there was no significant difference in SA2 scores between High and Low
SO persons. However, when agent reasoning was available participants who performed
better on the SOT also had higher SA2 scores than their counterparts.
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Figure 45. Average SA2 scores by Spatial Orientation Test (SOT) High/Low group membership,
sorted by agent reasoning transparency level. Bars denote SE.

A two-way between-groups ANOVA revealed no significant interaction between
SV and ART on SA2 scores, F(2,54) = 0.70, p = .501, ηp2 = .03, nor any significant main
effect of SV on SA2 scores, F(1,54) = 3.57, p = .064, ηp2 = .06. A two-way betweengroups ANOVA revealed no significant interaction between PAC and ART on SA2 scores,
F(2,54) = 0.21, p = .809, ηp2 = .01, nor any significant main effect of PAC on SA2 scores,
F(1,54) = 0.08, p = .775, ηp2 = .00.
SA3 Evaluation
A two-way between-groups ANOVA revealed no significant interaction between
SOT and ART on SA3 scores, F(2,54) = 0.62, p = .541, ηp2 = .02, nor any significant main
effect of SOT on SA3 scores, F(1,54) = 3.34, p = .073, ηp2 = .06. A two-way betweengroups ANOVA revealed no significant interaction between SV and ART on SA3 scores,
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F(2,54) = 0.63, p = .537, ηp2 = .02, nor any significant main effect of SV on SA3 scores,
F(1,54) = 0.65, p = .423, ηp2 = .01. A two-way between-groups ANOVA revealed no
significant interaction between PAC and ART on SA3 scores, F(2,54) = 0.42, p = .661, ηp2
= .02, nor any significant main effect of PAC on SA3 scores, F(1,54) = 1.27, p = .265, ηp2
= .02.
Working Memory Capacity (WMC)
Hypothesis 11: High WMC individuals will have more correct rejects and
higher SA2 and SA3 scores than Low WMC individuals.
The effects of Working Memory Capacity (WMC) and agent reasoning
transparency (ART) level were evaluated via two-way between-groups ANOVAs, α = .05.
Post hoc t-tests within each ART compared performance differences between high/low
group memberships. Descriptive statistics for WMC, as measured using the RSPAN test,
are shown in Tables 29 and 30.
Table 29. Descriptive statistics for Working Memory Capacity (WMC), by Agent Reasoning
Transparency (ART) level.

WMC

Mdn Split Count
SD
Hi
Lo

Group

N

Min

Max

Mdn

Mean

Overall

60

10

54

31.00

31.47

12.06

31

29

ART 1

20

17

54

31.00

33.15

11.86

11

9

ART 2

20

11

54

32.50

31.10

13.75

11

9

ART 3

20

10

54

28.00

30.15

11.17

9

11
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Table 30. Descriptive statistics for Working Memory Capacity (WMC), by Agent Reasoning
Transparency (ART) level, sorted by High/Low group membership.
N
ART 1

WMC

ART 2

ART 3

Mean

SD

SE

95% C.I. for Mean

Low

9

22.11

3.55

1.18

(19.38, 24.84)

High

11

42.18

7.59

2.29

(37.08, 47.28)

Low

9

18.00

4.61

1.54

(14.46, 21.54)

High

11

41.82

7.83

2.36

(36.56, 47.08)

Low

11

22.09

5.65

1.70

(18.30, 25.88)

High

9

40.00

7.62

2.54

(34.15, 45.85)

Correct Rejects
A two-way between-groups ANOVA revealed no significant interaction between
WMC and ART on Correct Rejection scores, F(2,54) = 1.61, p = .210, ηp2 = .06, nor any
significant main effect of WMC on Correct Reject scores, F(1,54) = 0.61, p = .439, ηp2 =
.01.
SA Scores
A two-way between-groups ANOVA revealed no significant interaction between
WMC and ART on SA2 scores, F(2,54) = 0.78, p = .465, ηp2 = .03, however there was a
significant main effect of WMC on SA2 scores across ARTs, F(1,54) = 8.33, p = .006, ηp2
= .13 (Figure 46). High WMC participants had higher SA2 scores in all ART conditions
(ART1, t(18) = -2.25, p = .037, d = 1.01; ART2, t(18) = -2.28, p = .035, d = 1.02; ART3,
t(18) = -1.94, p = .359, d = 0.44) than their Low WMC counterparts. Performance of the
High WMC group was consistent between ARTs, while the Low WMC participants’ SA2
scores varied. This difference was greatest in ART2, where access to agent reasoning
resulted in Low WMC participants to have lower SA2 scores than in the no reasoning
condition, and smallest in ART3, where increased access to agent reasoning appears to
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have helped Low WMC participants SA2 scores increase to almost that of their High WMC
counterparts.

Figure 46. Average SA2 scores by Working Memory Capacity (WMC) High/Low group
membership, sorted by agent reasoning transparency level (ART). Bars denote SE.

There was no significant interaction between WMC and ART on SA3 scores,
F(2,54) = 1.17, p = .317, ηp2 = .04, nor any significant main effect of WMC on SA3 scores,
F(1,54) = 0.45, p = .503, ηp2 = .01.
Discussion
The primary goal of this study was to examine how the transparency of an
intelligent agent’s reasoning in a high information environment affected complacent
behavior in a route selection task. Participants supervised a three-vehicle convoy as it
traversed a simulated environment and re-routed the convoy when needed with the
assistance of an intelligent agent, RoboLeader (RL). Information regarding potential
events along the pre-planned route, together with communications from a commander
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confirming either the presence or absence of activity in the area, were provided to all
participants. They received information about both their current route and the agentrecommended alternative route. When the convoy approached a potentially unsafe area,
the intelligent agent would recommend re-routing the convoy. The agent recommendations
were correct 66% of the time. The participant was required to recognize and correctly
reject any incorrect suggestions. The secondary goal of this study was to examine how
differing levels of agent transparency affected main task and secondary task performance,
response time, workload, SA, trust, and system usability, along with implications of
individual difference factors such as spatial ability, WMC, PAC, and complacency
potential.
Each participant was assigned to a specific level of agent reasoning transparency
(ART). The reasoning was provided as to why the agent was making the recommendation
and this differed among these levels. ART1 provided no reasoning information; RL
notified that a change was recommended without explanation. The type of information the
agent supplied varied slightly between ARTs 2 and 3. In ART2 the agent reasoning were
simple statements of fact corresponding to the information icons that appeared on the map,
along with reasoning as to how the agent factored each piece of information into its final
recommendation (e.g. recommend revise convoy route: Potential IED (H), Potential Sniper
(M), Dense Fog (L)). In ART3 an additional piece of information was added, which
conveyed when the agent had received the information leading to its recommendation (e.g.
recommend revise convoy route: Potential IED (H), TOR: 1 [hour], Potential Sniper (M),
TOR: 2, Dense Fog (L), TOR: 4). This additional information did not convey any
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confidence level or uncertainty but was designed to encourage the operator to actively
evaluate the quality of the information rather than simply respond. Therefore, not only was
access to agent reasoning examined, but the impact of the type of information the agent
supplied was reviewed as well.
Complacent behavior was investigated via primary (route selection) task response
at those decision points where the agent recommendation was incorrect, in the form of
incorrect acceptances of the agent recommendation, an objective measure of errors of
commission (Parasuraman et al., 2000). Access to agent reasoning was predicted to reduce
the number of incorrect acceptances while an increase in agent reasoning transparency was
expected to increase incorrect acceptances. The trend in the data appeared to support this
prediction, even though the findings were not significant. While there was a slight decrease
in the mean score for incorrect acceptances when agent reasoning transparency was added,
the highest mean score for incorrect acceptances was in ART3, when agent reasoning
transparency was highest. Response times for incorrect acceptances were longer than those
for correct rejections in the agent reasoning transparency condition, indicating that these
incorrect acceptances could be the result of errors in judgment rather than an indication of
complacent behavior.

However, in the condition with the highest amount of agent

reasoning transparency, not only are there more incorrect acceptances of the agent
suggestion, but the decision times for these responses is no different from those for correct
rejections. Considered together, this may be an indication that the combination of high
information and increased access to agent reasoning could overwork the operator, resulting
in an out-of-the-loop (OOTL) situation. Differences due to individual differences offer
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support for this notion, as individuals with higher working memory capacity had fewer
incorrect acceptances overall, demonstrating an ability to process more information more
effectively than their counterparts.

Additionally, individuals who scored low on

complacency potential (CP) had fewer incorrect acceptances in the agent reasoning
transparency conditions. There was no difference in performance between High and Low
CP individuals in the information-only condition. However, when agent reasoning was
transparent, Low CP individuals had more correct rejections than the High CP individuals,
and when agent reasoning transparency was increased the difference in performance
became more pronounced. The better performance of low CP individuals could be an
indication of either their willingness to engage with the agent rather than defer, or of their
calibrated trust in the ability of the intelligent agent (Parasuraman & Manzey, 2010).
As in experiment 1, the operator received all information needed to route the
convoy correctly without the agent’s suggestion. While the addition of agent reasoning
did result in fewer incorrect acceptances than in the no reasoning condition, the difference
was not significant. However, the small reduction in the number of incorrect acceptances
considered with the increased response times does provide evidence that the addition of
agent reasoning transparency is effective at keeping the operator engaged in the task, even
if the performance gains are small. In the highest reasoning transparency condition,
operators were also given information that could have seemed ambiguous, and as a result,
the number of incorrect acceptances increased while the response times were unchanged
from those for correct responses. Thus, the addition of information that isn’t clear how it
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should be used created a situation that encouraged the operator to defer to the agent
suggestion.
Performance on the route selection task was evaluated via correct rejections and
acceptances of the agent suggestion. An increased number of correct acceptances and
rejections, as well as reduced decision times, were all indicative of improved performance.
Route selection performance was anticipated to improve with access to agent reasoning
and then decline as access to agent reasoning increased.

This hypothesis was not

supported. Performance was unchanged in the agent reasoning transparency conditions
compared to the information-only condition.

Decision times (overall and correct

responses) were slightly longer in the agent reasoning transparency conditions compared
to the information only condition, which is to be expected due to the additional processing
required for the agent reasoning transparency. However, decision times for incorrect
responses did not follow this trend, with mean decision time in the most transparent agent
reasoning condition being shortest of all conditions. This shortening of deliberation time
could indicate complacent behavior is occurring in this condition.
Complacency Potential (CP), as evaluated using the Complacency Potential Rating
Scale (CPRS), and Spatial Orientation (SO) test scores were found to be predictive of
performance on the route selection task, in that individuals with low CP and those with
high SO ability were found to score higher on the route selection task overall. There were
also performance differences due to Perceived Attentional Control (PAC); individuals with
higher PAC had better performance on the route selection task in all ART conditions.
When considered together, these findings offer support for the notion that automation bias
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is, at least to some degree, an issue stemming from attention resource issues (Parasuraman
& Manzey, 2010).
Operator trust in the agent was assessed objectively by evaluating incorrect
rejections of the agent’s suggestions, and subjectively using the Usability and Trust Survey.
As in experiment 1, the objective measure of operator trust indicated no difference in trust
due to agent reasoning transparency. However, unlike experiment 1, the subjective
measures also indicated no difference in trust or perceived usability due to agent reasoning
transparency. Complacency Potential (CP), as evaluated using the Complacency Potential
Rating Scale (CPRS), was found to be predictive of operator trust, as evaluated via
incorrect rejections and scores on the usability and trust survey. Individuals with low CP
were found to have fewer incorrect rejections of the agent recommendation overall and
rated the agent as more trustworthy and usable than their high CP counterparts. However,
there was no difference in incorrect rejections, trust, or usability evaluations across agent
reasoning transparency conditions between high and low CP individuals, which indicates
these findings were not affected by the presence (or lack thereof) of agent reasoning
transparency.
Operator workload was expected to increase as agent reasoning transparency was
increased. However, this hypothesis was not supported. Workload was evaluated using the
NASA-TLX and several ocular indices that have been shown to be informative as to
cognitive workload. Global NASA-TLX scores decreased as ART increased, but such
changes were not significant. Pupil Diameter (PD) also decreased as ART increased,
indicating that overall cognitive workload decreased as ART increased. Operator PD was
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larger in the information-only condition compared to the agent reasoning transparency
conditions, indicating that the presence of agent reasoning transparency reduced cognitive
workload. This finding contradicts our stated hypothesis. Fixation Count (FC) and
Duration (FD) did not differ significantly between the three ART levels, indicating no
difference in cognitive workload.
Similar to Global scores, Mental Demand and Physical Demand were greater in
ART1 than in ARTs 2 or 3, suggesting that the access to agent reasoning reduced cognitive
workload. The ratings for NASA-TLX Temporal Demand and Effort were higher in ART1
than in either ART2 or 3, albeit not significantly different, which would support the Mental
Demand ratings.

Interestingly, participants also reported higher satisfaction in their

Performance in ART2 than in ART3. Although participants reported greater mental
demand in ART2 than in ART3, they also stayed more engaged in the task, as indicated by
their increased decision times for incorrect responses, resulting in higher performance
ratings.

Alternatively, the addition of the recency information in ART3 created an

overwork condition for the operator which encouraged complacent behavior. The
combination of decreased satisfaction in their performance and reduced decision times for
incorrect responses in ART3 could be indicative of an OOTL situation.
Situation Awareness (SA) scores were hypothesized to improve with access to
agent reasoning; this with the exception of SA1 and SA3 scores in ART3. In this study,
SA1 scores evaluated how well the participant maintained a general awareness of their
environment. The additional context gained by access to agent reasoning would make
certain events and situations more salient, which in turn would lead to improved
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performance on the route selection task (Hancock & Diaz, 2002). However, increased
access to agent transparency was expected to overwhelm the participant, leading to a
decline in SA1 and SA3 scores. The hypotheses were not supported, SA scores did not
improve with access to agent reasoning, nor did they vary across ART levels. In a high
information environment, access to agent reasoning does not appear to affect operator
situation awareness. These results offer limited support for experiment 1 findings, in which
access to agent reasoning does little to improve SA.
While there were no differences in situation awareness due to the effect of agent
reasoning access, there were notable distinctions in SA scores for several individual
difference factors. Low complacency potential (CP) individuals overall had higher SA1
scores than their high CP counterparts in all ART levels, which could be due to reduced
trust in the agent encouraging them to monitor their surroundings more carefully (Pop,
Shrewsbury, & Durso, 2015), in effect, supervising the agent. High working memory
capacity (WMC) individuals had higher SA2 scores across all ART levels than their low
WMC counterparts, demonstrating their improved ability to assimilate the information
from various sources into a coherent understanding (Wickens & Hollands, 2000). Low
WMC individuals’ SA2 scores were lowest in ART2, which could indicate that the access
to agent reasoning overtasked them, and the scoring their lowest SA2 scores in ART2.
High spatial orientation (SO) individuals had higher SA2 scores when agent reasoning
transparency was available than their low SO counterparts. While both groups had similar
SA2 scores in the absence of agent reasoning, when access to agent reasoning became
available the High SO individuals’ SA2 scores improved while the Low SO individuals’
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SA2 scores decreased. Gugerty and Brooks (2004) found that high SO individuals were
better able to overlook slight disparities in reference-frame alignments. This ability could
explain why high SO individuals appear to have increased skill when combining
information from several sources (one of which being a map of the area) into a
comprehensive understanding of the environment surrounding the convoy’s route.
Access to agent reasoning appeared to have little influence on performance on the
target detection task. The number of targets detected in ART3 was significantly lower than
the other two conditions, indicating that increased agent reasoning transparency interfered
with this task. However, access to agent reasoning had no effect on the number of false
alarms reported. Signal Detection Theory was used to evaluate whether access to agent
reasoning had any effect on sensitivity or selection criteria. There was no significant
difference in either sensitivity to targets, assessed as d’, or selection criteria, assessed as
Beta, across ART levels.

In an information-rich environment, agent reasoning

transparency appears to have no effect on sensitivity to targets or target selection criterion.
As in experiment 1, a potential limitation of this work could be the added time
information in ART3. Participants in that agent reasoning condition were instructed that
the time reflected when the agent received the information upon which it based its
recommendation, however they were not instructed how they should use that information
in their deliberations. Thus, this information could have appeared ambiguous to the
participants, and there could be variability in how they factored this information into their
decision based upon their personal experience.
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Conclusion
The findings of the present study are important for the design of intelligent
recommender and decision-aid systems. Keeping the operator engaged and in-the-loop is
important for reducing complacency, which could allow lapses in system reliability to go
unnoticed.

To that end, we examined how agent reasoning transparency affected

complacent behavior, as well as task performance, workload, and trust when the operator
had complete information about their task environment.
Access to agent reasoning was found to have little effect on complacent behavior
when the operator has complete information about the task environment. However, the
addition of information that created ambiguity for the operator appeared to encourage
complacency, as indicated by reduced performance and shorter decision times. Agent
reasoning transparency did not increase overall workload, which agrees with previous
studies (see Mercado et al., 2015), and operators reported higher satisfaction with their
performance and reduced mental demand. Contrary to findings previously reported by
Helldin et al. (2014) and Mercado et al. (2015), access to agent reasoning did not improve
operators’ secondary task performance, situation awareness, or operator trust. However,
this access did not have a negative effect until transparency increased to such a level as to
include ambiguous information, thus encouraging complacency. As such, these findings
would suggest that when the operator has complete information regarding their task
environment, access to agent reasoning may be beneficial, but not dramatically so.
However, agent reasoning transparency that includes ambiguous information does have
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negative effects, as such, the amount of transparency and the type of information conveyed
to the operator should be carefully considered.
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CHAPTER 5: COMPARISON OF EXPERIMENTS 1 & 2
Objective
Results from Experiments 1 and 2 were compared to evaluate how differences in
the level of information available to the operator interacted with access to the agents’
reasoning and uncertainty information. In ART1, the only difference between experiment
1 (EXP1) and experiment 2 (EXP2) was the amount of information the participant received
via the map icons. In ARTs 2 and 3, agent reasoning transparency was similar between the
two experiments in that participants were shown the agent reasoning equating to each map
icon; there were simply more icons in EXP2 to explain. However, in EXP2 participants
were also told how the agent factored each piece of information into its recommendation
via the weighing factor, thus there was a slight increase in agent reasoning transparency in
ARTs 2 and 3 compared to EXP1.
Hypotheses:
Based on the review of the literature, this proposal posits the following hypotheses:
It is hypothesized that complacent behavior in the high information environment
(EXP2) will be lower than in the low information environment (EXP1) in the absence of
agent reasoning (ART1).

The additional information should help the participant

successfully maneuver their environment more safely. The presence of agent reasoning
(ART2) will assist the operator in understanding the additional environmental information,
resulting in reduced incorrect acceptances in the high information environment (EXP2)
from the low information environment (EXP1). However, the increase in agent reasoning
transparency (ART3) will overload the operator, and as a result, incorrect acceptances will
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be greater in the high information environment (EXP2) than in the low information
environment (EXP1).
Hypothesis 1: Incorrect acceptances will be lower in EXP2 than in EXP1 in
ART1 (EXP1 > EXP2), as the additional environmental information will
reduce the operator’s dependency on the agent’s recommendations. In
ART2, incorrect acceptances will be lower in EXP2 than in EXP1 due to
the presence of agent reasoning (EXP1 > EXP2). In ART3, incorrect
acceptances will be higher in EXP2 than in EXP1 (EXP1 < EXP2) due to
overloading the operator with information.
Hypothesis 2: Performance (number of correct rejects and accepts) on the
route selection task in Experiment 2, compared to Experiment 1, will be:


Lower in ART1, due to increased environmental information without
access to agent reasoning (EXP1 > EXP2).



Greater in ART2, due to access to agent reasoning, (EXP1 < EXP2), and



Lower in ART3, due to information overload as a result of the increase in
transparency of the agent reasoning which included ambiguous
information (EXP1 > EXP2).



In all conditions, time to decide on the route selection task will be higher
in Experiment 2 than Experiment 1 (EXP1 < EXP2).
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Hypothesis 3: Operator trust in the agent will be greater in EXP2 than in
EXP1 for ARTs 1 and 2 (EXP1 < EXP2). However, operator trust will be
lower in EXP2 than in EXP1 for ART3 (EXP1 > EXP2).
Hypothesis 4: Operator perceived workload will be greater in Experiment 2
than in Experiment 1 for all ARTs, (EXP1 < EXP2). Inferred measures of
workload (i.e., pupil diameter, fixation count, and fixation duration) will
also show increased workload.
Hypothesis 5: The increased environmental information will result in lower
SA scores in EXP2 than in EXP1 in ARTs 1 and 3 (EXP1 > EXP2) for SA
1 and SA 3 measures. SA 2 scores will be higher in EXP2 than in EXP1 in
ARTs 1 and 2, however, will be lower in ART3.


SA1: ARTs 1, 2 & 3: EXP1 > EXP2



SA2: ARTs 1 & 2: EXP1 < EXP2; ART3: EXP1 > EXP2.



SA3: ARTs 1, 2 & 3: EXP1 > EXP2

Hypothesis 6: Performance in the Target Detection Task, in both Targets Detected
and False Alarms, will be worse in EXP2 than in EXP1 in all ARTs, due to
information overload.


Number of Targets Detected: EXP1 > EXP2



False Alarms: EXP1 < EXP2.
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Table 31. The anticipated pattern of findings (hypotheses) for comparison of Experiment 2 results
to Experiment 1 results.
DV Measure

ART 1

ART 2

ART 3

Route Selection Task Correct accepts and rejects
(RS)
Decision Time

LI > HI
LI < HI

LI < HI
LI < HI

LI > HI
LI < HI

Target Detection Task Targets Detected
(TD)
False Alarms

LI > HI
LI < HI

LI > HI
LI < HI

LI > HI
LI < HI

Complacent Behavior Incorrect Acceptances

LI > HI

LI > HI

LI < HI

Situation Awareness
Scores

SA Level 1 Queries (Perception)
SA Level 2 Queries (Comprehension)
SA Level 3 Queries (Projection)

LI > HI
LI < HI
LI > HI

LI > HI
LI < HI
LI > HI

LI > HI
LI > HI
LI > HI

Workload

Global NASA-TLX

LI < HI

LI < HI

LI < HI

LI < HI
LI < HI

LI < HI
LI < HI

LI < HI
LI < HI

Incorrect Rejections
Usability and Trust Survey
LI - Low Information (EXP1), HI - High Information (EXP2)
Trust

Results
Data was examined using independent samples t-tests (α = .05) within each agent
reasoning transparency (ART) level between Experiment 1 (EXP1) and Experiment 2
(EXP2). Equal variances between groups were not assumed. Specifically, ART1 was
compared to ART1, ART2 to ART2, and ART3 to ART3 for each measure of interest.
Means, SD, SE, and 95% CI are reported for each measure.
Complacent Behavior Evaluation
Hypothesis 1: Incorrect acceptances will be lower in EXP2 than in EXP1 in
ART1 (EXP1 > EXP2), as the additional environmental information will
reduce the operator’s dependency on the agent’s recommendations. In
ART2, incorrect acceptances will be lower in EXP2 than in EXP1 due to
the presence of agent reasoning (EXP1 > EXP2). In ART3, incorrect
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acceptances will be higher in EXP2 than in EXP1 (EXP1 < EXP2) due to
overloading the operator with information.
Descriptive statistics for incorrect acceptances and EXP1 – EXP2 t-test results are
shown in Table 32.
Table 32. Descriptive statistics for incorrect acceptances, sorted by experiment (EXP) for each
agent reasoning transparency (ART) level, and t-test results for between-experiment comparisons.

EXP 1

20

3.25

2.27

95% C.I. for
Mean
0.51 (2.19, 4.31)

EXP 2

20

0.98

1.11

0.25

(0.46, 1.49)

EXP 1

20

1.15

1.31

0.29

(0.54, 1.76)

EXP 2

20

0.90

0.91

0.20

(0.47, 1.33)

EXP 1

20

2.65

2.32

0.52

(1.56, 3.74)

EXP 2

20

1.50

1.64

0.37

(0.73, 2.27)

N
ART 1

ART 2

ART 3

Mean

SD

SE

df

t

p

Cohen's
d

27.6

4.03

< .001

1.35

33.9

0.70

.488

0.23

34.2

1.81

.079

0.58

Evaluating incorrect acceptances between experiments, it is evident that, overall,
more incorrect acceptances occurred in EXP1 than EXP2 (Figure 47). There was a
significant correlation between EXP and the number of incorrect acceptances, regardless
of ART, r = -.26, p = .013. In ART1, which had no agent reasoning available for the
operator, there were fewer incorrect acceptances in EXP2 than EXP1. This supports the
hypothesis and is strong evidence that operator knowledge of the task environment can
reduce complacent behavior even in the absence of agent reasoning. As predicted,
incorrect acceptances were also lower in EXP2 than in EXP1 in ART2. However, this
result was not statistically significant. It was expected that the increased agent reasoning
transparency in ART3 would overwhelm the operator in EXP2, resulting in higher incorrect
acceptances. However, this was not the case. Although EXP2 mean scores in ART3 were
greater than those in ARTs 1 or 2, indicating that the increased transparency was not
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without its cost, scores were significantly lower than in EXP1. Overall, these findings are
evidence of the importance of information in addition to agent reasoning transparency for
reducing the complacent behavior.

Figure 47. Average incorrect acceptances by experiment for each agent reasoning transparency
(ART) level. Bars denote SE.

Participants’ scores were further analyzed by comparing the number of participants
who had no incorrect acceptances, by ART level, between EXP1 and EXP2 (Figure 48).
Chi-square analysis found a significant difference in ART1 in the number of participants
with no incorrect acceptances, Χ2(6) = 15.26, p = .018, Cramer’s V = .618, but no difference
in ART2, Χ2(5) = 3.35, p = .646, Cramer’s V = .290, or ART3, Χ2(6) = 8.23, p = .222,
Cramer’s V = .454. In ART1, the increased information in EXP2 appeared to improve the
participants’ ability to discern when the agent was incorrect compared to EXP1. However,
the addition of agent reasoning in ARTs 2 and 3 appeared to improve EXP1 participants’
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ability to discern when the agent was incorrect to the same degree as in EXP2. When
participants did incorrectly accept the agent’s recommendation, more participants made
incorrect acceptances in EXP1 (n = 43) than in EXP2 (n = 35), across all ARTs. Of these,
89% of participants in EXP2 scored less than 50% on incorrect acceptances, compared to
51% of those in EXP1.

Figure 48. Between experiment comparisons of the number of participants who had no incorrect
acceptances in each agent reasoning transparency (ART) level.

Decision time for responses on the route selection task at those locations where the
agent recommendation was incorrect was evaluated. It was hypothesized that decision time
would increase as agent reasoning transparency increased, and decision times in EXP2
would be longer than those in EXP1 as participants should require additional time to
process the extra information. Thus, reduced time could indicate less time spent in
deliberation, which could be an indication of complacent behavior. Descriptive statistics
for Decision Times and EXP1 – EXP2 t-test results are shown in Table 33.
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Table 33. Descriptive statistics for average decision time at those locations where the agent
recommendation is incorrect, sorted by experiment (EXP) for each agent reasoning transparency
(ART) level, and t-test results for between-experiment comparisons.

EXP 1

20

7.63

3.10

95% C.I. for
Mean
0.69
(6.18, 9.08)

EXP 2

20

11.14

3.68

0.82

(9.42, 12.87)

EXP 1

20

7.20

2.77

0.62

(5.91, 8.50)

EXP 2

20

11.51

3.35

0.75

(9.94, 13.08)

EXP 1

20

7.89

3.01

0.67

(6.48, 9.30)

EXP 2

20

12.30

3.96

0.89 (10.45, 14.16)

N
ART 1

ART 2

ART 3

Mean

SD

SE

df

t

p

Cohen's
d

36.9

-3.27

.002

1.04

36.7

-4.43

< .001

1.41

35.5

-3.97

< .001

1.27

Evaluating decision times at those locations where the agent recommendation was
incorrect between experiments, it is evident that participants took longer deliberating in
EXP2 than EXP1 (Figure 49) across all ARTs, which supports the hypothesis. This
difference was smallest in ART1 (ΔM = 3.52), and larger when agent reasoning
transparency was present (ART2, ΔM = 4.31; ART3, ΔM = 4.42). Participants took longer
to reach their decisions in EXP2 than in EXP1, most likely due to the increased
environmental information and increased agent reasoning. It is interesting that in ART3,
when agent reasoning transparency was at its highest, decision time was the roughly the
same as in ART2. In order to understand this lack of difference, decision times were also
evaluated by correct/incorrect responses, see Table 34.

176

Figure 49. Average decision time in seconds for participant responses at decision points where the
agent recommendation was incorrect, sorted by experiment, for each agent reasoning transparency
(ART) level. Bars denote SE.

Table 34. Descriptive statistics for decision times (in seconds) for participant responses at decision
points where the agent recommendation was incorrect. Decision times are sorted by correct
rejections, incorrect acceptances, and experiment (EXP) for each agent reasoning transparency
(ART) level, and include t-test results for between-experiment comparisons.

Incorrect Acceptances

Correct Rejections

N
ART 1

ART 2

ART 3

ART 1

ART 2

ART 3

Mean

SD

SE

EXP 1

14

8.96

8.69

2.32

EXP 2

20

11.15

4.25

0.95

EXP 1

20

7.49

3.17

0.71

EXP 2

20

11.25

3.19

0.71

EXP 1

18

8.14

3.47

0.82

EXP 2

20

12.94

5.09

1.14

EXP 1

18

8.72

4.88

1.15

EXP 2

11

12.17

5.76

1.74

EXP 1

11

6.09

1.76

0.53

EXP 2

12

14.37

4.49

1.30

EXP 1

14

8.94

5.27

1.41

EXP 2

12

15.70 11.23

3.24
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df

t

p

Cohen's
d

32.0

-0.98

.337

0.34

38.0

-3.73

.001

1.18

36.0

-3.36

.002

1.12

27.0

-1.73

.096

0.65

14.6

-5.91

< .001

2.65

24.0

-2.01

.056

0.82

Response times for both correct rejections and incorrect acceptances were
significantly longer in EXP2 than EXP1 in all ARTs. However, the differences in response
times between EXP1 and EXP2 were greater for the incorrect responses than the associated
correct responses in each ART (Figure 50). There was no significant difference in response
times between experiments for the notification-only condition, indicating that the increase
in information alone did not result in an associated increase in decision time, regardless of
correct or incorrect status. Considered along with the reduced number of incorrect
acceptances in EXP2, this could be evidence that information alone appears to be effective
at mitigating complacent behavior. For correct rejections, differences in response time for
the agent reasoning conditions were similar but longer than the response time for the
notification-only condition. Response times for incorrect acceptances were considerably
longer than those for correct rejections in the same ARTs, which could be evidence that
the incorrect responses were due to difficulty integrating all of the available information.
In ART3 the difference in response time for incorrect acceptances is considerably longer
than that for correct rejections, and not significantly different between the two experiments.
This is mainly due to the increased variability of response times in EXP2 in this ART level.
The increased variability could indicate that while some participants erred due to difficulty
in assimilating the information, others were exhibiting complacent behavior.
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Figure 50. Differences in mean decision times (EXP2-EXP1) for average decision times (in
seconds) for correct rejections and incorrect acceptances, sorted by agent reasoning transparency
(ART) level. An asterisk (*) denotes that the difference between experiments was significant.

Route Selection Task Performance
Hypothesis 2: Performance (number of correct rejects and accepts) on the
route selection task in Experiment 2, compared to Experiment 1, will be:


Lower in ART1, due to increased environmental information without
access to agent reasoning (EXP1 > EXP2).



Greater in ART2, due to access to agent reasoning, (EXP1 < EXP2), and



Lower in ART3, due to information overload as a result of the increase in
transparency of the agent reasoning which included ambiguous
information (EXP1 > EXP2).



In all conditions, time to decide on the route selection task will be higher
in Experiment 2 than Experiment 1 (EXP1 < EXP2).
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Descriptive statistics for Route Selection Task scores and EXP1 – EXP2 t-test
results are shown in Table 35.
Table 35. Descriptive statistics for route selection task scores, sorted by experiment (EXP) for each
agent reasoning transparency (ART) level, and t-test results for between-experiment comparisons.

ART 1

ART 2

ART 3

N

Mean

SD

EXP 1

20

14.10

2.59

95% C.I. for
Mean
0.58 (12.89, 15.31)

EXP 2

20

13.20

3.46

0.77 (11.58, 14.82)

EXP 1

20

15.90

1.80

0.40 (15.06, 16.74)

EXP 2

20

13.30

3.18

0.71 (11.81, 14.79)

EXP 1

20

14.70

2.81

0.63 (13.38, 16.02)

EXP 2

20

13.40

3.28

0.73 (11.86, 14.94)

SE

df

t

p

Cohen's
d

35.2

0.93

.358

0.30

30.1

3.18

.003

1.04

37.1

1.35

.187

0.43

Evaluating Route Selection scores between experiments, it is evident that, overall,
scores were higher in EXP1 than in EXP2 (Figure 51), although this difference was only
significant in ART2. In ART1, which had no agent reasoning available for the operator,
and ART3, which had the greatest access to agent reasoning, route selection scores were
essentially the same between the two experiments. Increasing the amount of information
available to the operator did not improve overall performance on the primary task as
predicted, nor did performance improve when agent reasoning transparency was at its
highest level. This is evidence that too much access to agent reasoning can have a similar
effect on performance as too little. Results in ART2 are contrary to the predicted direction,
where performance in EXP2 was expected to be greater than in EXP1. Instead, route
selection scores were significantly higher in EXP1 than in EXP2. These results indicate
that the combination of high environment information and access to agent reasoning can
have a detrimental effect on task performance.

180

Figure 51. Average route selection task score by experiment for each agent reasoning transparency
(ART) level. Bars denote SE.

Operator performance was also evaluated via response time on the route selection
task. Descriptive statistics for Overall Decision Times and EXP1 – EXP2 t-test results are
shown in Table 36.
Table 36. Descriptive statistics for overall decision times (in seconds) for the route selection task,
sorted by experiment (EXP) for each agent reasoning transparency (ART) level, and t-test results
for between-experiment comparisons.

ART 1

ART 2

ART 3

N

Mean

SD

EXP 1

20

7.64

3.60

95% C.I. for
Mean
0.81
(5.95, 9.32)

EXP 2

20

10.86

3.04

0.68

(9.44, 12.82)

EXP 1

20

7.51

3.36

0.75

(5.93, 9.08)

EXP 2

20

12.53

3.09

0.69 (11.08, 13.97)

EXP 1

20

8.14

3.62

0.81

EXP 2

20

12.52

4.91

1.10 (10.22, 14.81)

SE
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(6.46, 9.84)

df

t

p

Cohen's
d

37.0

-3.06

.004

0.97

37.7

-4.92

< .001

1.56

34.9

-3.21

.003

1.03

Overall decision time on the route selection task was hypothesized to be longer in
EXP2 than in EXP1, and the findings support the hypothesis. Comparing decision times
between experiments, it is evident that times were significantly longer in EXP2 than in
EXP1 (Figure 52). This difference was smallest in ART1 (ΔM = 3.22), and larger when
agent reasoning transparency was present (ART2, ΔM = 5.02; ART3, ΔM = 4.38).
Participants took longer to reach their decisions in EXP2 than in EXP1, most likely due to
the increased environmental information and increased agent reasoning. It is interesting
that in ART3 when agent reasoning transparency was at its highest, decision time was the
same as in ART2. In order to understand this lack of difference, decision times were also
evaluated by correct/incorrect responses, see Table 37.

Figure 52. Average overall decision times (in seconds) by experiment for each agent reasoning
transparency (ART) level. Bars denote SE.
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Table 37. Descriptive statistics for decision times (in seconds) for the route selection task, sorted
by correct and incorrect responses, and experiment (EXP) for each agent reasoning transparency
(ART) level, and t-test results for between-experiment comparisons.

Incorrect Responses

Correct Responses

N
ART 1

ART 2

ART 3

ART 1

ART 2

ART 3

Mean

SD

SE

EXP 1

20

7.52

3.50

0.78

EXP 2

20

10.32

2.79

0.62

EXP 1

20

7.42

3.37

0.75

EXP 2

20

11.95

3.40

0.76

EXP 1

20

7.98

3.33

0.74

EXP 2

20

12.10

4.60

1.03

EXP 1

18

8.85

5.38

1.27

EXP 2

20

13.06

5.39

1.21

EXP 1

17

8.44

4.20

1.02

EXP 2

19

15.58

4.89

1.12

EXP 1

14

9.16

5.20

1.39

EXP 2

17

14.77

8.46

2.05

df

t

p

Cohen's
d

38.0

-2.80

.008

0.89

38.0

-4.23

< .001

1.34

38.0

-3.42

.002

1.04

36.0

-2.40

.022

0.78

34.0

-4.67

< .001

1.57

29.0

-2.16

.039

0.82

Response times for both correct and incorrect responses were significantly longer
in EXP2 than EXP1 in all ARTs. However, the differences in response times between
EXP1 and EXP2 were greater for the incorrect responses than the associated correct
responses in each ART (Figure 53). For correct responses, the difference in response time
for the agent reasoning conditions was similar but longer than the response time for the
notification-only condition. Response times for incorrect responses were longer than those
for correct responses in the same ARTs, which could be evidence that the incorrect
responses were due to difficulty integrating all of the available information. The reduced
route selection score along with the increased decision times in ART2 supports this notion.
However, if this were the case, the difference in response times for incorrect responses in
ART3 would be at least as long as that in ART2; instead, it is shorter, and there is no
difference in route selection task scores between experiments in ART3. This reduction in
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response time may be an indication of some participants’ exhibiting complacent behavior
in the highest ART.

Figure 53. Differences in mean decision times (EXP2-EXP1) for average decision times (in
seconds) for correct and incorrect responses, sorted by agent reasoning transparency (ART) level.
An asterisk (*) denotes that the difference between experiments was significant.

Operator Trust Evaluation
Hypothesis 3: Operator trust in the agent will be greater in EXP2 than in
EXP1 for ARTs 1 and 2 (EXP1 < EXP2). However, operator trust will be
lower in EXP2 than in EXP1 for ART3 (EXP1 > EXP2).
Descriptive statistics for incorrect rejections and EXP1 – EXP2 t-test results are
shown in Table 38.
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Table 38. Descriptive statistics for incorrect rejections, sorted by experiment (EXP) for each agent
reasoning transparency (ART) level, and t-test results for between-experiment comparisons.

ART 1

ART 2

ART 3

N

Mean

SD

EXP 1

20

0.75

1.14

95% C.I. for
Mean
0.26
(0.19, 1.26)

EXP 2

20

3.75

3.49

0.78

(2.12, 5.39)

EXP 1

20

0.93

0.77

0.17

(0.57, 1.28)

EXP 2

20

3.80

2.76

0.62

(2.51, 5.09)

EXP 1

20

0.34

0.54

0.12

(0.08, 0.59)

EXP 2

20

3.10

3.04

0.68

(1.68, 4.52)

SE

df

t

p

Cohen's
d

23.0

-3.68

< .001

1.31

21.9

-4.48

< .001

1.63

20.2

-4.00

< .001

1.54

Incorrect rejections of the agent recommendation at those locations where the agent
recommendation was correct were evaluated as indicative of operator trust. There were
significantly more incorrect rejections in EXP2 than in EXP1 in all ARTs (Figure 54).
Incorrect rejections in ARTs 1 and 2 were expected to be lower in EXP2 than in EXP1, as
such these findings are contrary to the stated hypothesis. Incorrect rejections in ART3
were expected to be higher in EXP2 than in EXP1, due to the combination of the high
information environment and increased access to agent reasoning transparency, and this
was supported. Across all ARTs, more participants had no incorrect rejections in EXP1
(33 out of 60) than in EXP2 (11 out of 60). The increased number of incorrect rejections
in EXP2 is most likely due to the increase in task environment information, which was
consistent across ARTs.
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Figure 54. The average number of incorrect rejections of agent recommendations, by experiment,
for each agent reasoning transparency (ART) level. Bars denote SE.

Decision time on the route selection task for the locations where the agent
recommendation was correct was also compared between experiments.

It was

hypothesized that decision time would increase as agent reasoning transparency increased,
and decision times in EXP2 would be longer than those in EXP1 as participants should
require additional time to process the extra information. Descriptive statistics for decision
times and EXP1 – EXP2 t-test results are shown in Table 39.
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Table 39. Descriptive statistics for average decision time at those locations where the agent
recommendation is correct, sorted by experiment (EXP), for each agent reasoning transparency
(ART) level, and t-test results for between-experiment comparisons.

EXP 1

20

7.55

3.77

95% C.I. for
Mean
0.84
(5.79, 9.32)

EXP 2

20

10.65

2.92

0.65

(9.29, 12.02)

EXP 1

20

7.66

3.75

0.84

(5.90, 9.41)

EXP 2

20

13.03

3.67

0.82 (11.32, 14.75)

EXP 1

20

8.07

3.60

0.80

(6.39, 9.76)

EXP 2

20

12.12

4.54

1.02

(9.99, 14.24)

N
ART 1

ART 2

ART 3

Mean

SD

SE

df

t

p

Cohen's
d

35.8

-2.91

.006

0.93

38.0

-4.59

< .001

1.45

36.1

-3.12

.004

0.99

Evaluating decision times at those locations where the agent recommendation was
correct between experiments, it is evident that participants took longer deliberating in
EXP2 than EXP1 (Figure 55) across all ARTs, which supports the hypothesis. This
difference was smallest in ART1 (ΔM = 3.10), and larger when agent reasoning
transparency was present (ART2, ΔM = 5.38; ART3, ΔM = 4.04). Participants took longer
to reach their decisions in EXP2 than in EXP1, most likely due to the increased
environmental information.

Decision times were also evaluated by correct/incorrect

responses, see Table 40.
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Figure 55. Average decision times (in seconds) for operator responses at decision locations where
the agent recommendation was correct, sorted by experiment, for each agent reasoning
transparency (ART) level. Bars denote SE.

Incorrect Rejections

Correct Acceptances

Table 40. Descriptive statistics for decision times (in seconds) for participant responses at decision
points where the agent recommendation was correct. Decision times are sorted by correct
acceptances, incorrect rejections, and experiment (EXP) for each agent reasoning transparency
(ART) level, and include t-test results for between-experiment comparisons.

ART 1

ART 2

ART 3

ART 1

ART 2

ART 3

N

Mean

SD

SE

EXP 1

20

8.21

5.82

1.30

EXP 2

20

9.89

2.91

0.65

EXP 1

20

7.53

3.75

0.84

EXP 2

20

12.35

4.28

0.96

EXP 1

20

8.04

3.59

0.80

EXP 2

20

12.10

5.14

1.15

EXP 1

7

10.79

9.82

3.71

EXP 2

16

13.26

5.57

1.39

EXP 1

14

9.69

4.57

1.22

EXP 2

18

15.95

5.24

1.24

EXP 1

6

9.62

4.59

1.88

EXP 2

15

13.20

6.62

1.71
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df

t

p

Cohen's
d

38.0

-1.15

.256

0.38

38.0

-3.79

.001

1.20

38.0

-2.89

.006

0.93

21.0

-0.77

.448

0.32

30.0

-3.54

.001

1.28

19.0

-2.21

.242

0.64

Response times for both correct acceptances and incorrect rejections were longer
in EXP2 than EXP1 in all ARTs (Figure 56). There was no significant difference in
response times between experiments for the notification-only condition (ART1), indicating
that the increase in information alone did not result in an associated increase in decision
time, regardless of correct or incorrect response status. Decision times in ART2 were
significantly longer in EXP2 than in EXP1 regardless of correct or incorrect response
status. This could indicate either more distrustful behavior, the participant’s level of
engagement with the agent, or difficulty integrating the information. However, it is likely
that the large increase in decision time for EXP2 for incorrect rejections is an indication of
difficulty integrating the available information.
In ART3, decision times for incorrect rejections were shorter than those for correct
acceptances. This difference was significant for correct acceptances. However there was
no significant difference in decision times for incorrect rejections even though there were
considerably more incorrect rejections in EXP2 than in EXP1. This could be an indication
that the incorrect rejections in ART3 were due to an overwork situation, rather than
difficulty integrating information, i.e. complacent behavior or overtrust.
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Figure 56. Differences in mean decision times (EXP2-EXP1) for average decision times (in
seconds) for correct acceptances and incorrect rejections, sorted by agent reasoning transparency
(ART) level. An asterisk (*) denotes that the difference between experiments was significant.

Usability and Trust survey results were also compared between experiments.
Descriptive statistics for Usability and Trust Survey scores and EXP1 – EXP2 t-test results
are shown in Table 41.
Table 41. Descriptive statistics for Usability and Trust Survey score, sorted by experiment (EXP)
for each agent reasoning transparency (ART) level, and t-test results for between-experiment
comparisons.

ART 1

ART 2

ART 3

N

Mean

EXP 1

20

104.40 12.91

95% C.I. for
Mean
2.89 (98.36, 110.44)

EXP 2

20

91.30 19.29

4.31 (82.27, 100.33)

EXP 1

20

95.15 16.94

3.79 (87.22, 103.08)

EXP 2

20

91.20 15.73

3.52

EXP 1

20

106.95 17.79

EXP 2

20

93.60 13.03

SD

SE

(83.84, 98.56)

3.98 (98.63, 115.27)
2.91

(87.50, 99.70)

df

t

p

Cohen's
d

33.2

2.52

.017

0.81

37.8

0.76

.449

0.24

34.8

2.71

.010

0.87

Independent samples t-tests were used to compare overall Usability and Trust
scores between experiments (Figure 57). Usability and Trust survey scores were higher in
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EXP1 than in EXP2 across all ART levels, although this difference was not significant in
ART2.

Figure 57. Average usability and trust survey score, by experiment, for each agent reasoning
transparency (ART) level. Bars denote SE.

Usability survey results were compared between experiments.

Descriptive

statistics for Usability Survey scores and EXP1 – EXP2 t-test results are shown in Table
42.
Table 42. Descriptive statistics for Usability Survey score, sorted by experiment (EXP), for each
agent reasoning transparency (ART) level, and t-test results for between-experiment comparisons.

ART 1

ART 2

ART 3

N

Mean

SD

EXP 1

20

46.75

5.33

95% C.I. for
Mean
1.19 (44.26, 49.24)

EXP 2

20

40.35

7.18

1.61 (36.99, 43.71)

EXP 1

20

40.75

6.60

1.48 (37.66, 43.84)

EXP 2

20

39.45

6.05

1.35 (36.62, 42.28)

EXP 1

20

46.20

5.90

1.32 (43.44, 48.96)

EXP 2

20

41.60

5.70

1.27 (38.93, 44.27)

SE
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df

t

p

Cohen's
d

35.1

3.20

.003

1.02

37.7

0.65

.520

0.21

38.0

2.51

.017

0.79

Examining the Usability scores separately from the Trust survey scores, there is a
significant difference in perceived usability between the two experiments. Usability scores
were higher for EXP1 than EXP2 in ARTs 1 and 3 (Figure 58). This indicates that the
extra information provided in EXP2 affected the operator perception of agent usability in
these ARTs. However, this appears to have been mitigated in ART2, where there was no
significant difference in evaluation between the two experiments.

Figure 58. Average usability survey scores, by experiment, for each agent reasoning transparency
(ART) level. Bars denote SE.

Trust survey results were compared between experiments. Descriptive statistics for
Trust Survey scores and EXP1 – EXP2 t-test results are shown in Table 43.
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Table 43. Descriptive statistics for Trust Survey score, sorted by experiment (EXP), for each agent
reasoning transparency (ART) level, and t-test results for between-experiment comparisons.

ART 1

ART 2

ART 3

N

Mean

SD

EXP 1

20

58.55

8.28

95% C.I. for
Mean
1.85 (54.67, 62.43)

EXP 2

20

50.95 13.08

2.92 (44.83, 57.07)

EXP 1

20

54.40 10.23

2.29 (49.61, 59.19)

EXP 2

20

51.75 11.19

2.50 (46.51, 56.99)

EXP 1

20

61.60 11.72

2.62 (56.12, 67.08)

EXP 2

20

52.00

1.93 (47.97, 56.03)

8.61

SE

df

t

p

Cohen's
d

32.1

2.20

.035

0.71

37.7

0.78

.439

0.25

34.9

2.95

.006

0.94

Examining the Trust scores separately from the Usability survey scores, there is a
significant difference in operator subjective trust between the two experiments. Trust
scores were higher for EXP1 than EXP2 in all ART levels (Figure 59), and this difference
was significant in ARTs 1 and 3. This indicates that the extra information provided in
EXP2 reduced operator trust in the agent. However, the access to agent reasoning in ART2
also reduced operator trust in EXP1, where there was no significant difference in trust
survey scores between the two experiments.
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Figure 59. Average trust survey scores, by experiment, for each agent reasoning transparency
(ART) level. Bars denote SE.

Workload Evaluation
Hypothesis 4: Operator perceived workload will be greater in Experiment 2
than in Experiment 1 for all ARTs, (EXP1 < EXP2). Objective measures
of workload (i.e., pupil diameter, fixation count, and fixation duration) will
also show increased workload.
Operator perceived workload was evaluated using the NASA-TLX workload
survey, and results were compared between experiments. Descriptive statistics for Global
NASA-TLX scores and EXP1 – EXP2 t-test results are shown in Table 44.
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Table 44. Descriptive statistics for Global NASA-TLX scores, sorted by experiment (EXP), for
each agent reasoning transparency (ART) level, and t-test results for between-experiment
comparisons.

EXP 1

20

64.70 13.47

95% C.I. for
Mean
3.01 (58.40, 70.01)

EXP 2

20

67.03 10.87

2.43 (61.95, 72.12)

EXP 1

20

65.19 12.38

2.77 (59.39, 70.98)

EXP 2

20

62.80 13.89

3.08 (56.35, 69.25)

EXP 1

20

60.70 14.01

3.13 (54.15, 67.26)

EXP 2

20

61.48 11.58

2.59 (56.06, 66.90)

N

Mean

SD

SE

df

t

p

Cohen's
d

36.4

-0.60

.550

0.19

37.6

0.58

.569

0.18

36.7

-0.19

.848

0.06

Using independent samples t-test to compare findings, no significant difference in
global NASA-TLX scores was found between experiments (Figure 60).

Figure 60. Average global NASA-TLX score, by experiment, for each agent reasoning
transparency (ART) level. Bars denote SE.

Cognitive workload was also evaluated using several ocular indices, and results
were compared between experiments. Descriptive statistics for Pupil Diameter, Fixation
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Count, and Fixation Duration and EXP1 – EXP2 t-test results are shown in Tables 45, 46,
and 47, respectively.
Table 45. Descriptive statistics for Pupil Diameter, sorted by experiment (EXP), for each agent
reasoning transparency (ART) level, and t-test results for between-experiment comparisons.

ART 1

ART 2

ART 3

N

Mean

SD

EXP 1

19

3.74

0.31

95% C.I. for
Mean
0.07
(3.58, 3.94)

EXP 2

18

3.77

0.58

0.14

(3.48, 4.06)

EXP 1

20

3.62

0.35

0.08

(3.46, 3.78)

EXP 2

17

3.43

0.32

0.08

(3.26, 3.59)

EXP 1

19

3.51

0.40

0.09

(3.31, 3.70)

EXP 2

17

3.48

0.36

0.09

(3.29, 3.66)

df

t

p

Cohen's
d

25.7

-0.20

.844

0.07

34.8

1.79

.082

0.59

34.0

0.23

.820

0.08

SE

Table 46. Descriptive statistics for Fixation Count, sorted by experiment (EXP), for each agent
reasoning transparency (ART) level, and t-test results for between-experiment comparisons.
N
ART 1

ART 2

ART 3

Mean

SD

df

t

p

Cohen's
d

34.9

-0.16

.877

0.05

35.0

0.64

.526

0.21

33.4

-0.43

.667

0.15

SE 95% C.I. for Mean

EXP 1

19

4830.81 689.30 158.14

(4498.58, 5163.04)

EXP 2

18

4864.48 620.01 146.14

(4556.16, 5172.80)

EXP 1

20

5109.85 819.94 183.34

(4726.10, 5493.59)

EXP 2

17

4949.58 701.14 170.05

(4589.09, 5310.07)

EXP 1

19

4897.41 667.18 153.06

(4575.84, 5218.98)

EXP 2

17

4995.22 680.51 165.05

(4645.33, 5345.10)

Table 47. Descriptive statistics for Fixation Duration, sorted by experiment (EXP), for each agent
reasoning transparency (ART) level, and t-test results for between-experiment comparisons.

ART 1

ART 2

ART 3

N

Mean

SD

SE

EXP 1

19

260.82 40.24

9.23

95% C.I. for
Mean
(241.43, 280.22)

EXP 2

18

279.20 38.57

9.09

(260.01, 298.38)

EXP 1

20

276.59 37.11

8.30

(259.23, 293.96)

EXP 2

17

263.89 43.44

10.54

(241.55, 286.22)

EXP 1

19

267.18 38.98

8.94

(248.39, 285.97)

EXP 2

17

271.67 32.62

7.91

(254.90, 288.44)
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df

t

p

Cohen's
d

35.0

-1.42

.165

0.47

31.7

0.95

.351

0.32

33.9

-0.38

.709

0.13

Using independent samples t-test to compare findings, no significant difference in
workload between experiments was found for any agent reasoning transparency level, as
evaluated using eye measure metrics.
Situation Awareness (SA) Evaluation
Hypothesis 5: The increased environmental information will result in lower
SA scores in EXP2 than in EXP1 in ARTs 1 and 3 (EXP1 > EXP2) for SA1
and SA3 measures. SA2 scores will be higher in EXP2 than in EXP1 in
ARTs 1 and 2, however, will be lower in ART3.


SA1: ARTs 1, 2 & 3: EXP1 > EXP2



SA2: ARTs 1 & 2: EXP1 < EXP2; ART3: EXP1 > EXP2.



SA3: ARTs 1, 2 & 3: EXP1 > EXP2

Descriptive statistics for SA1 scores and EXP1 – EXP2 t-test results are shown in
Table 48.
Table 48. Descriptive statistics for SA1 scores, sorted by experiment (EXP), for each agent
reasoning transparency (ART) level, and t-test results for between-experiment comparisons.

ART 1

ART 2

ART 3

N

Mean

SD

EXP 1

20

1.35

4.93

95% C.I. for
Mean
1.10
(-0.96, 3.66)

EXP 2

20

1.60

4.31

0.96

(-0.42, 3.62)

EXP 1

20

0.10

5.86

1.31

(-2.64, 2.84)

EXP 2

20

2.25

3.84

0.86

(0.45, 4.05)

EXP 1

20

3.85

3.65

0.82

(2.14, 5.56)

EXP 2

20

1.55

5.43

1.22

(-0.99, 4.09)

SE

df

t

p

Cohen's
d

37.3

-0.17

.865

0.05

32.8

-1.37

.179

0.44

33.2

1.57

.125

0.51

SA1 scores were expected to be lower in EXP2 than in EXP1 in all ART levels.
When comparing results from EXP1 to EXP2, it is evident that SA1 scores varied widely
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between experiments and ART levels, however, there were no significant differences
between EXP2 and EXP1 at any ART level. The hypothesis was not supported.
Descriptive statistics for SA2 scores and EXP1 – EXP2 t-test results are shown in
Table 49.
Table 49. Descriptive statistics for SA2 scores, sorted by experiment (EXP), for each agent
reasoning transparency (ART) level, and t-test results for between-experiment comparisons.

ART 1

ART 2

ART 3

N

Mean

SD

EXP 1

20

10.90

4.51

95% C.I. for
Mean
1.01 (8.79, 13.01)

EXP 2

20

14.80

3.35

0.75 (13.23, 16.37)

EXP 1

20

12.55

3.76

0.84 (10.79, 14.31)

EXP 2

20

13.20

7.15

1.60

(9.85, 16.55)

EXP 1

20

11.25

4.96

1.11

(8.93, 13.57)

EXP 2

20

15.20

6.28

1.40 (12.26, 18.14)

SE

df

t

p

Cohen's
d

35.1

-3.11

.004

0.99

28.8

-0.36

.722

0.12

36.1

-2.21

.034

0.70

SA2 scores were expected to be lower in EXP1 than in EXP2 in ART levels 1 and
2, but higher in EXP1 than EXP2 in ART3. Comparing results from EXP1 to EXP2, it is
evident that SA2 scores were higher in EXP2 than in EXP1 for all ART levels, although
this difference was not significant in ART2 (Figure 61). Thus, the hypothesis was partially
supported. The additional environmental information in EXP2 did improve SA2 scores in
ART1, compared to EXP1, which supported the hypothesis. In ART3, the high information
environment and the increased access to agent transparency were expected to overload the
operator, resulting in lower SA2 scores in EXP2 than in EXP1. However, this was not the
case. Participants in EXP2 had higher SA2 scores than their EXP1 counterparts, contrary
to the stated hypothesis.
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Figure 61. Average SA2 scores, by experiment, for each agent reasoning transparency (ART) level.
Bars denote SE.

SA3 scores were compared between experiments. Descriptive statistics for SA3
scores and EXP1 – EXP2 t-test results are shown in Table 50.
Table 50. Descriptive statistics for SA3 scores, sorted by experiment (EXP), for each agent
reasoning transparency (ART) level, and t-test results for between-experiment comparisons.

EXP 1

20

1.90 10.22

95% C.I. for
Mean
2.29
(-2.88, 6.68)

EXP 2

20

2.90

9.40

2.10

(-1.50, 7.30)

EXP 1

20

3.35 10.43

2.33

(-1.53, 8.23)

EXP 2

20

0.45

8.51

1.90

(-3.53, 4.43)

EXP 1

20

8.10

7.18

1.61

(4.74, 11.46)

EXP 2

20

2.00

8.78

1.96

(-2.11, 6.11)

N
ART 1

ART 2

ART 3

Mean

SD

SE

df

t

p

Cohen's
d

37.7

-0.32

.749

0.10

36.5

-0.96

.342

0.31

36.6

2.41

.021

0.76

SA3 scores were expected to be lower in EXP2 than in EXP1 in all ART levels.
Comparing results from EXP1 to EXP2, SA3 scores were significantly higher in EXP1
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than in EXP2 for ART3, but not significantly different in ARTs 1 and 2 (Figure 62). Thus,
the hypothesis was partially supported. In ART3, the high information environment and
the increased access to agent transparency were expected to overload the operator, resulting
in lower SA3 scores in EXP2 than in EXP1.

Figure 62. Average SA3 score, by experiment, for each agent reasoning transparency (ART) level.
Bars denote SE.

Target Detection Task Performance
Hypothesis 6: Performance in the Target Detection Task, in both Targets Detected
and False Alarms, will be worse in EXP2 than in EXP1 in all ARTs, due to
information overload.


Number of Targets Detected: EXP1 > EXP2.



False Alarms: EXP1 < EXP2.
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Descriptive statistics for Target Detection task scores and EXP1 – EXP2 t-test
results are shown in Table 51.
Table 51. Descriptive statistics for Target Detection scores, sorted by experiment (EXP), for each
agent reasoning transparency (ART) level, and t-test results for between-experiment comparisons.

EXP 1

20

44.45 10.10

95% C.I. for
Mean
2.26 (39.72, 49.18)

EXP 2

20

45.25 10.96

2.45 (40.12, 50.38)

EXP 1

20

45.05 13.64

3.05 (38.66, 51.44)

EXP 2

20

47.65 10.74

2.40 (42.62, 52.68)

EXP 1

20

44.75 10.19

2.28 (39.98, 49.52)

EXP 2

20

40.30 13.28

2.97 (34.09, 46.51)

N
ART 1

ART 2

ART 3

Mean

SD

SE

df

t

p

Cohen's
d

37.8

-0.24

.812

0.08

36.0

-0.67

.507

0.21

35.6

1.19

.242

0.38

Target Detection task scores were expected to be lower in EXP2 than in EXP1 in
all ART levels. Comparing results from EXP1 to EXP2, Target detection scores were not
significantly different in any ART level. Thus, the hypothesis was not supported.
Descriptive statistics for the number of reported False Alarms and EXP1 – EXP2 ttest results are shown in Table 52.
Table 52. Descriptive statistics for False Alarms (count), sorted by experiment (EXP), for each
agent reasoning transparency (ART) level, and t-test results for between-experiment comparisons.

ART 1

ART 2

ART 3

N

Mean

SD

EXP 1

20

20.80

6.25

95% C.I. for
Mean
1.40 (17.87, 23.73)

EXP 2

20

16.30

6.18

1.38 (13.41, 19.19)

EXP 1

20

16.35

5.29

1.18 (13.87, 18.83)

EXP 2

20

16.65

4.97

1.11 (14.33, 18.97)

EXP 1

20

15.25

3.89

0.87 (13.43, 17.07)

EXP 2

20

15.90

6.12

1.37 (13.04, 18.76)

SE

df

t

p

Cohen's
d

38.0

2.29

.028

0.72

37.8

-0.19

.854

0.06

32.2

-0.40

.691

0.13

Reported False Alarms were expected to be lower in EXP1 than in EXP2 in all
ART levels. When comparing results from EXP1 to EXP2, there are significantly more
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False Alarms reported in EXP1 than in EXP2 in ART1, but no significant difference in
ARTs 2 and 3 (Figure 63). Thus, the hypothesis was partially supported.

Figure 63. Average reported False Alarms, by experiment, for each agent reasoning transparency
(ART) level. Bars denote SE.

In each experiment, results of the target detection task were also evaluated using
SDT to determine if there were differences in sensitivity (d’) or selection bias (Beta)
between the three ARTs. These comparisons follow. Descriptive statistics and EXP1 –
EXP2 t-test results for sensitivity (d’) are shown in Table 53.
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Table 53. Descriptive statistics for d’ scores, sorted by experiment (EXP), for each agent reasoning
transparency (ART) level, and t-test results for between-experiment comparisons.

ART 1

ART 2

ART 3

N

Mean

SD

EXP 1

20

2.20

0.32

95% C.I. for
Mean
0.07
(2.05, 2.35)

EXP 2

20

2.30

0.40

0.09

(2.11, 2.49)

EXP 1

20

2.31

0.43

0.10

(2.11, 2.52)

EXP 2

20

2.38

0.35

0.08

(2.21, 2.54)

EXP 1

20

2.29

0.38

0.09

(2.11, 2.46)

EXP 2

20

2.19

0.44

0.10

(1.99, 2.39)

SE

df

t

p

Cohen's
d

36.4

-0.85

.400

0.27

36.6

-0.49

.626

0.16

37.3

0.73

.467

0.23

Target Detection task scores were expected to be lower in EXP2 than in EXP1 in
all ART levels, so it would be expected that sensitivity to target presence would be higher
in EXP1 compared to EXP2. Comparing results from EXP1 to EXP2, mean d’ scores for
EXP2 were higher than those in EXP1 in ARTs 1 and 2, which was contrary to the expected
results. However, these results were not significant. The mean d’ scores in ART3 were
higher in EXP1 than in EXP2, which was in the expected direction. However, this finding
was not significant. Thus, the hypothesis was not supported.
Descriptive statistics and EXP1 – EXP2 t-test results for selection bias (Beta) are
shown in Table 54.
Table 54. Descriptive statistics for Beta scores, sorted by experiment (EXP), for each agent
reasoning transparency (ART) level, and t-test results for between-experiment comparisons.

ART 1

ART 2

ART 3

N

Mean

SD

EXP 1

20

2.42

0.28

95% C.I. for
Mean
0.06
(2.29, 2.56)

EXP 2

20

2.64

0.34

0.08

(2.48, 2.80)

EXP 1

20

2.59

0.35

0.08

(2.43, 2.76)

EXP 2

20

2.60

0.25

0.06

(2.49, 2.72)

EXP 1

20

2.60

0.37

0.08

(2.43, 2.78)

EXP 2

20

2.65

0.39

0.09

(2.47, 2.83)

SE
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df

t

p

Cohen's
d

36.8

-2.22

.033

0.70

34.0

-0.11

.912

0.04

37.9

-0.39

.701

0.12

The number of reported False Alarms were expected to be lower in EXP1 than in
EXP2 in all ART levels, so it would be expected that selection bias (Beta) would be stricter
(higher Beta scores) in EXP1 compared to EXP2. Comparing results from EXP1 to EXP2,
mean Beta scores for EXP2 were significantly higher than those in EXP1 in ART1.
However, there was no significant difference in Beta scores between the two experiments
in ARTs 2 and 3 (Figure 64). The lower Beta scores for EXP1 for ART1 indicate a looser
selection criterion was used in this setting, agreeing with the finding that there were more
reported False Alarms in this condition. This is evidence that the additional environmental
information supplied in EXP2 added support for this task, most likely by removing
ambiguity for the operator, thus freeing their attention from the route selection task so that
it could be directed to the target detection task. However, the hypothesis was not supported.

Figure 64. Average Beta scores, by experiment, for each agent reasoning transparency (ART) level.
Bars denote SE.
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Discussion
The primary goal of this study was to examine how differing levels of information
regarding the task environment and agent reasoning transparency affected complacent
behavior in a route selection task. In two experiments, participants supervised a threevehicle convoy as it traversed a simulated environment and re-routed the convoy when
needed with the assistance of an intelligent agent, RoboLeader (RL). Participants received
communications from a commander confirming either the presence or absence of activity
in the area. They also received information regarding potential events along their route via
icons that appeared on a map displaying the convoy route and surrounding area.
Participants in Experiment 1 (low information setting) received information about their
current route only; they did not receive any information about the suggested alternate route.
However, they were instructed that the proposed path was at least as safe as their original
route. Participants in Experiment 2 (high information setting) received information about
both their current route and the agent recommended alternative route. When the convoy
approached a potentially unsafe area, the intelligent agent would recommend re-routing the
convoy. The agent recommendations were correct 66% of the time. The participant was
required to recognize and correctly reject any incorrect suggestions. The secondary goal
of this study was to examine how differing levels of information affected main task and
secondary task performance, response time, workload, SA, trust, and system usability.
Complacent behavior was quantified as incorrect acceptances of agent suggestion
(Parasuraman et al., 2000), and evaluated via primary (route selection) task response at
those decision points where the agent recommendation was incorrect.
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Increased

environmental information was predicted to reduce the number of incorrect acceptances,
except when the agent reasoning included information that may be ambiguous for the
operator. This prediction was partially supported, as the number of incorrect acceptances
were lower in all ARTs in EXP2 than in EXP1. However, the participants in the high
information setting (in all ART conditions) may have been more inclined to reject the agent
suggestion overall, as the information manipulation gave them more reasons to reject rather
than accept (Shafir, 1993). As such, the low number of incorrect acceptances in EXP2 is
not particularly informative on its own.
In ART2, participants in EXP1 reduced their incorrect acceptances to nearly the
same as those in EXP2. Considering that the number of incorrect acceptances for EXP2
were the same in all ARTs, this result serves to underscore how effective the addition of
agent reasoning transparency was in EXP1 in mitigating complacent behavior. There were
also interesting differences in the amount of time it took participants to reach their
decisions. Even though there was more information available in EXP2 than in EXP1,
participants in EXP2 did not take any more time to respond (whether correctly or
incorrectly) to the agent suggestion in ART1 than those in EXP1, which may suggest that
the additional route information also encouraged more complacent behavior in the absence
of agent reasoning. Decision times were significantly longer in ART2 in EXP2 than those
in EXP1, particularly for incorrect acceptances, which were nearly twice as long as their
decision times for correct rejections.

This could indicate difficulty integrating the

information, or more likely, difficulty deciding to accept (albeit incorrectly) the agent
suggestion in the face of the additional inducement to reject.
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Participants in ART3 in EXP2 also had significantly longer decision times for
correct rejections than their EXP1 counterparts. However there was no significant
difference in their decision times for incorrect acceptances. Considering the results from
the other ARTs, it would be reasonable to deduce that this lack of difference in decision
times could indicate an overwork situation which encouraged more complacent behavior.
Overall performance on the route selection task was predicted to be worse in the
high information setting, except in ART2, when performance in the high information
setting would be improved. These predictions were not supported; there was no difference
in route selection scores in ARTs 1 or 3 between the two experiments and route selection
task scores were lower in ART2 for EXP2 than for EXP1. As previously discussed, these
results are most likely due to the added inducement to reject present in EXP2. While
decision times were longer in EXP2 than in EXP1 for route selection choices, these
findings were anticipated and did not indicate any supervisory control issues.
Operator trust of the agent was expected to be greater in EXP2 than in EXP1, except
when access to agent reasoning was at its highest (ART3). Incorrect rejections of the agent
recommendation when the agent was correct, along with the associated decision times,
were assessed as objective indicators of operator trust. There were significantly more
incorrect rejections in EXP2 than in EXP1 in all ARTs. The increased number of incorrect
rejections in EXP2 is most likely due to the increase in task environment information,
which most likely encouraged participants to reject the agent suggestion. Participants took
longer deliberating in EXP2 than EXP1 in all ARTs. The difference in decision times
between experiments for ART1 was not significant, which could indicate that the increase
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in information alone did not result in any associated increase in decision time. In ART2
decision times were significantly longer in EXP2 than in EXP1, and this difference was
twice as long for incorrect rejections as for correct acceptances. Considering this, it is most
likely that this increase is an indication of difficulty integrating the available information
rather than a reflection of the operators trust in the agent.

In ART3, the difference in

decision times between experiments was significant for correct acceptances. However there
was no significant difference in decision times for incorrect rejections even though there
were considerably more incorrect rejections in EXP2 than in EXP1. This could be an
indication that the incorrect rejections in ART3 were due to an overwork situation, rather
than difficulty integrating information, i.e. complacent behavior or overtrust. Taken as a
whole, the objective assessments of operator trust indicate no discernable distrust of the
agent. However there could be indications of overtrust when agent reasoning transparency
was at its highest.
The Usability and Trust survey, the subjective measure of operator trust, indicates
that in two conditions, ART1 - when no agent reasoning was available, and ART3 – when
agent reasoning transparency was greatest, operators reported higher trust and greater
usability in EXP1 than in EXP2. However, in ART2 – when agent reasoning transparency
was available but contained no information that would be considered ambiguous or
subjective, there was no difference in operator trust of reported usability. Therefore, the
hypothesis was only partially supported.

In the high information setting, operators

appeared to question the agent suggestions more and reported lower trust and usability than
in the low information setting. These findings agree with previous research that found
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when operators question the agent’s accuracy and rationale they will demonstrate reduced
trust and reliance on the agent (Linegang et al., 2006, Lyons & Havig, 2014).
Operator workload was expected to be greater in the high information setting than
in the low information setting. However, this hypothesis was not supported. Workload
was evaluated using the NASA-TLX and several ocular indices that have been shown to
be informative as to cognitive workload. Similar to findings by Mercado et al. (2016),
there were no significant differences in global NASA-TLX scores or eye behavior metrics
due to information level.
Situation Awareness (SA) scores were hypothesized to be lower in the high
information setting than the low information setting, with the exception of SA2 scores in
ART2. There was no difference in SA1 scores between experiments. Contrary to the
predicted outcome, SA2 scores were higher in the high information setting when agent
reasoning transparency was not available, and again when agent reasoning transparency
was at its highest. However, there was no difference in SA2 scores between experiments
in ART2. There was no difference in SA3 scores between the two experiments, except in
the highest agent reasoning transparency condition, where scores in the low information
setting were much higher than those in the high information setting. These findings provide
partial support for the hypothesis. Operator comprehension (SA2) benefitted from the
increased level of information in EXP2 when agent reasoning transparency was not
available, and again when it was ambiguous.
Performance on the secondary task, target detection, was not different between the
two experiments. However, false alarms were greater in the low information setting than
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in the high information setting when agent reasoning transparency was not available.
Higher Beta scores indicate that participants were using a looser selection criterion in
ART1 in the low information setting than in the high, indicating that having more
information about their task environment allowed them to be more discerning when
conducting the target detection task.
There were several limitations to this comparative analysis.

First, the agent

reasoning transparency in EXP2 was arguably greater than that in EXP1, as it contained
the weight factors that were not present in EXP1. Therefore, within-condition comparisons
contained analysis that attempted to tease apart the effects that resulted from the increase
in agent reasoning transparency from those that resulted from the increase in environmental
information. A second limitation would be the study paradigm itself. At each decision
point, the participant is not choosing which path to take so much as they are deciding
whether to reject the agent suggestion. In EXP1, where there is no other information
available about the agent’s recommended route, there is no strong reason to reject the
route. However, in EXP2 when the participants receive information about the alternative
route they receive two pieces of information, as compared to the one piece of information
they have about their original route.

According to decision theory, this additional

information would make it more likely that the participant would reject the agent
suggestion (Shafir, 1993). Thus the comparison of the effect of information level between
the two experiments is not equitable. A third limitation is a difference in information
between EXP1 and EXP2. In EXP1, the participant is given one piece of information about
their main path, and no information about the alternative route. In EXP2 the participant is
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given one piece of information about the main path and two pieces of information about
the alternative route. Hence, the comparison is not of the effects of an increase in
information as much as it is comparing the difference between no information and some
information. While these limitations do not negate the findings of the comparative
analysis, understanding how they would potentially affect the outcome of this comparison
warrants caution in the interpretation of the comparison and generalizing the findings to
larger populations.
Conclusion
Understanding the interaction between the amount of information available to the
operator and the transparency of agent reasoning is important to designers of intelligent
recommender and decision-aid systems. To that end, we examined how the amount of
information pertaining to the task environment the operator had, and the increase in agent
reasoning transparency, affected complacent behavior, as well as task performance,
workload, and trust.
The amount of information the operator had regarding the task environment had a
profound effect their proper use of the agent. Increased environmental information resulted
in more rejections of the agent recommendation regardless of the transparency of agent
reasoning. The way in which the information was presented appeared to create a situation
wherein operators were encouraged to reject the agent recommendation. Even so, the
addition of agent reasoning transparency appeared to be effective at countering this bias by
keeping the operator engaged.
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Objective evidence indicated probable complacent behavior in the high information
setting when agent reasoning was either not transparent or so transparent as to become
ambiguous. However, operators reported lower trust and usability for the agent than when
environmental information was limited.

This suggests dissonance between operator

performance and operator perception of the agent.
Situation awareness (SA2) scores were also higher in the high information
environment when agent reasoning was either not transparent or so transparent as to
become ambiguous, compared to the low information environment. However, when a
moderate amount of agent reasoning was available to the operator, the amount of
information available to the operator had no effect on the operator’s complacent behavior,
subjective trust, or SA. These findings indicate that some negative outcomes resulting
from the incongruous transparency of agent reasoning may be mitigated by increasing the
information the operator has regarding the task environment.
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APPENDIX B:
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Demographics Questionnaire

Date: ________________

Participant ID: _________

1. General Information
a. Age: _____
Gender: _____

Handedness (L/R): ______

b. How long ago did you have an eye exam? Within the last (Circle one):
6 months
1 year
2 years
4+ years
never
c. Do you have any of the following (Circle all that apply):
Astigmatism
Near-sightedness
Far-sightedness
Other (explain):

__________

d. Do you have corrected vision (Circle one)? No
If so, are you wearing them today?

Glasses
Yes

e. Are you in your good/ comfortable state of health physically?
If NO, please briefly explain:
f.

How many hours of sleep did you get last night?

2. Military Experience
a. Do you have prior military service?
If Yes, how long __________

Contact Lenses
No
YES NO

______ hours

YES

NO

3. Educational Data
a. What is your highest level of education received? Select one.
____ GED
____ Bachelor’s Degree
____ High School
____ M.S/M.A
____ Some College
____ Ph.D.
____ Associates or Technical Degree
b. What subject is your degree/education in (for example, Engineering)? _______________
4. Computer Experience
a. How long have you been using a computer?
__Less than 1 year
___ 1-3 years ___4-6 years

___7-10 years ___10+ years

b. How often do you play computer/video games? (Circle one)
Daily
3-4X/ Week Weekly
Monthly
Once or twice a year

Never

c. Enter the names of the games you play most frequently:

________________________________________________________________
d. How often do you operate a radio-controlled vehicle (car, boat, or plane)?
Daily
3-4X/ Week Weekly
Monthly
Once or twice a year

Never

e. How often do you use graphics/drawing features in software packages?
Daily
3-4X/ Week Weekly
Monthly
Once or twice a year

Never
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APPENDIX C:
ATTENTIONAL CONTROL SURVEY
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APPENDIX D:
CUBE COMPARISON TEST
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Cube Comparisons Test

Participant # _______

223

Date _______
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APPENDIX E:
SPATIAL ORIENTATION TEST
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The Spatial Orientation Test, modeled after the cardinal direction test developed by
Gugerty and his colleagues (Gugerty & Brooks, 2004), is a computerized test consisting of
a brief training segment and 32 test questions. The program automatically captures both
accuracy and response time. Participants are shown the following image:

The right side image is a map showing a plane flying. The left side of the display
is the pilot’s view (from the cockpit of the plane) of several parking lots surrounding a
building. The participants’ task is to use the right side of the display to learn in which
direction the plane is flying. They then use this information to identify which parking lot
(north, south, east, or west) in the left side image has the dot. In the example shown above,
the plane is heading north, and so the dot appears in the north parking lot. In the example
shown below, the plane is heading south, and so the dot appears in the east parking lot.

Participants are shown 32 of these images in succession; each time the direction the
plane is flying and the location of the dot are randomized. Participants answer by clicking
on one of four buttons (North, South, East, or West). This test is self-paced; the participant
may take as long as they wish to answer, and when they answer one question the next
question automatically appears. No questions can be skipped, and the order of images is
randomized among participants.
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Complacency Potential Rating Scale
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APPENDIX G:
NASA-TLX WORKLOAD ASSESSMENT
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APPENDIX H:
RSPAN TEST

233

Participants will be administered a computerized version of the RSPAN task
(Daneman & Carpenter, 1980; Unsworth, Heitz, Schrock, & Engle, 2005) in order to
evaluate their working memory capacity, as well as remove participants with potential
reading comprehension issues.
RSPAN Instructions for automated presentation
The RSPAN task is broken down into two sections. First, participants receive
practice and second, the participants perform the actual task. The practice sessions are
further broken down into three sections.
The first practice is simple letter span. They see letters appear on the screen one at
a time, and then must recall these letters in the same order they saw them. In all
experimental conditions, letters remain on-screen for 800 ms. Recall consists of filling in
boxes with the appropriate letters. Entering a letter or space in a box should advance the
cursor to the next box. At the final box, hitting the spacebar will advance to the next slide.
After each recall slide, the computer provides feedback about the number of letters
correctly recalled.
Next, participants practice the sentence portion of the task. Participants first see a
sentence (e.g., “Andy was stopped by the policeman because he crossed the yellow
heaven”). Once the participant has read the sentence, they are required to answer YES or
NO (did the sentence make sense). After each sentence sense-verification, participants are
given feedback. The reading practice serves to familiarize participants with the sentence
portion of the task as well as calculate how long it takes a given person to solve the sentence
problems. Thus, it attempts to account for individual differences in the time it takes to solve
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reading problems. After the reading practice, the program calculates the individual’s mean
time required to solve the problems. This time (plus 2.5 standard deviations) is then used
as a time limit for the reading portion of the experimental session.
The final practice session has participants perform both the letter recall and reading
portions together, just as they will do in the task block. As with traditional RSPAN,
participants first see the sentence and after verifying that it makes sense or not, they see
the letter be recalled. If participants take more time to verify the sentence than their average
time plus 2.5 SD, then the program automatically moves on. This serves to prevent
participants from rehearsing the letters when they should be verifying the sense of the
sentences. After the participant completes all of the practice sessions, the program moves
them on to the real trials.
The task trials consist of 3 trials of each set-size, with the set sizes ranging from 3
- 6. This makes for a total of 54 letters and 54 sentence problems. Subjects are instructed
to keep their reading accuracy at or above 80% at all times. During recall, a percentage in
red is presented in the upper right-hand corner. Subjects are instructed to keep a careful
watch on the percentage in order to keep it above 80%. Subjects get feedback at the end
of each trial. Subjects that do not finish with a reading accuracy score of 80% or better
will be excused from continuing with the study.
RSPAN Timing
Sentence verification screen: Min=none, Max=Mean of practice trials +2.5 SD.
Letter presentation: 800 ms.
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Recall screen: Min=none, Max= 2 min (Have a next button or something they can
click to continue faster)
READY screen: 3 seconds (No keys active, cannot skip this screen)
RSPAN Scoring
Scores should report five values at the conclusion of the task: Absolute score,
RSPAN score, total number correct, sentence errors, and speed errors.
The absolute score combines sentence verification with letter recall. In order to be
eligible to earn a point, the participant must first correctly answer yes or no, identifying the
statement as correct or not. Then the corresponding letter to the statement must be correctly
entered in the correct blank for that set. Example: Q1 (F) was incorrectly identified No,
Q2 (M), Q3 (P), and Q4 (B) were correctly identified Yes. The participant entered the
letters F, M, B, & P.

The participant scored 1 point. Although four correct letters were

entered, Q1 was answered incorrectly, and Q3 & Q4 letters were entered in the wrong
blanks.
RSPAN score is the sum of all perfectly recalled sets. So, for example, if an
individual recalled correctly 2 letters in a set size of 2, 3 letters in a set size of 3, and 3
letters in a set size of 4, their RSPAN score would be 5 (2 + 3 + 0).
Total number correct is the total number of letters recalled in the correct position.
For example, if an individual recalled correctly 2 letters in a set size of 2, 3 letters in a set
size of 3, and 3 letters in a set size of 4, their RSPAN score would be 8 (2 + 3 + 3).
Sentence errors are reported as accuracy errors where the subject verified the sense
of the sentence incorrectly.
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Speed errors are where the subject ran out of time in attempting to verify a given
sentence.
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Usability and Trust Survey
1.

2.

3.

4.

I made use of RoboLeader’s recommendations.
Strongly
DISAGREE 1
2
3
4
5

6

7

Strongly
AGREE

I sometimes felt ‘lost’ using the RoboLeader display.
Strongly
DISAGREE 1
2
3
4
5

6

7

Strongly
AGREE

I do not feel the RoboLeader display was helpful in the task.
Strongly
DISAGREE 1
2
3
4
5
6

7

Strongly
AGREE

I relied heavily on the RoboLeader for the task.
Strongly
DISAGREE 1
2
3
4
5

7

Strongly
AGREE

6

5.

Threats were visible on the screen(s) long enough to accurately detect them.
Strongly
Strongly
DISAGREE 1
2
3
4
5
6
7
AGREE

6.

The RoboLeader display was confusing.
Strongly
DISAGREE 1
2
3
4

5

6

7

Strongly
AGREE

The RoboLeader display was annoying.
Strongly
DISAGREE 1
2
3
4

5

6

7

Strongly
AGREE

The RoboLeader display improved my performance on the task.
Strongly
DISAGREE 1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Strongly
AGREE

The RoboLeader display can be deceptive.
Strongly
DISAGREE 1
2
3
4

Strongly
AGREE

7.

8.

9.

10.

5

6

7

The RoboLeader display sometimes behaves in an unpredictable manner.
Strongly
Strongly
DISAGREE 1
2
3
4
5
6
7
AGREE
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11.

I am often suspicious of the RoboLeader system’s intent, action, or outputs.
Strongly
Strongly
DISAGREE 1
2
3
4
5
6
7
AGREE

12.

I am sometimes unsure of the RoboLeader system.
Strongly
DISAGREE 1
2
3
4
5

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

20.

7

Strongly
AGREE

The RoboLeader system may have harmful effects on the task.
Strongly
DISAGREE 1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Strongly
AGREE

I am confident in the RoboLeader system.
Strongly
DISAGREE 1
2
3
4

6

5

6

7

Strongly
AGREE

The RoboLeader system can provide security.
Strongly
DISAGREE 1
2
3
4
5

6

7

Strongly
AGREE

The RoboLeader system has integrity.
Strongly
DISAGREE 1
2
3
4

5

6

7

Strongly
AGREE

The RoboLeader system is dependable.
Strongly
DISAGREE 1
2
3
4

5

6

7

Strongly
AGREE

The RoboLeader system is consistent.
Strongly
DISAGREE 1
2
3

5

6

7

Strongly
AGREE

I can trust the RoboLeader system.
Strongly
DISAGREE 1
2
3

4

4

I am familiar with the RoboLeader display.
Strongly
DISAGREE 1
2
3
4
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5

6

7

Strongly
AGREE

5

6

7

Strongly
AGREE

APPENDIX J:
ROBOLEADER NOTIFICATIONS
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RoboLeader communications vary across experiment and level of reasoning.
Experiment 1 is the low information study, and will only have one icon present on the map
that affects each route decision. Experiment 2 is the high information study and has several
icons present on the map that will need to be considered when accepting or rejecting RL’s
suggestion.
Experiment 1 Mission 1 RoboLeader Notifications:
Experiment 1 ART1:
All Areas:
Change to convoy path recommended
Experiment 1 ART2:
Area 1 Change to convoy path recommended
Activity in area:
Congested Area/Roadblock
Recommended action: Reroute to avoid Congested Area/Roadblock
Area 2 Change to convoy path recommended
Activity in area:
Gunfire/Sniper
Recommended action: Reroute to avoid Gunfire/Sniper
Area 3 Change to convoy path recommended
Activity in area:
Congested Area/Roadblock
Recommended action: Reroute to avoid Congested Area/Roadblock
Area 4 Change to convoy path recommended
Activity in area:
Potential IED
Recommended action: Reroute to avoid Potential IED
Area 5 Change to convoy path recommended
Activity in area:
Comm Dead Zone
Recommended action: Reroute to avoid Comm Dead Zone
Area 6 Change to convoy path recommended
Activity in area:
Dense Fog
Recommended action: Reroute to avoid Dense Fog
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Experiment 1 ART3:
Area 1 Change to convoy path recommended
Activity in area:
Congested Area/Roadblock TOR: 1
Recommended action: Reroute to avoid Congested Area/Roadblock
Area 2 Change to convoy path recommended
Activity in area:
Gunfire/Sniper TOR: 1
Recommended action: Reroute to avoid Gunfire/Sniper
Area 3 Change to convoy path recommended
Activity in area:
Congested Area/Roadblock TOR: 1
Recommended action: Reroute to avoid Congested Area/Roadblock
Area 4 Change to convoy path recommended
Activity in area:
Potential IED TOR: 1
Recommended action: Reroute to avoid Potential IED
Area 5 Change to convoy path recommended
Activity in area:
Comm Dead Zone TOR: 1
Recommended action: Reroute to avoid Comm Dead Zone
Area 6 Change to convoy path recommended
Activity in area:
Dense Fog TOR: 1
Recommended action: Reroute to avoid Dense Fog
Experiment 2 Mission 1 RoboLeader Notifications
Experiment 2 ART1:
All Areas
Change to convoy path recommended
Experiment 2 ART2:
Area 1 Change to convoy path recommended
Activity in area:
Congested Area/Roadblock (H)
Comm Dead Zone (M)
Dense Fog (L)
Recommended action: Reroute to avoid Congested Area/Roadblock
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Area 2 Change to convoy path recommended
Activity in area:
Gunfire/Sniper (H)
Congested Area/Roadblock (M)
Comm Dead Zone (L)
Recommended action: Reroute to avoid Gunfire/Sniper
Area 3 Change to convoy path recommended
Activity in area:
Congested Area/Roadblock (H)
Potential IED (L)
Comm Dead Zone (M)
Recommended action: Reroute to avoid Congested Area/Roadblock
Area 4 Change to convoy path recommended
Activity in area:
Potential IED (H)
Gunfire/Sniper (M)
Dense Fog (L)
Recommended action: Reroute to avoid Potential IED
Area 5 Change to convoy path recommended
Activity in area:
Comm Dead Zone (H)
Potential IED (M)
Dense Fog (L)
Recommended action: Reroute to avoid Comm Dead Zone
Area 6 Change to convoy path recommended
Activity in area:
Dense Fog (H)
Gunfire/Sniper (M)
Congested Area/Roadblock (L)
Recommended action: Reroute to avoid Dense Fog

Experiment 2 ART3:
Area 1 Change to convoy path recommended
Activity in area:
Congested Area/Roadblock (H) TOR: 1
Comm Dead Zone (M) TOR: 4
Dense Fog (L) TOR: 2
Recommended action: Reroute to avoid Congested Area/Roadblock
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Area 2 Change to convoy path recommended
Activity in area:
Gunfire/Sniper (H) TOR: 1
Congested Area/Roadblock (M) TOR: 2
Comm Dead Zone (L) TOR: 4
Recommended action: Reroute to avoid Gunfire/Sniper
Area 3 Change to convoy path recommended
Activity in area:
Congested Area/Roadblock (H) TOR: 1
Potential IED (L) TOR: 3
Comm Dead Zone (M) TOR: 6
Recommended action: Reroute to avoid Congested Area/Roadblock
Area 4 Change to convoy path recommended
Activity in area:
Potential IED (H) TOR: 1
Gunfire/Sniper (M) TOR: 4
Dense Fog (L) TOR: 6
Recommended action: Reroute to avoid Potential IED
Area 5 Change to convoy path recommended
Activity in area:
Comm Dead Zone (H) TOR: 1
Potential IED (M) TOR: 4
Dense Fog (L) TOR: 6
Recommended action: Reroute to avoid Comm Dead Zone
Area 6 Change to convoy path recommended
Activity in area:
Dense Fog (H) TOR: 1
Gunfire/Sniper (M) TOR: 6
Congested Area/Roadblock (L) TOR: 3
Recommended action: Reroute to avoid Dense Fog
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Experiment 1 Mission 2 RoboLeader Notifications:
Experiment 1 ART1:
All Areas:
Change to convoy path recommended
Experiment 1 ART2:
Area 1 Change to convoy path recommended
Activity in area:
Dense Fog
Recommended action: Reroute to avoid Dense Fog
Area 2 Change to convoy path recommended
Activity in area:
Comm Dead Zone
Recommended action: Reroute to avoid Comm Dead Zone
Area 3 Change to convoy path recommended
Activity in area:
Potential IED
Recommended action: Reroute to avoid Explosion
Area 4 Change to convoy path recommended
Activity in area:
Congested Area/Roadblock
Recommended action: Reroute to avoid Congested Area/Roadblock
Area 5 Change to convoy path recommended
Activity in area:
Gunfire/Sniper
Recommended action: Reroute to avoid Gunfire/Sniper
Area 6 Change to convoy path recommended
Activity in area:
Congested Area/Roadblock
Recommended action: Reroute to avoid Potential IED
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Experiment 1 ART3:
Area 1 Change to convoy path recommended
Activity in area:
Dense Fog TOR: 1
Recommended action: Reroute to avoid Dense Fog
Area 2 Change to convoy path recommended
Activity in area:
Comm Dead Zone TOR: 1
Recommended action: Reroute to avoid Comm Dead Zone
Area 3 Change to convoy path recommended
Activity in area:
Potential IED TOR: 1
Recommended action: Reroute to avoid Explosion
Area 4 Change to convoy path recommended
Activity in area:
Congested Area/Roadblock TOR: 1
Recommended action: Reroute to avoid Congested Area/Roadblock
Area 5 Change to convoy path recommended
Activity in area:
Gunfire/Sniper TOR: 2
Recommended action: Reroute to avoid Gunfire/Sniper
Area 6 Change to convoy path recommended
Activity in area:
Congested Area/Roadblock TOR: 1
Recommended action: Reroute to avoid Potential IED
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Experiment 2 Mission 2 RoboLeader Notifications:
Experiment 2 ART1:
All Areas
Change to convoy path recommended
Experiment 2 ART2:
Area 1 Change to convoy path recommended
Activity in area:
Dense Fog (H)
Gunfire/Sniper (M)
Congested Area/Roadblock (L)
Recommended action: Reroute to avoid Dense Fog
Area 2 Change to convoy path recommended
Activity in area:
Comm Dead Zone (H)
Dense Fog (M)
Potential IED (L)
Recommended action: Reroute to avoid Comm Dead Zone
Area 3 Change to convoy path recommended
Activity in area:
Potential IED (H)
Gunfire/Sniper (M)
Congested Area/Roadblock (M)
Recommended action: Reroute to avoid Explosion
Area 4 Change to convoy path recommended
Activity in area:
Congested Area/Roadblock (H)
Comm Dead Zone (M)
Dense Fog (L)
Recommended action: Reroute to avoid Congested Area/Roadblock
Area 5 Change to convoy path recommended
Activity in area:
Gunfire/Sniper (H)
Comm Dead Zone (M)
Congested Area/Roadblock (L)
Recommended action: Reroute to avoid Gunfire/Sniper
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Area 6 Change to convoy path recommended
Activity in area:
Congested Area/Roadblock (H)
Potential IED (L)
Comm Dead Zone (M)
Recommended action: Reroute to avoid Potential IED
Experiment 2 ART3:
Area 1 Change to convoy path recommended
Activity in area:
Dense Fog (H) TOR: 1
Gunfire/Sniper (M) TOR: 4
Congested Area/Roadblock (L) TOR: 2
Recommended action: Reroute to avoid Dense Fog
Area 2 Change to convoy path recommended
Activity in area:
Comm Dead Zone (H) TOR: 1
Dense Fog (M) TOR: 2
Potential IED (L) TOR: 4
Recommended action: Reroute to avoid Comm Dead Zone
Area 3 Change to convoy path recommended
Activity in area:
Potential IED (H) TOR: 1
Gunfire/Sniper (M) TOR: 3
Congested Area/Roadblock (M) TOR: 2
Recommended action: Reroute to avoid Explosion
Area 4 Change to convoy path recommended
Activity in area:
Congested Area/Roadblock (H) TOR: 1
Comm Dead Zone (M) TOR: 2
Dense Fog (L) TOR: 4
Recommended action: Reroute to avoid Congested Area/Roadblock
Area 5 Change to convoy path recommended
Activity in area:
Gunfire/Sniper (H) TOR: 2
Comm Dead Zone (M) TOR: 1
Congested Area/Roadblock (L) TOR: 6
Recommended action: Reroute to avoid Gunfire/Sniper
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Area 6 Change to convoy path recommended
Activity in area:
Congested Area/Roadblock (H) TOR: 1
Potential IED (L) TOR: 6
Comm Dead Zone (M) TOR: 3
Recommended action: Reroute to avoid Potential IED
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Experiment 1 Mission 3 RoboLeader Notifications:
Experiment 1 ART1:
All Areas:
Change to convoy path recommended
Experiment 1 ART2:
Area 1 Change to convoy path recommended
Activity in area:
Potential IED
Recommended action: Reroute to avoid Potential IED
Area 2 Change to convoy path recommended
Activity in area:
Dense Fog
Recommended action: Reroute to avoid Dense Fog
Area 3 Change to convoy path recommended
Activity in area:
Congested Area/Roadblock
Recommended action: Reroute to avoid Congested Area/Roadblock
Area 4 Change to convoy path recommended
Activity in area:
Comm Dead Zone
Recommended action: Reroute to avoid Comm Dead Zone
Area 5 Change to convoy path recommended
Activity in area:
Gunfire/Sniper
Recommended action: Reroute to avoid Gunfire/Sniper
Area 6 Change to convoy path recommended
Activity in area:
Congested Area/Roadblock
Recommended action: Reroute to avoid Congested Area/Roadblock
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Experiment 1 ART3:
Area 1 Change to convoy path recommended
Activity in area:
Potential IED TOR: 1
Recommended action: Reroute to avoid Potential IED
Area 2 Change to convoy path recommended
Activity in area:
Dense Fog TOR: 2
Recommended action: Reroute to avoid Dense Fog
Area 3 Change to convoy path recommended
Activity in area:
Congested Area/Roadblock TOR: 1
Recommended action: Reroute to avoid Congested Area/Roadblock
Area 4 Change to convoy path recommended
Activity in area:
Comm Dead Zone TOR: 3
Recommended action: Reroute to avoid Comm Dead Zone
Area 5 Change to convoy path recommended
Activity in area:
Gunfire/Sniper TOR: 1
Recommended action: Reroute to avoid Gunfire/Sniper
Area 6 Change to convoy path recommended
Activity in area:
Congested Area/Roadblock TOR: 1
Recommended action: Reroute to avoid Congested Area/Roadblock
Experiment 2 Mission 3 RoboLeader Notifications:
Experiment 2 ART1:
All Areas
Change to convoy path recommended
Experiment 2 ART2:
Area 1 Change to convoy path recommended
Activity in area:
Potential IED (H)
Congested Area/Roadblock (M)
Gunfire/Sniper (L)
Recommended action: Reroute to avoid Potential IED
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Area 2 Change to convoy path recommended
Activity in area:
Dense Fog (H)
Comm Dead Zone (M)
Potential IED (L)
Recommended action: Reroute to avoid Dense Fog
Area 3 Change to convoy path recommended
Activity in area:
Congested Area/Roadblock (H)
Gunfire/Sniper (L)
Dense Fog (M)
Recommended action: Reroute to avoid Congested Area/Roadblock
Area 4 Change to convoy path recommended
Activity in area:
Comm Dead Zone (H)
Gunfire/Sniper (M)
Dense Fog (L)
Recommended action: Reroute to avoid Comm Dead Zone
Area 5 Change to convoy path recommended
Activity in area:
Gunfire/Sniper (H)
Comm Dead Zone (M)
Congested Area/Roadblock (L)
Recommended action: Reroute to avoid Gunfire/Sniper
Area 6 Change to convoy path recommended
Activity in area:
Congested Area/Roadblock (H)
Potential IED (M)
Comm Dead Zone (L)
Recommended action: Reroute to avoid Congested Area/Roadblock

253

Experiment 2 ART3:
Area 1 Change to convoy path recommended
Activity in area:
Potential IED (H) TOR: 1
Congested Area/Roadblock (M) TOR: 4
Gunfire/Sniper (L) TOR: 2
Recommended action: Reroute to avoid Potential IED
Area 2 Change to convoy path recommended
Activity in area:
Dense Fog (H) TOR: 2
Comm Dead Zone (M) TOR: 1
Potential IED (L) TOR: 3
Recommended action: Reroute to avoid Dense Fog
Area 3 Change to convoy path recommended
Activity in area:
Congested Area/Roadblock (H) TOR: 1
Gunfire/Sniper (L) TOR: 3
Dense Fog (M) TOR: 4
Recommended action: Reroute to avoid Congested Area/Roadblock
Area 4 Change to convoy path recommended
Activity in area:
Comm Dead Zone (H) TOR: 3
Gunfire/Sniper (M) TOR: 1
Dense Fog (L) TOR: 2
Recommended action: Reroute to avoid Comm Dead Zone
Area 5 Change to convoy path recommended
Activity in area:
Gunfire/Sniper (H) TOR: 1
Comm Dead Zone (M) TOR: 2
Congested Area/Roadblock (L) TOR: 4
Recommended action: Reroute to avoid Gunfire/Sniper
Area 6 Change to convoy path recommended
Activity in area:
Congested Area/Roadblock (H) TOR: 1
Potential IED (M) TOR: 2
Comm Dead Zone (L) TOR: 3
Recommended action: Reroute to avoid Congested Area/Roadblock
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APPENDIX K:
SITUATION AWARENESS PROBES
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Situation awareness probes were common across all ART levels and both
experiments.
Level 1 – What is happening?
SA1 queries gauged how well the participant perceived information about the
experimental environment.
Mission 1
1. How many Dump trucks have you passed?
Answer: B. 2
A. 1
D. 4
B. 2
E. None
C. 3
2. What vehicle was positioned between the two walls?
Answer: E. Tank
A. Personnel Carrier
D. Dump Truck
B. Pickup Truck
E. Tank
C. Fuel Truck
3. What vehicle/object of interest did you just pass?
Answer: B. Garbage Truck
A. Personnel Carrier
D. Dump Truck
B. Garbage Truck
E. Propane Tank
C. Fuel Truck
4. You have just passed a person standing behind the wall. Identify them.
Answer: A. Male Civilian
A. Male Civilian
D. Armed Civilian
B. Female Civilian
E. None
C. US Military
5. Who was standing next to the Dump truck you just passed?
Answer: D. 1 Male & 1 Female Civilian
A. 1 Male Civilian
D. 1 Male & 1 Female Civilian
B. 1 Female Civilian
E. None
C. 2 Male Civilians
6. What object/vehicle of interest was next to the Garbage Truck you just passed?
Answer: C. Fuel Truck
A. Personnel Carrier
D. Dump Truck
B. Garbage Truck
E. Propane Tank
C. Fuel Truck
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Mission 2
1. Who was standing next to the Dump truck you just passed?
Answer: C. 2 Male Civilians
A. 1 Male Civilian
D. 1 Male & 1 Female Civilian
B. 1 Female Civilian
E. None
C. 2 Male Civilians
2. How many U.S. Military were standing by the Garbage truck?
Answer: C. 3
A. 1
D. 4
B. 2
E. None
C. 3
3. What vehicle/object of interest did you just pass?
Answer: C. Fuel Truck
A. Personnel Carrier
D. Dump Truck
B. Garbage Truck
E. Propane Tank
C. Fuel Truck
4. How many destroyed vehicles were near the Dump truck?
Answer: A. 1
A. 1
D. 4
B. 2
E. None
C. 3
5. What vehicle/object of interest was near the Propane Tank that you just passed?
Answer: C. Fuel Truck
A. Personnel Carrier
D. Dump Truck
B. Garbage Truck
E. Propane Tank
C. Fuel Truck
6. What was behind the wall that you just passed?
Answer: B. Propane Tank
A. Pickup Truck
D. Tank
B. Propane Tank
E. Dump Truck
C. Fuel Truck
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Mission 3
1. How many Propane Tanks have you passed?
Answer: B. 2
A. 1
D. 4
B. 2
E. None
C. 3
2. Who was standing next to the Dump truck you just passed?
Answer: D. 3 Male Civilians
A. 1 Male Civilian
D. 3 Male Civilians
B. 1 Female Civilian
E. None
C. 2 Male Civilians
3. Since your last route selection, how many Dump Trucks have you passed?
Answer: B. 2
A. 1
D. 4
B. 2
E. None
C. 3
4. How many U.S. Military were standing by the Personnel Carrier?
Answer: D. 4
A. 1
D. 4
B. 2
E. None
C. 3
5. What was behind the wall that you just passed?
Answer: D. Dump Truck
A. Personnel Carrier
D. Dump Truck
B. Garbage Truck
E. Propane Tank
C. Fuel Truck
6. Who was standing next to the Personnel Carrier you just passed?
Answer: C. 2 Male Civilians
A. 1 Male Civilian
D. 2 Female Civilians
B. 1 Female Civilian
E. None
C. 2 Male Civilians
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Level 2 – Why is it happening?
SA2 Queries evaluated how well the participant was integrating information from
multiple sources in their decision-making. These questions appeared shortly after the SA3
queries. Each mission contained 6 SA2 queries.
Mission 1
Area 1
Both Paths:
Bravo unit - Why are you on your current route? (Select all that apply)
A. Avoid Congested Area/Roadblock
B. Avoid Comm Dead Zone
C. Avoid Dense Fog
D. Avoid Potential IED
E. Route Clear
Area 2
Both Paths:
Bravo unit - Why are you on your current route? (Select all that apply)
A. Avoid Congested Area/Roadblock
B. Avoid Comm Dead Zone
C. Avoid Gunfire/Sniper
D. Avoid Potential IED
E. Main path Clear (or Proposed path clear)
Area 3
Both Paths:
Bravo unit - Why are you on your current route? (Select all that apply)
A. Avoid Congested Area/Roadblock
B. Avoid Comm Dead Zone
C. Avoid Dense Fog
D. Avoid Potential IED
E. Main path Clear (or Proposed path clear)
Area 4
Both Paths:
Bravo unit - Why are you on your current route? (Select all that apply)
A. Avoid Congested Area/Roadblock
B. Avoid Gunfire/Sniper
C. Avoid Dense Fog
D. Avoid Potential IED
E. Main path Clear (or Proposed path clear)
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Area 5
Both Paths:
Bravo unit - Why are you on your current route? (Select all that apply)
A. Avoid Congested Area/Roadblock
B. Avoid Comm Dead Zone
C. Avoid Dense Fog
D. Avoid Potential IED
E. Main path Clear (or Proposed path clear)
Area 6
Both Paths:
Bravo unit - Why are you on your current route? (Select all that apply)
A. Avoid Congested Area/Roadblock
B. Avoid Gunfire/Sniper
C. Avoid Dense Fog
D. Avoid Potential IED
E. Main path Clear (or Proposed path clear)
Mission 2
Area 1
Both Paths:
Bravo unit - Why are you on your current route? (Select all that apply)
A. Avoid Congested Area/Roadblock
B. Avoid Comm Dead Zone
C. Avoid Dense Fog
D. Avoid Gunfire/Sniper
E. Main Path Clear (or Proposed Path Clear)
Area 2
Both Paths:
Bravo unit - Why are you on your current route? (Select all that apply)
A. Avoid Congested Area/Roadblock
B. Avoid Comm Dead Zone
C. Avoid Dense Fog
D. Avoid Potential IED
E. Main Path Clear (or Proposed Path Clear)
Area 3
Both Paths:
Bravo unit - Why are you on your current route? (Select all that apply)
A. Avoid Congested Area/Roadblock
B. Avoid Comm Dead Zone
C. Avoid Potential IED
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D. Avoid Gunfire/Sniper
E. Main Path Clear (or Proposed Path Clear)
Area 4
Both Paths:
Bravo unit - Why are you on your current route? (Select all that apply)
A. Avoid Congested Area/Roadblock
B. Avoid Comm Dead Zone
C. Avoid Dense Fog
D. Avoid Gunfire/Sniper
E. Main Path Clear (or Proposed Path Clear)
Area 5
Both Paths:
Bravo unit - Why are you on your current route? (Select all that apply)
A. Avoid Congested Area/Roadblock
B. Avoid Comm Dead Zone
C. Avoid Dense Fog
D. Avoid Gunfire/Sniper
E. Main Path Clear (or Proposed Path Clear)
Area 6
Both Paths:
Bravo unit - Why are you on your current route? (Select all that apply)
A. Avoid Congested Area/Roadblock
B. Avoid Comm Dead Zone
C. Avoid Dense Fog
D. Avoid Potential IED
E. Main Path Clear (or Proposed Path Clear)

Mission 3
Area 1
Both Paths:
Bravo unit - Why are you on your current route? (Select all that apply)
F. Avoid Congested Area/Roadblock
G. Avoid Potential IED
H. Avoid Dense Fog
I. Avoid Gunfire/Sniper
J. Main Path Clear (or Proposed Path Clear)
Area 2
Both Paths:
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Bravo unit - Why are you on your current route? (Select all that apply)
A. Avoid Congested Area/Roadblock
B. Avoid Comm Dead Zone
C. Avoid Dense Fog
D. Avoid Potential IED
E. Main Path Clear (or Proposed Path Clear)
Area 3
Both Paths:
Bravo unit - Why are you on your current route? (Select all that apply)
A. Avoid Congested Area/Roadblock
B. Avoid Comm Dead Zone
C. Avoid Dense Fog
D. Avoid Gunfire/Sniper
E. Main Path Clear (or Proposed Path Clear)
Area 4
Both Paths:
Bravo unit - Why are you on your current route? (Select all that apply)
A. Avoid Congested Area/Roadblock
B. Avoid Comm Dead Zone
C. Avoid Dense Fog
D. Avoid Gunfire/Sniper
E. Main Path Clear (or Proposed Path Clear)
Area 5
Both Paths:
Bravo unit - Why are you on your current route? (Select all that apply)
A. Avoid Congested Area/Roadblock
B. Avoid Comm Dead Zone
C. Avoid Dense Fog
D. Avoid Gunfire/Sniper
E. Main Path Clear (or Proposed Path Clear)
Area 6
Both Paths:
Bravo unit - Why are you on your current route? (Select all that apply)
A. Avoid Congested Area/Roadblock
B. Avoid Comm Dead Zone
C. Avoid Dense Fog
D. Avoid Potential IED
E. Main Path Clear (or Proposed Path Clear)
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Level 3 – What will happen?

SA3 Queries evaluated how well the participant could predict the consequences of
their chosen action. This question was asked immediately after passing every decision
point, regardless of route selection. There were 6 SA3 queries in each mission.
Bravo unit Please evaluate how safe your current route will be.
A – Completely Safe
C – Relatively Unsafe
B – Relatively Safe
D – Completely Unsafe
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APPENDIX L:
COMMAND COMMUNICATIONS
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Messages from command were the same in both experiments and across ARTs, but
unique for each Mission. Messages were both informative notifications (i.e., All Units),
and ‘chatter’ that was included to create noise and keep the rate of incoming messages near
one message (from all sources) every 30 seconds. The following lists are in order of
appearance.
Mission 1 Script/Messages

Area 1 MP (Main Path)
1.
Echo Unit: Report Status
2.
All Units: Accident Reported in Sector D9
3.
SA1 Prompt 1
4.
RB prompt
5.
SA3 Prompt 1
6.
Alpha Unit Report Status
7.
SA2 prompt 1
Area 1 PP (Proposed Path)
8.
SA3 Prompt
9.
Alpha Unit: Report status
10. Victor Unit: Rally at Checkpoint
11. All Units: Gunman subdued, All Clear Sector
12. All Units: Dense Fog Reported - Sector C7
13. Charlie Unit: Return to Base
14. SA 2 prompt
Area 2 MP
15. SA1 prompt
16. All Units: Gunfire reported Sector C9
17. RB prompt
18. SA3 prompt
19. All Units: Communications Down Sector D5
20. Echo Unit: Report Status
21. All Units: Sector C7 – Fog Cleared
22. Alpha Unit: Report Status
23. SA2 prompt
Area 2 PP
24. SA3 prompt
25. All Units: Communications Down Sector D5
26. SA2 prompt
Area 3 MP
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27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

SA1 prompt
All Units: Crowd dispersed All Clear Sector C9
RB prompt
SA3 Prompt
All Units: Suspicious Activity: Large Congregation Sector B4
SA2 Prompt

Area 3 PP
33. SA3 Prompt
34. All Units: Suspicious Activity: Large Congregation Sector B4
35. Charlie Unit: Recon Sector B4 and Report
36. Lima Unit: Rendezvous Sierra Unit Sector E11
37. All Units: All Clear Sector E9
38. SA2 Prompt
Area 4 MP
39. SA1 Prompt
40. Echo Unit: Report Status
41. All Units: Explosion reported Sector B7
42. SA1 Prompt
43. RB Prompt
44. SA3 Prompt
45. All Units: Communications restored Sector B6
46. SA2 Prompt
Area 4 PP
47. SA3 Prompt
48. Alpha Unit: Report Status
49. Delta Unit: Recon Sector D4 and Report
50. Zulu Unit: Report Status
51. Echo Unit: Return to Base
52. All Units: Communications restored Sector B6
53. SA2 Prompt
Area 5 MP
54. RB Prompt
55. SA3 Prompt
56. All Units, Dense Fog Reported Sector C6
57. SA2 Prompt
Area 5 PP
58. SA3 Prompt
59. Sierra Unit: Report to Rally Point
60. Lima Unit: Report Status
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61.
62.

All Units, Dense Fog Reported Sector C6
SA2 Prompt

Area 6 MP
63. RB Prompt
64. SA3 Prompt
65. All Units: Accident/Road Blocked Sector C9
66. SA1 Prompt
67. All Units: IED Cleared All Clear Sector D7
68. SA2 Prompt
Area 6 PP
69. SA3 Prompt
70. Charlie Unit: Report Status
71. All Units: Accident/Road Blocked Sector C9
72. SA1 Prompt
73. Lima Unit: Return to Base
74. All Units: IED Cleared All Clear Sector D7
75. SA2 Prompt

Mission 2 Script/Messages
Area 1 MP
1.
Alpha Unit: Report status
2.
Victor Unit: Rally at Checkpoint
3.
All Units: Dense Fog Reported Sector D2
4.
SA1 Prompt
5.
RB Prompt
6.
SA3 Prompt
7.
All Units: Communications Down Sector E5
8.
Charlie Unit: Return to Base
9.
Echo Unit: Report Status
10.
Victor Unit: Rally at Checkpoint
11.
All Units: Road Clear Sector C6
12.
SA2 prompt
Area 1 PP
13.
SA3 Prompt
14.
All Units: Communications Down Sector E5
15.
Charlie Unit: Return to Base
16.
Echo Unit: Report Status
17.
Victor Unit: Rally at Checkpoint
18.
All Units: Road Clear Sector C6
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19.

SA 2 prompt

Area 2 MP
20.
Echo Unit: Report Status
21.
All Units: Fog Clear Sector C7
22.
SA1 prompt
23.
Alpha Unit: Report Status
24.
All Units: Gunfire reported Sector B4
25.
Delta Unit: Return to Base
26.
RB prompt
27.
SA3 prompt
28.
Zulu Unit: Proceed to Rally Point
29.
SA2 prompt
Area 2 PP
30.
SA3 prompt
31.
Zulu Unit: Proceed to Rally Point
32.
Charlie Unit: Recon Sector B4 and Report
33.
Lima Unit: Rendezvous Sierra Unit Sector E11
34.
All Units: All Clear Sector E9
35.
SA2 prompt
Area 3 MP
36.
Delta Unit: Recon Sector D4 and Report
37.
Zulu Unit: Report Status
38.
SA1 prompt
39.
Echo Unit: Return to Base
40.
All Units: Explosion Reported Sector C5
41.
Sierra Unit: Report Status
42.
RB prompt
43.
SA3 Prompt
44.
All Units: Suspicious Activity: Large Congregation Sector D4
45.
Echo Unit: Report Status
46.
All Units: Sector C7 – Fog Cleared
47.
Alpha Unit: Report Status
48.
Victor Unit: Rally at Checkpoint
49.
All Units: Accident/Road Blocked Sector E6
50.
Tango Unit: Recon Sector D6 and Report
51.
SA2 Prompt
52.
RB Prompt (for Area 4)
Area 3 PP
53.
SA3 Prompt
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54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

All Units: Suspicious Activity: Large Congregation Sector D4
Echo Unit: Report Status
All Units: Sector C7 – Fog Cleared
Alpha Unit: Report Status
Victor Unit: Rally at Checkpoint
All Units: Accident/Road Blocked Sector E6
Tango Unit: Recon Sector D6 and Report
SA2 Prompt
RB Prompt (for Area 4)

Area 4 MP
63.
SA3 prompt
64.
Sierra Unit: Report to Rally Point
65.
All Units: All Clear Sector B11
66.
All Units: High Wind Reported Sector D3
67.
Victor Unit: Report Status
68.
Lima Unit: Return to Base
69.
All Units: Communications restored Sector B6
70.
SA2 Prompt
Area 4 PP
71.
SA3 Prompt
72.
Sierra Unit: Report to Rally Point
73.
Victor Unit: Report Status
74.
All Units: Communications restored Sector B6
75.
SA2 Prompt
Area 5 MP
76.
Echo Unit: Report Status
77.
SA1 Prompt
78.
All Units: Gunfire Reported Sector E3
79.
Lima Unit: Rendezvous Sierra Unit Sector C2
80.
Tango Unit: Report Status
81.
RB Prompt
82.
SA3 Prompt
83.
Sierra Unit: Report Status
84.
Charlie Unit: Report Status
85.
All Units: Dense Fog Sector B6
86.
SA2 Prompt
Area 5 PP
87.
SA3 Prompt
88.
Sierra Unit: Report Status
89.
Charlie Unit: Report Status
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90.
91.

All Units: Dense Fog Sector B6
SA2 Prompt

Area 6 MP
92.
SA1 Prompt
93.
All Units: Congestion Cleared Sector D4
94.
RB Prompt
95.
SA3 Prompt
96.
All Units: All Clear Sector D7
97.
Charlie Unit: Return to Base
98.
Lima Unit: Report to Rally Point
99.
SA2 Prompt
Area 6 PP
100. SA3 Prompt
101. All Units: All Clear Sector D7
102. Charlie Unit: Return to Base
103. Lima Unit: Report to Rally Point
104. SA2 Prompt

Mission 3 Script/Messages
Area 1 MP
1.
Alpha Unit: Report status
2.
All Units: Explosion Reported in Sector C10
3.
RB prompt
4.
SA3 Prompt
5.
Alpha Unit Report Status
6.
SA2 prompt
Area 1 PP
7.
SA3 Prompt
8.
Alpha Unit: Report status
9.
All Units: Dense Fog Reported Sector C7
10.
Victor Unit: Rally at Checkpoint
11.
All Units: Road Clear Sector C6
12.
Charlie Unit: Return to Base
13.
SA 2 prompt
Area 2 MP
14.
SA1 prompt
15.
All Units: Wind Calm All Clear Sector D9
16.
RB prompt
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17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

SA3 prompt
Lima Unit: Rendezvous Sierra Unit Sector E11
Echo Unit: Report Status
All Units: Fog Cleared All Clear Sector C7
Alpha Unit: Report Status
SA2 prompt

Area 2 PP
23.
SA3 prompt
24.
Lima Unit: Rendezvous Sierra Unit Sector E11
25.
Echo Unit: Report Status
26.
All Units: Fog Cleared All Clear Sector C7
27.
Alpha Unit: Report Status
28.
SA2 prompt
Area 3 MP
29.
SA1 prompt
30.
Charlie Unit: Return to Base
31.
Lima Unit: Report to Rally Point
32.
All Units: Accident Reported in Sector D9
33.
SA1 Prompt
34.
RB prompt (Area 3)
35.
SA3 Prompt
36.
Delta Unit: Recon Sector D4 and Report
37.
SA1 Prompt
38.
All Units: Communications restored Sector C6
39.
SA2 Prompt
40.
RB prompt (Area 4)
Area 3 PP
41.
SA3 Prompt
42.
Delta Unit: Recon Sector D4 and Report
43.
SA1 Prompt
44.
All Units: Communications restored Sector C6
45.
SA2 Prompt
46.
RB prompt (Area 4)
Area 4 MP
47.
SA3 Prompt
48.
Sierra Unit: Report to Rally Point
49.
Lima Unit: Report Status
50.
All Units: Gunfire Reported Sector D5
51.
SA2 Prompt
52.
RB prompt (Area 5)
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Area 4 PP
53.
SA3 Prompt
54.
All Units: IED Cleared All Clear Sector D7
55.
Tango Unit: Recon Sector D6 and Report
56.
Sierra Unit: Report to Rally Point
57.
Lima Unit: Report Status
58.
All Units: Gunfire Reported Sector D5
59.
SA2 Prompt
60.
RB prompt (Area 5)
Area 5 MP
61.
SA3 Prompt
62.
All Units, Dense Fog Reported Sector C6
63.
SA2 Prompt
Area 5 PP
64.
SA3 Prompt
65.
Delta Unit: Recon Sector D4 and Report
66.
Zulu Unit: Report Status
67.
Echo Unit: Return to Base
68.
All Units, Dense Fog Reported Sector C6
69.
SA2 Prompt
Area 6 MP
70.
Zulu Unit: Proceed to Rally Point
71.
SA1 Prompt
72.
Lima Unit: Rendezvous Sierra Unit Sector E11
73.
All Units: Accident Reported in Sector E6
74.
RB Prompt
75.
SA3 Prompt
76.
Charlie Unit: Recon Sector B4 and Report
77.
All Units: IED Cleared All Clear Sector E10
78.
SA2 Prompt
Area 6 PP
79.
SA3 Prompt
80.
Charlie Unit: Recon Sector B4 and Report
81.
All Units: Accident/Road Blocked Sector C9
82.
Lima Unit: Return to Base
83.
All Units: IED Cleared All Clear Sector E10
84.
SA2 Prompt
85.
Echo Unit: Report Status
86.
SA1 prompt
87.
All Units: Road Cleared Sector C9
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UCF IRB APPROVAL OF HUMAN RESEARCH
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APPENDIX N:
TRAINING MATERIALS
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Experiment 1 Training Slides
Slides are common across ARTs unless otherwise noted.
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The following slides in the section “Route Supervision,” parts a and b, vary according to
Agent Reasoning Transparency (ART) level.
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Route Supervision training slides, ART 3

Route Supervision training slides, ART 2
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Route Supervision training slides, ART 1
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The following slides are common to all ART levels.
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Experiment 2 Training Slides
Slides are common across ARTs unless otherwise noted.
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The following slides in the section “Route Supervision,” parts a and b, vary
according to Agent Reasoning Transparency (ART) level.
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Route Supervision training slides, ART 3
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Route Supervision training slides, ART 2

Route Supervision training slides, ART 1
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The following slides are common to all ART levels.
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